Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1999, pages 26, 137

Islam and the Middle East in the Far East

Indonesia’s Elections Point Toward Transfer of Power to Sukarnoputri Party in Coalition With Islamists

By John Gee

After 44 years in which there had not been any genuinely democratic elections, Indonesia went to the polls on June 7. Unconfirmed final results available as the Washington Report went to press showed the outcome was broadly consistent with pre-election forecasts by opinion-polling organizations. Although 48 parties contested the election, the great majority of the 462 seats contested were taken by five major parties.

In the lead by far was the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia’s late first president, the charismatic Ahmed Sukarno. It secured 35,687,071 of the 105,786,630 valid votes, giving it 154 seats in the 500-member parliament.

The PDI faction encouraged to break away by the ruling Suharto regime during a split in 1993 failed to win a single seat. As anticipated, the PDI-P achieved its strongest showing in the densely populated heartland of Indonesia on the island of Java. In the country’s capital, Jakarta, the PDI-P received four times the vote of Golkar, its leading rival at the national level.

However, this concentration of strength in Java did not work to the PDI-P’s advantage. Representation in the Indonesian parliament is weighted in favor of the outlying provinces, where Golkar, the former ruling party headed by President B.J. Habibie, performed well. Golkar’s best showing was in Sulawesi (the Celebes) and Kalimantan (Borneo), far from the heavily populated core regions of the Indonesian state. As a result, although Golkar trailed behind the PDI-P with 23,732,749 votes, it won 120 seats—about five more than its share of the popular vote would have netted for it under a national system of proportional representation.

The other major winners were three parties which call for a stronger role for Islam in Indonesia. The PKB (National Awakening Party) took 51 seats, the PPP (United Development Party) 39 and PAN (National Mandate Party) secured 35.

The PPP had sought to put its history of collaboration with the Suharto regime behind it. The result indicates that it was fairly successful in doing so. Skeptical observers suggest, however, that it will ally itself with Golkar in the new parliament, if only informally. It won the largest vote in the Aceh area of northern Sumatra, where Islam is a particularly powerful force and where there is a persistent secessionist movement which opposed the PPP’s election campaign.

Although the result still has to be made official, the final outcome is clear. The three-party electoral alliance of the PDI-P, PKB and PAN has won a parliamentary majority.

Indonesia desperately needs a period of stable government.

The PDI-P is in a strong position, with one third of the votes and almost as many seats as Golkar and PPP combined, but will nevertheless have to do some hard bargaining in order to put together a governing coalition, given the differences in policy objectives between it and its potential partners.

Golkar has reason to be pleased with its result, however, given that its standing was severely compromised by its record of tame support for ex-President Suharto. In an election campaign which was relatively free from violence, public rallies by Golkar were the most likely to spark conflict, but they were generally low-key affairs which did not bring out the numbers onto the streets which the PDI-P could manage. Much of the center of Jakarta became a sea of red when Megawati’s supporters turned out wearing T-shirts in the party color and waving flags. It was very clear that, at least in Java, her party could count upon massive popular support.

Against that, Golkar made use of the resources it had built up during the years after it became entrenched in the machinery of administration. It retained the largest party organization and had more money than its rivals, who accused Golkar of paying people to attend its rallies. In some areas, the party was alleged to have extended loans to farmers which they were told would be written off if their region voted Golkar, but which they would have to repay if it lost. Lastly, many people did benefit from their association with Golkar and wish to see it continue to hold power.

Golkar did not expect to win an outright majority, but hoped that it could pick up enough support to make itself an indispensable coalition partner and to retain a serious chance of taking the presidency. The party hopes to be able to count upon the votes of the 38 army nominees in parliament, as well as many of the 200 non-governmental representatives who will join with MPs in November to form the People’s Consultative Assembly, which elects the president.

The head of the Golkar-leaning PPP and some other Muslim leaders have declared that only a man could lead Indonesia—a very obvious attack on Megawati. However, the two largest Muslim organizations in the country subsequently issued statements saying that a woman could lead Indonesia. Abdurrahman Wahid, chair of Nahdlatul Ulama and founder of the Islamist PKB, declared that his 40-million-strong movement would support Megawati’s presidential bid.

Much depends upon how successfully the PDI-P courts the army leadership and builds alliances. In a bid for army backing, it has already indicated to Chief of Staff General Wiranto that it is prepared to make him vice president to Megawati Sukarnoputri, but Wiranto seems content to keep both PDI-P and Golkar guessing at his intentions for the moment.

Indonesia is grappling with high unemployment, debt, divisions among its nationalities and the issue of the future of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony in contrast to the rest of Indonesia, which was under Dutch control until the four-year occupation by Japan during World War II. Indonesia now desperately needs a period of stable government during which much-needed reforms can be introduced and its transition to democracy consolidated.

Relations with Israel?

A leading aide to Megawati Sukarnoputri, head of the PDI-P, has told the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz of his expectation that Israel and Indonesia will establish diplomatic relations within the next few years, according to a June 8 Ha’aretz article.

PDI-P’s Subagyo Anam told foreign news editor Adar Primor, “We have no prejudices against Israel. On the contrary. Many of our people admire Israel and Israelis. We want to improve relations between Israel and the Arab nations in order to bring prosperity to the entire region. It is up to you to solve the problems in the Middle East, but I believe the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Indonesia is only a matter of time. I expect to see ties established in the coming years.”

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have long had friendly ties with the PLO as a matter of political conviction, while Singapore and Thailand have had diplomatic relations and strong commercial links with Israel. However, the three predominantly Muslim states of the region—Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia—have supported the position taken by the Islamic Conference Organization on the Palestine question. Their official view has been that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel depends upon a resolution of the conflict over Palestine, and like all Muslim nations they have consistently supported the Palestinians in the United Nations.

Nevertheless, there were signs of a shift in the Indonesian position following the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in September 1993. The following month, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Jakarta as the guest of President Suharto.

The latter said at the time that he was hosting Rabin in Suharto’s capacity as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. The two met again at the United Nations in 1995, just before Rabin’s assassination.

The election of Binyamin Netanyahu as Israel’s hawkish prime minister brought the development of official relations to a halt, although Israeli businesspeople quietly went on with their work, more troubled by the turbulence surrounding the downfall of Suharto than the lack of relations between the two countries.

Ehud Barak’s victory in the Israeli general election reopens the way to the establishment of closer relations between Israel and Indonesia, but how fast Indonesia chooses to move depends not only upon events in the Middle East, but also upon the final political composition of the incoming Indonesian government.

The Muslim political parties in the new parliament are more critical of Israel than the PDI-P, and will carry enough weight to check any moves toward the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two states before substantial progress toward a resolution of the Palestine issue has been made. While some of the Indonesian Muslim leaders are critical of the arrangements being worked out between the PLO and Israel, Indonesia, like the other two Muslim states in Southeast Asia, eventually will base its assessment of relations with Israel on its progress toward peace with the Palestinian Authority. A final PA-Israel agreement would be followed by the normalization of Israel-Indonesia relations.

More English in Singapore Mosques

The great majority of Muslims in Singapore are Malays, although there are significant minorities of Arabs and Tamils. Their proportions are roughly reflected in the languages customarily used in Friday prayer sermons in the island republic’s 72 mosques.

In fact, many young Malays are predominantly English-speaking. Although the government of Singapore wishes to encourage its diverse population to be fluent in their respective “mother tongues,” English has served as a common language among them. Its position is reinforced by its use as an international language of commerce, as well as by its global cultural pre-eminence.

Six mosques have for some time provided Friday prayer sermons in English, and the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore decided in June to make the sermons available at 16 more mosques. Each week, they will be provided at six or seven of the 16 on a three-month experimental basis, after which the Council will review the response from the Muslim public.

John Gee is a free-lance reporter based in Singapore.