Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1998, pages 55-56, 62

The Ostrovsky Files

What Israel’s Top-Secret Manbar Trial Reveals About Extensive, Ongoing Israeli Arms Dealing With Iran

By Victor Ostrovsky

On March 27, 1997, the Israeli General Security Service (GSS)—or as it is known in Israel, Shabak—had the police arrest Nahum Manbar, an Israeli millionaire arms dealer, on one of his frequent visits to Israel from his new home in Switzerland. Manbar, a former kibbutz member, emigrated from Israel in 1985. After 15 days in custody, his family was notified of his arrest and, several days after that he was allowed to speak to a lawyer.

Manbar was lucky, in a way. Others arrested for alleged crimes against the security of Israel have disappeared for many years without anyone knowing what became of them. Dr. Marcus Klingberg, a scientist working at the biological weapons testing lab in Nes-Tsiona, disappeared for 10 years before it was revealed that he had been arrested for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. Klingberg was sentenced to life in prison.

An army major, Yosef Amit, vanished for six years before it was learned that he had been arrested and tried for “considering espionage” for the United States. (The man never actually spied.)

At this time there are several dozen others still rotting away in various prisons in Israel under the marking “Mr. X.” (Which is why Israel’s top security prisoners are nicknamed “the ex’s.”) In fact, a security prisoner in Israel cannot select just any lawyer to represent him. He must choose from a small pool of lawyers who have the proper security clearance. This, on its face, makes the lawyers’ loyalty to their clients questionable.

In addition, most of the trial is behind closed doors. Judges may, and do, order defendants and their lawyers out of the courtroom during some parts of their trials. There are no jurors, and some testimony given in trials is regularly kept secret from the defendants.

When, two months after Manbar’s arrest, prosecutors made it public, they launched one of the most bizarre espionage cases of the post-Cold War era. On July 14, 1998, 16 months after his arrest, the judges sentenced Manbar to 16 years imprisonment.

According to Israeli media accounts, stilted because of censorship and “official sources,” an Israeli expatriate sold to the Iranians, through a company in China, supplies and equipment for the manufacture of chemical weapons. It was also reported that the expatriate had an on-going relationship with Iranian officials in which he provided them with information and material needed for Iranian programs to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Israeli officials made it clear that Manbar had been under surveillance for some time. It was also revealed that during one such surveillance operation, in Vienna in 1993, two Mossad agents were killed in a motorcycle accident. It was said that because of the two deaths, the then-head of Mossad, Shabtai Shahavit, vowed to bring Manbar to justice in Israel.

While news of the arrest and trial of the “horrific traitor” was being splashed across the front pages of Israeli newspapers, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was busy spreading a new batch of rumors. His office alleged that Manbar’s dirty dealings were well known to previous Israeli Labor governments. It was alleged that Netanyahu’s predecessors, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, lacked the courage and the conviction to bring Manbar to justice.

Netanyahu’s henchmen also charged that the reason for this was Manbar’s generosity toward the Labor Party’s campaign coffers. This accusation, however, was proven false, providing another example of Netanyahu’s tendency to make statements he can’t prove, but then move on to new charges rather than admit he was wrong.

In this case, Netanyahu went on to boast that he had insisted the traitor be punished to the maximum extent of the law. This would in itself have been a violation of the law, as it is illegal in Israel for an official to voice his opinion while a trial is in progress, as his remarks might influence the outcome.

As the trial was drawing to an end, Manbar’s defense lawyer, Amnon Zichrony,¹ a high-profile attorney who also defended Mordechai Vanunu, asked that the presiding judge in the case, Amnon Shtrasnov, remove himself because of conflict of interest. Zichrony accused the judge of having had an affair during the trial with Pninat Yanai, a 25-year-old junior lawyer whom Zichrony had fired from Manbar’s defense team.

The judge, a former chief military prosecutor, denied the charge and refused to recuse himself. Instead, the trial proceeded and the accused was found guilty as charged.

In a pre-sentencing hearing, the former head of Mossad, Shabtai Shahavit, stated that Manbar’s case was the worst crime against the state of Israel that he could remember in his entire career. The government prosecutor, in turn, stated that this case was one of the most hideous crimes in the history of the state of Israel. The prosecutor then requested the harshest penalty available to the courts, which is life in prison, instead of the 16-year sentence Manbar received. So, beyond the press leaks and politics, what really happened?

Nahum Manbar was well connected to the Israeli military establishment. Over the years he had been directly involved in countless weapons and military materiel deals, and had set up many others for various Israeli companies. He had sold various items and equipment to Iran over the years, and had good business relationships with officials in Iran and in other Third World countries. During the period for which he is accused of treason—1990 to 1994—he is said to have sold the Iranians 150 tons of taiyonil chloride, a chemical that can be used for the manufacture of mustard gas.

This chemical is readily available to anyone, however, as it has civilian applications. In addition, Manbar is accused of entering into an agreement to build a factory that could manufacture various poison gases and another factory to make bombshells that could be loaded with such chemicals—a deal that fell through.

During that period one of Manbar’s top associates—who was his liaison to the Israeli military establishment—was retired Israeli Brig. Gen. Amos Kotzev. His name was kept out of the trial and, when he testified against Manbar, he was referred to only as R.

In addition to his well-connected partner, Manbar also had a GSS handler, code-named “Dan.” Dan would brief Manbar before every meeting he had with Iranians, and debrief Manbar afterward. The GSS handler, now about to be appointed head of the GSS special investigations branch, testified in the trial that Manbar did not pass on all the information he acquired in his dealings with Iranians, and that he tried to make some deals on his own.

To put matters in perspective, one must remember that all of this took place while Manbar was creating links for other Israeli industries with Iran. More than 100 different Israeli companies said to be dealing or seeking to deal with Iran were named in reports concerning the case. These deals were not allowed to be brought up in the trial, however, because of a gag order placed on this material by the office of the prime minister. Such deals, although they break the embargo the U.S. placed on Iran at Israel’s behest, are still active, and all of the deliveries and payments they involve are said to remain on schedule.

For example, my sources tell me that most of Manbar’s dealings with Iran were made through Europol, a company he owns based in Poland. In fact, most of the Israeli dealings with Iran are made through a third country, and Poland is usually the one used.

Manbar’s business manager, an unnamed Israeli living outside of London, was involved in one of the first deals Manbar made with the Iranians. It involved the sale of 30 Soviet-made surface-to-air (SA-7) missiles, from the Polish army’s arsenal. This deal was made with the knowledge and approval of the Israeli defense establishment and was worth $100,000. The Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon have missiles of this model.

A $100 Million Deal

Europol further sold Iran 50 Soviet-made tanks (T55s and T72s) also from Polish stocks. The tanks were equipped with advanced electronics by the Israeli company EL-OP. Polish specialists flew to Israel to inspect and receive training on the installation procedure and then flew to Iran through Cyprus. The deal is estimated at $100 million.

General Kotzer, Manbar’s business manager in Israel, proposed that the Iranians buy the Soviet tanks Israel had captured in the Six-Day War of 1967 from the Syrians and the Egyptians. The deal did not materialize.

In addition, Manbar sold the Iranians 22 trucks specially equipped for chemical warfare. The trucks were from the Israeli air force. The value of that deal is estimated at $200,000.

The Israeli gas mask manufacturer Shalon, from Kiryat Gat, was in the final stages of a deal, brokered by Manbar and approved by the Israeli government, to build a factory in Iran for gas masks.

Manbar arranged for several meetings between Elbit representatives Gai Brill and Gad Barsella and the head of Iran’s missile program, a Dr. Abusfair, the head of Department 105 in the Iranian Ministry of Defense. The meetings were known to Elbit’s president, Emanuel Gill, and were approved by the director of the Israeli defense department, David Ivry.

As the details of these embargo-breaking, profit-making Israeli deals with Iran leaked out, most Israelis were even more titillated by the apparent exploits of the young lawyer in Mr. Zichrany’s office, the 25-year-old Ms. Yanai, whom Zichrany accused of having had an affair with Judge Shtrasnov. She had also worked for Rehavam Zeevy, leader of the extreme right-wing Modedet² Party, a job she got on the recommendation of Shay Bezek, a former spokesman for Moledet who subsequently became the spokesman for Prime Minister Netanyahu.

In addition to whatever she did or did not do with the judge while working for Zichrony’s office on Manbar’s defense, she had a relationship—said to be intimate—with the GSS officer, “Dan,” who was investigating the case. That was in addition to still another alleged relationship she had with Shay Bezek, who was forced to resign from his position with Netanyahu because of it. (He now is under consideration for an assignment to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC, where he may find the ambiance more congenial.)

But all that just added spice to the journalistic treatment of a secret trial that should have raised serious questions about Israeli-Iran relationships, and the morality of America’s so-called “strategic ally” in the Middle East. For example, when is it legitimate to deal with Iran and when is it not?

Is it legitimate for Israel’s Elbit Company to enter into a deal with official Iranians in Vienna—approved by the Israeli Defense Ministry—to sell the Iranians equipment for battlefield identification of lethal gases?

Is the sale of mortar shells by Israel’s Sultam Company to the Iranians—another Manbar deal approved by the Israeli Defense Ministry—legitimate?

Is the sale of gas scrubbers by the Salon factory in Israel to Iran legitimate, not to mention Israeli sales of chemicals to Iran which amounted to more than $1.5 million in each of four successive years: 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994?

The trial testimony also raised an obvious question: If Manbar was such a danger to the security of the state of Israel for so many years, why was he not arrested? No one can say that he was hard to find. He not only spent several months every year in Israel, he also owned several basketball clubs in Israel in addition to the other business ventures in which he was involved.

Now, as the scandal recedes from Israeli front pages, and Manbar settles into what may be his prison routine for the next 16 years, most of the questions remain officially unanswered. It is clear, however, that Israel has been selling and continues to sell arms and other materials to Iran, despite the U.S. embargo. After all, Israel has sold such equipment to the worst regimes on the face of the earth for decades. Why stop now?

It was Rabin who complained that the Israeli military establishment had lost all sense of direction. He said that mortar shells sold by Israeli manufacturers ended up killing Israeli soldiers after they were handed over by the Iranians to the Hezbollah in the south of Lebanon.

At present Israeli companies are vying with each other to get their hands on a $300 million deal to refurbish Soviet-made T-55 and T-72 tanks for the Chinese army, equipping them with the latest optronics (optical electronics) Israeli industries have developed in cooperation with American companies in a program paid for with American taxpayer dollars.

It is the same Israeli industrial establishment that transferred to the Chinese all the latest technologies Israeli and U.S. companies had developed jointly in the now-defunct Lavi airplane project, as the Israeli establishment also did with the South Africans, before South Africa turned “bad for Israel,” but good for countries opposed to apartheid.

The Israeli establishment dealt with Pinochet of Chile, Papa Doc Duvalier and his son, Baby Doc, of Haiti, Idi Amin of Uganda, and Noriega of Panama. So why the commotion about Manbar?

In fact, “Dan,” his GSS handler, testified in court that he encouraged Manbar to get information about Iran for GSS. “You can trust us, just get us more information and you can rest assured we will not stick a knife in your back,” Dan told Manbar.

So what happened? It turns out that U.S. and British intelligence became aware of Manbar’s activities and told the Israelis to do something about them. There was no way that Israeli officials could admit that Manbar was working in conjunction with Israeli authorities and industries selling arms and other equipment to Israel’s worst enemy, especially when that country was under an American embargo. So what was the next best thing? Make Manbar out to be a spy and a traitor in a secret trial and send him up the river where he could be heard from no more.

The story has a moral for anyone considering assisting Israel and the Mossad. Although prostitution is the oldest profession and espionage the second, before getting involved with either, always use protection.

FOOTNOTES

1 Amnon Zichrony was a right-winger before he became a so-called human rights lawyer. He defended Mordechai Vanunu during the latter’s trial, but Vanunu later replaced him with another lawyer. Zichrony is well-connected to the Israeli security community and has a high security clearance which allows him to defend accused spies and the like.

2 The Moledet Party is the Israeli party advocating the transfer of all Arabs out of the state of Israel; the party is regarded as the most right-wing in the Knesset.