Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1998, page 30

Special Report

To Prevent a Nuclear War in South Asia, First Disarm the Nuclear Fuse—the Kashmir Problem

By Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai

While the United States and the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council ponder approaches to stemming the spiraling missile and nuclear arms race in South Asia, a more urgent realistic task is at hand—clipping the Kashmiri nuclear fuse to the regional nuclear warheads that may otherwise soon explode with ghastly consequences.

Sandwiched between India and Pakistan, Kashmir has been disputed territory for 50 years. A half-century ago, the United Nations Security Council, at the recommendation of both India and Pakistan, prescribed self-determination for Kashmir to settle its political status. That international law prescription has been flouted with impunity by India ever since, and people in Kashmir at present groan under the impact of over half a million Indian military and paramilitary forces notorious for shocking human rights violations.

India and Pakistan have warred twice over Kashmir (and once over Bangladesh) in their pre-nuclear lives. A fourth war in their post-nuclear age is far from chimerical. Indeed, the head of the Indian-sponsored regime in Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, has asserted that belligerency is imminent. And the new ruling party in India—the Hindu fundamentalist BJP—is pledged to conquer Azad Kashmir, occupied by Pakistan, by force and to employ whatever military strength is necessary to secure Indian hegemony in South Asia.

In sum, if the Kashmir conflict is not resolved soon, nuclear warheads may be exploding in the region long before any realistic prospect of nuclear and missile disarmament pacts. Kashmir, in fact, is also an easier nut to crack than is nuclear proliferation.

For half a century, Kashmiris have been barred from negotiations over their own political destiny, an exclusion that guaranteed failure, as experience teaches. To regard the Kashmir question as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan that can be resolved by some compromise between them is to misunderstand it altogether.

The Northern Ireland problem could not have been addressed sensibly without Sinn Fein as a negotiating partner. The Russian Federation’s difficulties with Chechnya necessitated negotiations with Chechens. To resolve Indonesia’s East Timor dispute requires discussions with the East Timorese. Ditto in the past for the Western Sahara-Morocco and Ethiopian-Eritrean conflicts.

When the “Sudetenland Problem” was disposed of in 1938 at Munich without the voice of Czechoslovakia, the results proved catastrophic for world peace. Similarly, we believe that the Kashmir dispute will not, and cannot, be solved bilaterally by the two countries. They have lost faith in each other. The time has come for a third party intervention.

India and Pakistan cannot by themselves reach a settlement over Kashmir without associating the genuine Kashmiri leadership with the negotiations. It would be like performing “Hamlet” without the prince of Denmark.

Thus, the first step in searching for a peaceful solution to the Kashmir conflict is to bring representative Kashmiris into the negotiating process as equal partners with India and Pakistan. At present, the All-Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) fairly reflects the voices of the broader spectrum of the Kashmiri people. The APHC categorically rejects terrorism and other violence as a legitimate method of securing political change.

The APHC is not wedded to any particular political dispensation. It keeps an open mind on any proposals that might be workable and will not prejudice the self-determination of the people and at the same time will assure a durable peace. Any Kashmiri agreement concluded by the negotiators, moreover, would require approval by the majority of the Kashmiri people in a free and fair election as was done in Northern Ireland. Otherwise, the pact wouldn’t be worth the paper it was written on and would offend the fundamental principle of self-determination.

Inflexible Positions

Past discussions of the Kashmir dispute have shipwrecked largely because the parties staked out inflexible positions. India has insisted that Kashmir is as much subject to its sovereignty as New Delhi. Intermediate solutions of the type the APHC is anxious to explore have never been seriously considered. Thus, a belief that a new round of Kashmiri negotiations with representative Kashmiris as equal partners in the talks might cut the 50-year Gordian knot is not Pollyannish.

Searching for approaches to cap or eliminate missiles and nuclear warheads in South Asia is laudable. But history teaches that success is unlikely until the Kashmir dispute is fairly and finally resolved. Before a melting of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, serious arms control measures proved chimerical. India and Pakistan are no different when it comes to Kashmir.

Now is an opportune moment for the United States and the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to defuse the present situation and promote stability throughout the world. They must assume their position as the leaders of the world and take an active role in finding a lasting settlement on Kashmir. It is obvious that no settlement can last if it is not based on justice to the people of Kashmir and recognition of their inherent rights. Only then can the crisis in South Asia and the possible disastrous consequences be averted.