Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1998, pages 8, 96

Special Report

Time for Palestine to Force the Pace of Peace

By John V. Whitbeck

With the agreed deadline for reaching a permanent status agreement between Israel and Palestine less than a year away, both Israel and the United States are urging the Palestinians to move immediately to accelerated permanent status talks, without worrying further about Israel’s non-compliance with its “interim period” obligations, most prominently those relating to further West Bank withdrawals. Perhaps reasoning, on the basis of prior experience, that anything that both the Israelis and the Americans want them to do must be bad for them, the Palestinians are resisting.

However, focusing now on the fundamental permanent status issues could serve both Palestinian national interests and the cause of peace if the Palestinians were to break free from their habit of simply reacting to the agendas and timetables of their adversaries and to promptly set the agenda for such talks and force the pace of peace by making the hard choices on the road to peace crystal clear and by publicly inviting Israel to make those choices and to make them soon.

The Palestinians could publicly proclaim their refusal to permit the failure of the greatest opportunity in half a century to achieve peace with some measure of justice, while acknowledging that the enormous asymmetry of power between the occupier and the occupied does not permit them to impose upon Israel their rights under international law or their preferences as to how a just and durable peace can best be built.

In this context, they could invite the Israeli government and people to choose between the only principled alternatives on the fundamental issues which still separate Israelis and Palestinians from peace while pledging to respect those choices and to work with Israel, on the basis of its choices, not simply to drag out a never-ending peace “process” but to actually achieve peace.

The choice regarding a one-state or a two-state solution might be presented as follows: “The Palestinian people could accept either a one-state or a two-state solution. In a one-state solution, the entire territory of the former Palestine Mandate would form a single democratic state, free of any form of discrimination based on race or religion and with equal rights for all who live there—as in any true democracy. In a two-state solution, the State of Israel would continue to exist within its internationally recognized borders, and the State of Palestine would continue to exist within that small portion of the former Palestine Mandate occupied by Israel in 1967, subject only to the possibilities of a mutually agreed formula for sharing sovereignty in Jerusalem (the only part of the former Palestine Mandate where the sovereignty claims of Israel and Palestine currently overlap) and of mutually agreed reciprocal boundary adjustments. We invite Israel to choose, knowing that the only third alternative is apartheid.”

A single democratic state would be a complete negation of Israel’s reason to exist.

Assuming that Israel would reject a single democratic state, free of any form of discrimination based on race or religion and with equal rights for all who live there as a complete negation of Zionism and of Israel’s reason to exist (as, indeed, it would be), two further choices would need to be offered.

The choice regarding Jerusalem might be presented as follows: “Palestine could accept either to divide sovereignty in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine as well as of Israel, consistently with the clear position in international law that all of expanded East Jerusalem is occupied territory, or to share sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem, within the current municipal boundaries unilaterally fixed by Israel, as a ‘condominium’ which would be the one and indivisible capital of two sovereign states. In either case, we envision a physically open city with free access to the entire city for all Israelis and all Palestinians. We invite Israel to choose, knowing that there will never be peace without a solution to the status of Jerusalem acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians.”

The choice regarding settlers and settlements might be presented as follows: “Palestine could accept that all settlers currently living in Palestine, as well as their descendants, should have a right of permanent residence in Palestine and that none of them would be forced to move—on the clear understanding that they would be legal residents of a foreign state, subject to the non-discriminatory laws of that state, with no special preferential rights arising out of their race, religion or citizenship and with no foreign army of occupation on Palestinian soil. Alternatively, Palestine would be willing to negotiate limited cessions of Palestinian land bordering Israel with the objective of transferring to Israeli sovereignty the smallest possible amount of land including the largest possible number of settlers—on the clear understanding that any agreed cessions of Palestinian land to Israel would be matched by agreed cessions of Israeli land to Palestine and that all settlers living in settlements not transferred to Israeli sovereignty would then be promptly repatriated to Israel. We invite Israel to choose, knowing that the world will never accept unilateral annexations of occupied Palestinian lands.”

Such an initiative would serve the cause of peace in at least three significant ways:

1. It is easy, indeed automatic, for Israel to reject any Palestinian position, without even offering a viable alternative. It would be much more difficult to reject at the same time both of two alternatives, each of which would appear extremely reasonable (indeed generous) in the eyes of world (and even American) public opinion. Offering a choice between a one-state and a two-state solution would make blindingly clear that, by continuing to reject a Palestinian state, Israel would be choosing apartheid and, by making this clear, would increase the pressure on Israel to accept that a Palestinian state is both inevitable and desirable—and to do so soon. As a purely practical matter, serious permanent status negotiations cannot even begin while there is any uncertainty as to whether the negotiators are seeking agreement on the details of the future relationship between two states or whether one of those states still hopes to annex the other.
   
   
2. It would be difficult to reach a Palestinian consensus position on all of these fundamental peace issues, and, if reached, such a position would then, almost certainly, be rejected by Israel simply because it is the Palestinian position. By publicly inviting Israel to choose between different approaches to the fundamental peace issues, each of which would be potentially acceptable to Palestinians, a long, difficult and ultimately useless process of seeking a Palestinian consensus on these issues could be rendered unnecessary.
   
   
3. If a country’s negotiating positions and objectives are completely contrary to international law and universal standards of justice, ethics and morality, that country must wish to keep them hidden from public view. If, however, a country’s negotiating positions and objectives are fully consistent with international law and universal standards of justice, ethics and morality, that country should publicly proclaim them—loudly, clearly and often—and strengthen its negotiating hand through international support.

Even if, as is entirely possible, the Netanyahu regime were to dismiss such an initiative with contempt, it would then at least be clear to the entire world that the “Oslo process” has nothing more to offer, that the Palestinians have sought peace through negotiations in complete good faith and that there is no reason to wait until May 1999 to affirm the existence of the State of Palestine (already proclaimed in November 1988 and recognized by over 100 other states at that time) in all the Palestinian territories conquered in 1967 (including those still occupied) and to further upgrade the new “super-observer” or “quasi-state” status of “Palestine” at the United Nations (won on July 7 by a General Assembly vote of 124 to 4) to full member state status. Palestine would then be doing so while holding both the moral and the legal high ground and in a context of unparalleled international sympathy and support.

If Palestine were a U.N. member state, the end of the occupation would no longer be a question of “whether” but simply of “when.” If U.N. membership were applied for in such circumstances, President Bill Clinton, with an eye on his place in history and knowing that he has no more elections to worry about and that even his wife supports Palestinian statehood, might well act in a wise and decent way—in the best interests of America, Israel, Palestine and peace.

It is clear that the Palestinians “are not asking for the moon,” as President Arafat has stated on innumerable occasions. However, the infinite patience verging on immobilism of the Palestinian leadership’s current approach to the “peace process” (which even Prime Minister Netanyahu has now publicly pronounced dead) gives the impression that the Palestinians will passively settle for crumbs and offers those around the world who wish to support them at this critical time very little to work with. It is now urgent for the Palestinian leadership to show some self-confidence, to seize the initiative and to do something dramatic, imaginative and constructive to force the pace of peace.