An Indian View

Outside Intervention is The Problem

By N. C. Menon

The issue is not what the U.S. role should be, but whether the U.S. should have a role in Kashmir at all. Before we consider that question, however, it will be useful to lay out a few facts that are not adequately known.

Kashmir would never have become such a long-lasting problem had it not been for the intervention of Pakistan. A parallel is Nagaland in India's northeast, where China once used to do just what Pakistan currently is doing in Kashmir: training and arming rebels. Once the Chinese support ended, the problem also evaporated. Nagaland is now an integral state of India, with elected governments and all the other appurtenances of democracy, including its warts.

Pakistan's rationale in trying to take over Kashmir has been that it is a "Muslim state'' that acceded to "Hindu" India because it had a Hindu ruler at the time of the British partition. Thus, soon after the two nations gained independence from British rule, Pakistan tried to overrun Kashmir, first with its own troops disguised as tribesmen, and subsequently with regular army units.

The alarmed maharaja of Kashmir appealed to India for help and, as an inducement, acceded to India. Indian troops went in and pushed back the raiders from the Kashmir Valley. When the fighting ended under a U. N.-mandated cease-fire, India held 45.6 percent of the total territory of 222,236 sq. km. and Pakistan continued to occupy 35 percent. China holds onto the 17 percent that it gobbled up during the 1962 fighting with India. China also has 2.3 percent of Kashmir (5,180 sq. km. ) granted to it by Pakistan so that the Chinese could build the strategic Aksai Chin road.

The Kashmiri population is 64.2 percent Muslim (most of them in the Kashmir Valley), 34.3 percent Hindu (mostly in Jammu), 1.2 percent Buddhist (mostly in Ladakh),2.2 percent Sikh and .18 percent others. It was the Muslim majority population that attracted Pakistan, originally in an effort to add to its own territory, and subsequently as a means of making things difficult for its rival, India. The concept of Muslim solidarity as a justification for intervention collapsed with East Pakistan seceding to form independent Bangladesh. India was admittedly the midwife at the birth of the new nation—a fact that Islamabad finds difficult to forgive. Hence the ongoing vengeful tactics of promoting breakaway tendencies in Kashmir.

Much is said about a U.N. resolution suggesting a plebiscite in Kashmir. There indeed was such a resolution. But what seems to have been lost in the shuffle is the fact that the plebiscite was conditioned on the invading Pakistan troops vacating the whole of Kashmiri territory. That clearly has not happened.

Besides, the plebiscite was intended to ascertain whether the people of Kashmir wished to join Pakistan or India. There was no third choice. If a plebiscite were to be held today, the one-third Hindu population, terrorized by the goon squads aided and abetted from across the border, would most certainly vote for India. The rest would be evenly divided between those who opt for Pakistan and others who prefer independence. If Islamabad insists on playing the plebiscite card, it might well find itself hoist on its own petard.

The Bush administration realized that the plebiscite as envisaged in the original U.N. resolution was already water under the bridge. It therefore endorsed the 1972 Simla Agreement, signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, calling for bilateral discussions to resolve the Kashmir dispute, and mandating against internationalization of the issue or interference by outside powers.

Not much has been heard about the Simla Agreement since the Clinton administration took office. The new formulation is that the dispute has to be settled between India and Pakistan, but taking fully into consideration the views of the Kashmiri people. The U.S. leaves open the issue of how the views are to be ascertained: In other words, an expanded plebiscite is not ruled out. As mentioned above, such a referendum is likely to result in a deadlock. The U. S. would be well advised to avoid such a "judgmental" mediatory role which will only further muddy the waters.

Would an independent Kashmir be viable? It is doubtful. The territory does not have any natural resources to speak of and most of its revenue is derived from tourists who are attracted by its Shangri-La-like charms. But the economy of an independent Kashmir cannot be kept afloat on houseboats alone.

At the same time, an independent Kashmir might well look like an attractive proposition to some of the remaining Cold Warriors in the U.S. administration. After all, it will cost comparatively little to grubstake an independent Kashmir in return, say, for an airbase in Ladakh, providing a commanding overview of the entire Indian subcontinent, China, and the former Soviet Asian republics.

If the U.S. sincerely wants to play a role in resolving the Kashmir dispute, its best move would be to use its considerable powers of persuasion to halt Pakistani assistance, both official and private, to Kashmiri militants. The crisis will then wither away for lack of sustenance, and with it will end the reports of human rights violations that now bedevil Indo-U.S. relations.

N. C. Menon is Washington correspondent of the Hindustan Times of New Delhi.