Somalia: More at Stake Than Meets the Eye

By Lucille Barnes

"Like it or not, the U. S. is setting an example in Somalia. Feeding starving people was a fine act, but it did not end the feuding and fighting of the Somalis. To now withdraw because matters are chaotic will set a bad precedent and be seen abroad as more confirmation of a larger withdrawal of the U.S. role in the world."

Christian Science Monitor editorial, Aug. 12, 1993 The United States did not go into Somalia eagerly. Then-President George Bush waited until after his unsuccessful reelection campaign and then intervened only under intense public pressure. By then up to 500,000 people had died of starvation, another 500,000 had fled Somalia and 600,000 were refugees within the country.

The chaos resulted from the inability of clan-based generals and warlords, who had driven out the country's long-time strongman, Siad Barre, to agree on a government to replace him. The problem that was causing drought-aggravated starvation through much of Somalia was centered in the capital of Mogadishu. There Mohammed Farah Aidid and another leader from the same Habr Gadir clan were locked in battle, not over control of the country, but only over who would control the city through which the country's supplies flowed.

The victims were not well-fed followers of well-armed clan leaders, but the weaker aggregations of immigrants from other African countries, members of small and powerless clans, and farmers driven off their land by the anarchy.

"Operation Restore Hope"

U.S. Marines landed at Mogadishu airport on the night of Dec. 8, 1992, and U.S. military spotters in civilian clothes set up radio command posts on the fringes of remote airstrips near "feeding camps" operated by international non-governmental organizations to guide in military transport aircraft bearing tons of food. By January, roads had been opened from the port and food was flowing freely into feeding stations all over the country.

A major decision was whether or not to disarm the rival warlords forcibly. U.S. authorities decided first to seek to reconcile them in hopes of securing their cooperation in rebuilding the national government and such institutions as the police and school system. On Jan. 14 the warlords agreed to meet. By March, all factions had agreed to negotiate a political settlement except a coalition loyal to Aidid. Even Aidid subsequently agreed, but through his radio station and in mass rallies he agitated against the foreign troops in his city.

Aided by long-awaited rains that enabled farmers to plant crops in newly pacified agricultural areas, "Operation Restore Hope" was deemed a success by May, when most refugees had left the feeding centers to return to their homes. On May 24, the U.S. handed over control of operations to the United Nations.

Where there had been 40,000 troops from more than 20 countries in Somalia at the height of "Operation Restore Hope," the number dropped to the present 22,854 under U.N. command, including 4,028 American personnel.

Another 1,269 U.S. quick-reaction troops remained in Somalia under direct U.S. command, and a combat-ready force of U.S. Marines remained on U.S. Seventh Fleet ships. Nevertheless, placing the bulk of the American military personnel under the U.N. commander, Turkish Gen. Cevet Bir, was in itself an experiment.

A Question of Leadership

Since the end of the Cold War the American public has complained that the world expects Americans to take the leading role in international police actions. Yet, at the same time, Americans have been conditioned by assurances from their political leaders that U.S. troops will always serve under American commanders in such actions.

If Americans look for leadership from other nations in fighting international brushfires, U.S. troops must be prepared to serve under commanders from other nations. In Somalia they do, and that's only one aspect of this operation that could become a how-to-do-it or how-not-to-do it model for the future.

A very high percentage of Middle Eastern troops are serving with U.N. peacekeepers in this former Arab League member state. Among the more than 20,000 U.N. troops are 4,718 from Pakistan, 1,340 from Morocco, 873 from Malaysia, 690 from the United Arab Emirates, 678 from Saudi Arabia, 540 from Egypt, 316 from Turkey, 143 from Tunisia, 108 from Kuwait, 101 from Greece and 25 from Bangladesh. A battalion of Indian troops is en route, and 1,700 troops from three African countries also are on hand.

It was a major ambush on the Pakistani contingent by Aidid's forces in Mogadishu, in which 24 Pakistani troops were killed, that set off the current concern about Somalia. Pakistani troops retaliated harshly against a mob converging on one of their posts, in which they feared were concealed Aidid gunmen.

U.S. helicopter gunships participated in three subsequent retaliatory strikes in which a still disputed number of Aidid's followers were killed. Journalists invited to view the carnage by Aidid's followers were mobbed at the scene, and four foreign photographers were killed.

A six-week death toll since the beginning of July included 26 Pakistanis, 4 Moroccans, 3 Italians, 6 Somali U.N. employees, the 4 journalists, and 4 U.S. soldiers killed Aug. 8 by a mine in Mogadishu. Now, as U.N. efforts increasingly focus on hunting down Aidid, and with the problem of feeding the starving seemingly solved, some political leaders urge that U.N. forces declare victory and leave.

"Time to Reassess"?

"I think it's time to reassess," said Senate Minority leader Bob Dole on an Aug. 8 talk show. From the Democratic side, however, House Speaker Thomas Foley called for a stronger U.S. commitment. "We have a ready response team. We have offshore forces. And I think we need to step up the efforts to find Aidid," Foley said.

Markets in Baidoa and Bardera, the interior "starvation centers" at the time U.S. forces landed, are thriving. Yet, if U.N. forces lease too soon, the country may lapse back into anarchy. Then a promising experiment in humanitarian relief and nation-building would be pronounced a failure. Concluded the New York Times in an August 10 editorial:

"This is one of the most ambitious U.N. ventures yet, the first to put U.S. troops under U.N. command. It would be regrettable if Washington rushed to withdraw American forces after the first fatalities. Collective security can't be built on selective risk. And it would be sad indeed if an innovative peace-keeping mission lapsed back into old-fashioned war.”