Narrow "Establishment" Parameters Limit Pakistani Democracy

By Masood Ghaznavi

Restoration of Pakistan's dismissed prime minister and its dissolved National Assembly by the country's Supreme Court on May 26, 1993, was hailed in Pakistan and abroad as a triumph of democracy and the rule of law. Nawaz Sharif, the restored prime minister, secured an enthusiastic vote of confidence from a jubilant National Assembly the following day.

The verdict was accepted by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whose dismissal orders the Supreme Court ruling had overturned. Yet, within less than two months of his restoration, and still enjoying the support of a parliamentary majority, Nawaz Sharif had to resign as prime minister and ask the president to dissolve the National Assembly "in the larger interests of the country."

A Sudden Surrender

Why did Nawaz Sharif, who had fought to retain his elected position as prime minister, suddenly surrender? Simply put—because the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar "advised" him to do so. For good measure, the general also asked the president to dissolve the National and Provincial Assemblies, order new elections and resign. This army "neutrality" had to be demonstrated because in the power struggle between the president and the prime minister, both the contestants belonged to what the Pakistanis call "the Establishment"—composed of the military and the career bureaucracy.

Thus, on duly 18, 1993, Pakistan's 15th prime minister in 22 years of civilian rule was sworn in to oversee national and provincial elections scheduled for Oct. 6 and 9, respectively. The man chosen for this caretaker assignment, Dr. Moeen Qureshi, was reportedly the choice of the outgoing president, and was endorsed by the outgoing prime minister and by his principal rival and leader of the opposition, Ms. Benazir Bhutto. Of the 14 previous prime ministers, only one resigned after losing his majority in the parliament. All of the others were dismissed, deposed or eased out by bureaucrats-turned-politicians or by the army chiefs. (See box.)

Dr. Qureshi, a brilliant economist who had been with the IMF and the World Bank for 33 years, is as neutral a person as possible, having been away from Pakistan virtually all of his professional life. Whether he will be able to ensure free elections will depend very much on the military high command. The current army chief, who was appointed to the job by the outgoing president, is reportedly "not political at all" and "a pure professional soldier." But that is what they said of all the generals who deposed elected prime ministers, changed the constitution and then ruled themselves.

The writer has discussed the supremacy of the highly centralized army and bureaucracy as the two ruling institutions of Pakistan in a previous article, in the October 1990 Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, reprinted in Annual Editions: The Third World 1992/3, Guilford, CT.

Bureaucrats-turned-politicians, with the army's support, took over total control of Pakistan from 1951 to 1958, when martial law first was imposed. During this period they dismissed six prime ministers, dissolved two parliaments and abrogated the constitutions all "in the larger interests of Pakistan.'' There followed 25 years of military rule, with one interruptiom

When civilian rule was restored in 1988, Pakistan's most senior bureaucrat, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, long past retirement age, and right-hand man of the military ruler General Zia ul-Haq, became president. Two years after assuming the presidency, in 1990 he fired elected prime minister Benazir Bhutto, dissolved the National Assembly and ordered fresh elections. Then, in 1993 he fired his own protege, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who also owed his entry into politics to General Zia. It was that dismissal that was voided by the Supreme Court. But, in the last analysis, the establishment could not be defeated. If Ishaq wanted to take Pakistan back to the l950s and the years of bureaucratic supremacy, the army, it seems, wanted to run the country through an indirectly elected president rather than the elected prime minister. To that end they had secured an amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, Article 58 (2) (b), giving the president the powers to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the National Assembly.

Now, with those powers voided by the Supreme Court, how will the military bureaucratic establishment control the political life of Pakistan, while maintaining the facade of democracy?

Before discussing the institution that enables the establishment to control the political and economic life of Pakistan, one fact should be recognized. Whereas states all over the world have armies, in Pakistan, the army has a state.

Army generals despise politicians, but want political power. A British journalist recently described a Pakistani general's remark that politicians were like little children. "We let them play with their toys for a while," he said, "but then someone has to impose discipline and stop them from becoming a nuisance."

What makes the assertion of this kind of power and infallibility on the part of the armed forces possible is not so much their guns as the politico-social structure of Pakistani society. Despite large-scale urbanization in the past four of five decades, Pakistan continues to be largely agricultural, feudal, tribal, clannish and caste-ridden.

The Factionalism of Tribal-Feudal Life

Even when they move to urban areas, people bring their loyalties, particularism, prejudices, customs and institutions with them. Their hereditary chiefs, whether they are the Chaudhris of Jats, Gujjars, Arain, Rajputs and other tribes of Punjab; Maliks of the Khattaks, Kakars and various -Zais and -Khels of the Pathans; Sardars of Bugti, Marri, Bizenjo and Zehris of the Baluch; or the Waderas of Talpurs, Bhuttos, Jatois, etc., of Sindh, all have two things in common: arrogance and factionalism. This factionalism, the most important political institution of the tribal-feudal life, not only marks one tribe against the other, but divides tribes into rival clans, faction against faction, cousin against cousin, and so forth. This factionalism is a great gift to any power, imperial or otherwise, which divides and rules until another combination of power takes over. It has been going on for centuries.

Another surprising characteristic of the members of this hereditary class—arrogant, powerful, "eternal" and intolerant of the success of their rivals as they are—is their submissiveness, almost servility, to men holding governmental power in the country, no matter who they are. Politics for them is the sport of princes and, like princes, they are exempt from paying income tax on their agricultural fortunes. So, they play the game of politics, locally and nationally, by the only rules they know are real. What better objective for the political game than personal aggrandizement!

Political life and political parties reflect these sentiments. When President Ishaq turned against him, 170 members of the Punjab Assembly, supposedly the power base of Nawaz Sharif, deserted him en bloc. When the Supreme Court restored his prime ministership, they supported him again.

Although the bureaucrats and army generals did not create this structure, they intensify the fracturing of Pakistan's body politic. This has resulted in numberless political parties, some of the same name, led by their, often hereditary, leaders with no organization, membership, elections, etc. Nor do even the major political parties bother about the election of officeholders, who may be appointed by the chairman or co-chairman of the party. That is the case of the Peoples Party of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto and her mother are the co-chairpersons of the party.

The new and powerful urban political party of the immigrants from India, Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz, became too powerful and swept the polls in urban Sindh in 1988. The establishment allegedly caused it to split into two. The new one is aptly named: The Genuine Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz. The original one is lying low, with its leader in self-exile in London "to save his life."

The case of the Pakistan Muslim League, the party of Pakistan's founder, is even more interesting. (See box.) It usually has been the ruling party in Pakistan, except for the Bhutto periods of 1971-1977 and 1988-1990.

When martial law is imposed and all political parties are banned, the activities of their leaders might be reported in the newspapers as follows:

"Chaudhri Sultan Amir, president of the defunct Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum group), in a statement issued on Human Rights Day, praised the efforts of the Martial Law regime for ensuring for Pakistani citizens full enjoyment of freedom and dignity. "

The generals themselves have revived the Muslim League. Both Field Marshal Ayub and General Zia ul-Haq did that. When in 1985, General Zia, after partyless elections, hand-picked Mohammad Khan Junejo as his prime minister, he thought it might be a good idea for his prime minister also to be the president of the Pakistan Muslim League. So he asked its president, the Pir of Pagara, a great landlord and hereditary spiritual leader of Sindh, to hand the party over to Mr. Junejo. That was done.

In 1988, when Mr. Junejo was dismissed, the Pir of Pagara wanted his Muslim League back. But Junejo and others refused to oblige. The Pir of Pagara finally declared that his Muslim League had been revived and is the real one. Its present name is "Pakistan Muslim League (Functional)."

Now, the Junejo Muslim League has split. The new offshoot is the "Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif)." Nawaz Sharif has launched his campaign for reelection in October as president of his own Pakistan Muslim League. Of course, other Muslim Leagues will oppose him.

It remains to be seen which Muslim League, or combination of Muslim Leagues and other political parties, gets the nod of approval from the army. Currently all political parties see it as the key to power.