Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1987,
pages 8-9
Trade and Finance
Syria: Returning to the Fold?
By John T. Haldane
Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, who sees himself
as the pace-setter, and is seen by Arab detractors as the holdout
in matters affecting the Iran-Iraq war, Arab unity, Arab pressure
on the Palestinians to unite, and a united Arab stand on negotiations
with Israel, is suddenly the object of considerable attention. The
reason is that Syria, whose politics are closely tied to its chronic
need for external financial assistance, is about to go broke.
Among the unlikely suitors flying in and out of Damascus
in late July was President Reagan's trusted emissary Vernon Walters,
US Ambassador to the United Nations, who held what he called "very
useful, very fruitful, very cordial" meetings with President
Al-Assad.
The visit followed years of increasing estrangement
between the two countries, which culminated in last year's recall
of US Ambassador William Eagleton after the British government charged
Al-Assad's government with backing an attempt to smuggle aboard
a bomb that would have blown up an E1 A1 flight originating in Britain.
Although both German and French government officials quietly let
it be known that they believed the plot was in fact aimed at discrediting
Al-Assad, the US only recently began talking about returning Eagleton
to Damascus in late August of this year.
US Ambassador to Lebanon John Kelly says, however,
that although it is "premature to talk about rapprochement
between the United States and Syria, Washington officials are encouraged
by the tone that marked Walters' sessions with Al-Assad." Syrian
officials have hinted at further meetings, including a possible
visit to Syria by Secretary of State George Shultz.
No mention has been made from either side about the
possibility of a renewal of US foreign aid to Syria. The US terminated
what had been significant economic assistance to Syria in November
1983, while US Marines were under fire from Lebanese militia artillery
in what was supposed to be Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon.
A week before Walters' trip, the European Economic
Community lifted its ban on high-level contacts with Syria. Danish
Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen, president of the EEC Council of
Ministers, said he might invite his Syrian counterpart to Denmark.
This would be the first meeting since the EEC, under British pressure,
barred ministerial contacts after the Israeli jetliner bomb plot.
European officials state that the decision to end
the ban on high-level contacts is intended to encourage Syria to
play a more constructive role in efforts to arrange a Middle East
peace conference, and to secure Syria's help in getting Western
hostages released in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, King Hussein of Jordan has been working
for months to bring President Al-Assad and Iraq's President Saddam
Hussein together for a reconciliation. Jordanian Prime Minister
Zaid Rifa'i has confirmed that the two leaders met secretly in eastern
Jordan earlier this year. Palestinian sources say that Al-Assad
and Hussein plan to hold a public reconciliation soon, although
Jordan has denied the report. King Hussein's goal is to arrange
an end to the Iran-Iraq war and to set up an Arab summit meeting
later this year. From that meeting, Hussein hopes to obtain united
Arab backing for an international peace conference to deal with
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Syria has a direct concern in any
such settlement since Israel has occupied, since 1967, a large chunk
of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights.
The Soviet Union has been strongly backing efforts
to bring Al-Assad and Hussein together. High-ranking Soviet officials
have been regularly flying in and out of Damascus recently, supposedly
to push Al-Assad toward a more moderate stance vis-a-vis Iraq, Egypt,
and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The point of this Soviet
pressure is to accelerate the Middle East peace process, with the
goal of full Moscow participation in any international peace conference.
One quid-pro-quo for Syria was a Soviet warning to Turkey
against pressuring Syria along the long border between the two countries.
Turkey has accused Syria of allowing anti-Turkish Kurds to use the
border for infiltration and has threatened to retaliate if further
Kurdish raids took place.
As the Jerusalem Post noted on July 17: "All
roads seem to lead to Damascus these days, as Syria becomes a focal
point of international moves to end two of the world's most intractable
disputes: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iran-Iraq war."
For President Al-Assad, who only eight months ago
was being ostracized for allegedly sponsoring international terrorism,
the attention comes just as, and because, his country is falling
apart, economically speaking.
Damascus' foreign debt to the West is estimated at
$3.5 billion, and its debt to the Soviet Union, largely for military
equipment, is estimated at $15 billion. Syria is experiencing its
worst cash flow crisis in 16 years. Its foreign currency reserves
are down to about $30 billion, less than one-tenth of what they
were eight years ago. Arab assistance has fallen off sharply. Syria
is more than $60 million in arrears to the World Bank on repayments
of more than $200 million in loans from that organization. Prices
for Syria's main exports, cotton and heavy crude oil, have fallen,
along with expatriate remittances. As one Western diplomat in Damascus
said: "They've just plain run out of money. If Syria were a
Western country, we'd consider it bankrupt."
A US Department of Commerce "Foreign Economic
Trends" report confirms this view: "Overall, the Syrian
economy is badly depressed. Government-controlled production is
poorly managed and uncompetitive. Syria now exports little except
raw materials."
The only bright spot in the Syrian domestic economy
is the Al-Thayyem oil field. It may bring in some $220 million annually
when it goes into full production. This revenue will be welcome,
but will hardly solve Syria's pressing foreign currency problems.
While Iran has been of some financial assistance,
this gain has been offset by the cut in aid from the oil-rich Arab
nations. Since the spring of 1982, when Syria aligned itself with
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and closed the Kirkuk-Homs pipeline through
which Iraq was transporting the bulk of its oil exports, Iran has
provided Syria with six million tons of oil annually. Iran provides
one million tons of this amount free of charge, and Syria is supposed
to purchase the remainder at near-commercial prices. However, since
Syria has been unable or unwilling to pay regularly, Tehran has
grown increasingly unhappy with the arrangement. In fact, Iran stopped
deliveries in late 1985. But then, fearing a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement,
Tehran renewed deliveries in the summer of 1986.
Syria is receiving from Arab states only about $540
million per year in Baghdad Agreement aid, although the pact set
Syria's allotment as a "confrontation state" in the conflict
with Israel at $1.8 billion annually. For this year, Rafik Hariri,
a close adviser of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, is reported to have
told President Al-Assad that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would provide
Syria with up to 50,000 barrels per day of oil if Syria broke with
Iran. Additional large donations of hard cash under the Baghdad
or other agreements also would seem a reasonable expectation by
Damascus.
Nora Bustany reported recently in the Washington
Post that: "Crushing foreign debt and a cash crisis have
moved Syria's economy closer to bankruptcy, a situation that other
Arab states in the region hope will loosen the country's ties to
Iran."
It appears that Saudi Arabia and the other wealthy
Arab states are prepared to stand aside and watch Syria collapse
unless Al-Assad agrees to abandon Iran and rejoin the Arab world.
The Soviet Union, which supplies Syria with arms on credit, seems
also to be asserting pressure on Syria aimed at Arab unity. Soviet-financed
Palestinian groups headquartered in Damascus abruptly rejoined the
PLO in Algiers last May, even though it is still headed by Yasir
Arafat, whom Syria for several years has been seeking to destroy
or isolate. If Al-Assad is half as clever as reputed, he may soon
make the best deal he can and abandon his alliance with Iran. Otherwise,
he may end up as a minor player in the Middle East.
John T. Haldane is a Middle East specialist who
has served as a Foreign Service Officer in Baghdad, Cairo, and Beirut,
and as an international economist in the Departments of Commerce
and Treasury. |