Sands of Sorrow: Israel's Journey from Independence

By Milton Viorst, New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 278 pages, $19.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by Andrea Barron

After the 1973 "Yom Kippur War," former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully negotiated two Israeli-Egyptian troop disengagement agreements—Sinai I and Sinai II—as well as an agreement between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. Kissinger thus set the stage for Camp David and the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and was lauded for his contributions to Mideast peace. According to Milton Viorst, however, Kissinger was not really a peacemaker at all; rather, he was the "architect of Israel's overwhelming military power." This power, writes Viorst, has become one of the greatest obstacles preventing a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In Sands of Sorrow, Viorst examines the "downside" of Kissinger's famous shuttle diplomacy. In order to win Golda Meir's acceptance of the Syrian agreement, for example, Kissinger assured Israel it could act to prevent terrorist activities "by all available means" and continue to count on US support for its actions. It was precisely this sort of American policy that prepared the ground for the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israel's first full-scale attack on a non-belligerent Arab state.

In Sinai II, Kissinger finally convinced Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's prime minister, to evacuate two strategic Sinai mountain passes and the Abu Rudeis oil fields. In return, the United States agreed to provide the Jewish state with "on-going, long-term" military and economic support—no strings attached. Kissinger also promised that America would not negotiate with the PLO unless the organization recognized Israel and accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

What did Egypt and Israel get out of Sinai II? Anwar Sadat got back what to him was a sacred piece of Egyptian territory. Yitzhak Rabin, now minister of defense in Israel's national unity government, achieved his lifetime goal of securing permanent access to American weaponry, making it possible for Israel to "maintain the Middle East's mightiest army."

And what about Henry Kissinger, the American diplomat "par excellence?" Viorst claims that Kissinger allowed the United States to be outmaneuvered at Sinai II, which "transformed the Israeli-American relationship" by giving Israel "the right to make claims on the federal budget. At the same time, it imposed a formal obligation on the United States to pay those claims...On the one hand, (Sinai II) legalized a patron-client relationship, while on the other it revoked virtually all of the patron's conventional powers of review over the client's policies." The agreement has also prevented the US from dealing with the PLO, which, to the frustration of the US and Israel alike, continues to command the allegiance of most of the world's four million Palestinians.

At times, it appears as if Milton Viorst has declared war against Kissinger, whose "legendary ego" and passion to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East led him to "give away the store" at Sinai II. Kissinger is accused of militarizing Israel in order to provide the US with a dependable anti-Communist ally in the Middle East. As a result, the Jewish state has become so strong that it now refuses to make any compromises or take any risks at all for peace.

Viorst is angry at the course America's Mideast policy has taken, but he is also saddened—thus the title of this book. Like most Jews, he identifies himself as a Zionist who believes in "the rightness of the in-gathering of the Jews in a place of their own." But Israel's 20-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the rise of Menachem Begin's brand of right-wing Revisionist Zionism have de-humanized Zionism for him. Viorst blames his country—the United States—for subsidizing this dehumanization to the tune of $3 billion a year. And he finds fault with his community—American Jews—for nurturing Israel's dependency on its superpower patron.

Some parts of Sands of Sorrow, such as the material on secular-religious and ethnic divisions in Israeli society, have been adequately covered in other books. But the brilliant analysis of Kissinger's post-1973 Mideast diplomacy, provided in the chapter entitled "Kissinger's Covenant," should be read by anyone who wants to understand the origins of the current Israeli-American strategic partnership.

Viorst suggests that by guaranteeing Israel permanent financial and diplomatic support under any and all conditions, the United States has made sure Israel will remain in permanent conflict with the Palestinians.

Perhaps it is time for the US to undo some of the damage it did at Sinai II. It could begin by reconsidering Kissinger's pledge not to deal with the PLO until it accepts UN Security Council Resolution 242. "Kissinger's Covenant," after all, was made in 1975 to encourage peace between Jews and Arabs. Now, more than 10 years later, it needs to be broken for the same reason.