Arafat Assures American Jews A Negotiated Peace is Possible

By Jerome Segal

In late May and early June of this year, I represented Washington Area Jews for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace (WAJIPP) in meetings with Chairman Yasir Arafat and other top leaders of the PLO. The two other members of the delegation were Hilda Silverman, representing New Jewish Agenda (NJA), and Mary Appelman, representing the American-Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (AICIPP). We believe this was the first time that American Jewish organizations like WAJIPP and NJA (AICIPP is not a Jewish organization) have sent representatives to meet with Arafat.

During a week in Tunis, besides meeting the PLO chairman, we also met with the other two Al-Fatah members on the PLO Executive Committee, Farouk Khaddoumi and Abu Mazen. In addition, we met with the PLO Ambassador to Tunisia and the Arab League, Hakim Balawi; Basam Abu Sharif, a top official in the PFLP (George Habash's organization); Imad Shakur, Arafat's adviser for Israeli affairs; and Dr. Sami Musallam, the staff director at PLO headquarters. There was a great deal of emphasis on the "unity" achieved in Algiers. Yet to me, differences in tone and nuance were apparent.

Binational State No Longer a PLO Objective

• PLO interest in a negotiated end to the conflict was stated explicitly and repeatedly. It was pointed out to us that delegates to the just-concluded PNC meeting in Algeria unanimously supported the call for an international conference. We asked Khaddoumi, "If negotiations were to lead to the creation of an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza, would this mean the end of armed conflict?" He answered with an unambiguous "Yes." He further offered to put it in writing. When the same question was put to Basam Abu Sharif (PFLP), he was more ambiguous. Creation of an independent state, he indicated, would totally transform the environment, making it impossible to conjecture about armed struggle. However, he endorsed the notion of any of a variety of security guarantees for the two states.

The notion of a binational state still remains part of the vocabulary. Following Israeli General Yehoshafat Harkabi's distinction between "grand design" and "policy objective," however, I concluded that establishment of a binational state is no longer a PLO policy objective. Balawi spoke of it as something that might occur after there was peace, and then only if it were freely chosen by both the Israelis and the Palestinians. In response to our suggestion that this was unrealistic, he replied that we should not prejudge future generations.

• PLO officials do not seem optimistic that an international conference will occur anytime in the near future. Moreover, Arafat expressed despair with respect to both the Israeli and US governments. His perception is that the PLO has made a considerable number of offers and moves, both public and private,

The theme of not being seen, recognized, or responded to arose repeatedly in our conversations.

but that he has encountered no Israeli or American responsiveness. The PLO perception is that in both countries the political leaders are essentially politicians, not statesmen. As such, they will follow rather than lead public opinion. If there is a focal point for PLO thinking, it is Israeli public opinion.

• Armed Struggle vs. Dialogue. From our discussions with various Palestinian leaders, I did not gain a clear understanding of their tactical disagreements over how to affect Israeli public opinion. All parties insisted on the right of armed struggle as a means of resisting occupation, and all called attention to the expansion of dialogue with the Israeli people. Our attention was repeatedly called to the Israeli delegation which met PLO officials in Rumania, and to an upcoming meeting between Palestinians and Israelis in Budapest. Imad Shakur was optimistic about the younger generation of Sephardic Jews.

On the other hand, it is known that George Habash has emphasized armed struggle as the only way to get the PLO a real place at the conference table. I left Tunis still uncertain whether Palestinian leaders recognize that these two tactics are incompatible. Stepped-up armed struggle, in my opinion, would undermine the possibilities for expanded and effective dialogue. Some PLO staff members maintained that one could do both, and that which was emphasized would depend on Israeli reactions.

Palestinians: Victim of Double Standards

• Sense of Moral Outrage. In our conversations with PLO officials, I was struck by their emphasis on the psychological dimensions of the conflict. We were told, for instance, "If no one listens to us, we are all radicals; if we are heard, we are all moderates." The theme of not being seen, recognized, or responded to emerged repeatedly. Arafat expressed some optimism when he contrasted the present Israeli scene, in which a number of Knesset members have called for a Palestinian self-determination, with Golda Meir's denial of the existence of a Palestinian people.

PLO leaders with whom we spoke expressed outrage over two basic moral issues. First, the failure of both Israelis and Americans to accept the fact that the Palestinians have been the victims of a major injustice in having been displaced from land which had been theirs. And second, PLO leaders see themselves as victims of a double moral standard: The whole world recognizes that a people under foreign occupation has a right to armed resistance; yet this is somehow denied when it comes to the Palestinians. As a result, all armed struggle on their part is labeled "terrorism," while no Israeli actions are so perceived.

• Dealing with Jewish Fears. We pressed on Arafat the need for clearly state PLO policies regarding both terrorism and the PLO's ultimate willingness to live at peace with Israel. We criticized the ambiguities in the Cairo Declaration on Terrorism, issued in late 1985 by Arafat. Arafat seemed to recognize the reality of Jewish fears with respect to both the issue of terrorism and of ultimate PLO willingness to make peace with Israel. He agreed there is a need to communicate more directly to allay these fears. Specifically, with respect to clear-cut recognition of Israel, we were given to understand that the PLO has an interest in moving further than it has thus far. At the same time, however, PLO leaders feel constrained by the lack of responsiveness from the other side. Several times, the theme of retaining the support of their Palestinian constituency arose. There is a perception, especially among the younger generation of Palestinians, that unilateral concessions by the PLO would undermine support for those who made them. Khaddoumi emphasized that the right of refugees to return to their homes could not be compromised outside of negotiations that lead to the establishment of an independent state.

I emerged from these meetings with mixed judgments about the prospects for peace. On the one hand, I saw continued PLO interest in negotiations and an increased interest in expanding dialogue with Israelis. On the other hand, I saw little indication that the PLO would be undertaking any major new peace initiatives. PLO leaders felt that they had tried, but that they had received little response from either the US or Israel. I believe there is still some string left to Arafat's effort to bring about negotiations, but without the appearance of progress, it will be played out before long. If that happens, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may witness a new increase in both organized and random violence.

Jerome Segal, PhD, is a research scholar at the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and a member of Washington Area Jews for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace (WAJIPP).