Syria's Middle East Role

By Talcott W. Seelye

When Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy announced to a congressional committee recently that Syria was playing a helpful role in Lebanon, there was a storm of criticism from those who are convinced that Syria's policies are unwaveringly antithetical to U.S. interests. In fact, American and Syrian interests in Lebanon converge: Both governments want stability and political equilibrium for Lebanon. However, the U.S. government harbors a lingering resentment toward Syria because of the problems it caused for the American military presence there and because Syria induced the Lebanese government to renege on the American-negotiated Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement.

The Reagan Administration does appear to have come around to recognizing the following two realities in Lebanon: (1) A political settlement there is not possible without concessions to pro-Syrian elements; and (2) Syria's "victory" in Lebanon has not been accompanied, after all, by any important Soviet gains. It has also become evident to the Administration that Syria's staying power in Lebanon, rooted in a number of factors, is and will continue to be far greater than that of Israel, the U.S., or any other outside power.

"Syria is less unwaveringly anti-American than it is determined to preserve Lebanon as a Syrian sphere of influence."

Syria now has the undivided responsibility—and headache—for maintaining stability in Lebanon and for bringing about political reconciliation. In pursuing this role it cannot afford to foster divisiveness or permit disruptive actions. As Lebanon's arbiter, Syria must act responsibly and indeed it appears to be doing so. It has succeeded in tempering the hard-line positions of its clients and in reining in the Iranian revolutionary guards and their Lebanese followers who once perpetrated violent attacks against American and other installations.

Syria is less unwaveringly anti-American than it is determined to preserve Lebanon as a Syrian sphere of influence. Indeed, there are indications that Syria realizes that the achievement of stability in Lebanon might be somewhat facilitated by a continuing U.S. political and economic involvement. Although the U.S. suffered a setback in Lebanon with regard to its credibility, many Lebanese still retain an attachment to the U.S. Syria recognizes this and knows it needs all the help it can get in view of the underlying centrifugal forces at work in the Lebanese body politic.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is prepared to work with the U. S. from time to time on specific problems when he perceives it is in his interests to do so. Such was the case in connection with the deployment of U.N. troops on the Golan Heights in 1974, the 1976 arrangements for Syria's entry into Lebanon, the 1982 ceasefire agreement with Israel and the 1983 Lebanese agreement leading to the Geneva reconciliation conference. If Syria felt that the U.S. could broker satisfactory security arrangements in southern Lebanon in connection with an Israeli troop withdrawal, it no doubt would cooperate.

Syrian policy is equally unwavering when it comes to dealing with Israel. Ever since the Camp David agreement, which peeled Egypt off from the main Arab body in a separate settlement, President Assad has concluded that negotiations with Israel under current circumstances would be fruitless. He has taken the position that only by negotiating for a comprehensive peace settlement from a position of strength can the Arabs elicit Israeli concessions. He considers that no Arab leverage now exists to induce Israel either to relinquish the Golan Heights or to settle the Palestine question. He sees that without Egypt's political and military backing the Arabs are at a marked disadvantage—militarily and politically.

"Assad's strategy for accomplishing a settlement is based on the existence of Arab military parity with Israel..."

Thus, although Assad is on record as endorsing U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (subsumed in U.N. Resolution 338), he is not ready to negotiate with Israel on the basis of these resolutions at this time. Assad's strategy for accomplishing a settlement is based on the existence of Arab military parity with Israel, on peace negotiations which are comprehensive, and on Soviet participation in these negotiations. He believes that this is not now achievable because the U.S. and Israel are committed to Israeli military superiority over the Arabs, a step-by-step negotiating process, and no Soviet participation. Therefore, Assad can be expected to play a spoiler role with regard to any foreseeable peace initiatives.

Many have alleged that Assad has ambitions to create a "Greater Syria" which would encompass Lebanon and Jordan. This implies that Assad wants unilaterally to annex these two countries regardless of the desires of their people. With some persuasiveness Syrian officials, including President Assad himself, deny this. On the other hand, there is no question that, in consonance with basic Baathist doctrine advocating Arab unity, Assad favors aligning neighboring Arab nations more closely with Syria on a mutually agreeable basis. This explains Assad's attempt in late 1978 to unify with Iraq—only to be turned down in the end by Saddam Hussain.

Assad feels that Syria has a key role to play in the Arab world. This reflects the view of a succession of Syrian leaders who have considered Damascus as the authentic heartbeat of Arab nationalism. Assad has chaffed at Syria's relative isolation from the Arab mainstream although, to a great extent, this is of his own making. One of Assad's many grievances against the U.S. is that the U.S. ignores Syria's view that it has a legitimate pivotal role in the Middle East. Since the abortive Geneva Conference of 1977, Syria has not figured in any U.S. peace proposals or deliberations. Indeed, Assad has concluded that the U.S. seeks to isolate Syria as much as possible on all fronts. The U. S. tilt toward Iraq, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, was interpreted in this light.

Assad's close association with Iran and his endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have undermined his leadership aspirations in the Arab world. In the first instance he took sides against an Arab country and in the second case he acquiesced in outside aggression against an Islamic nation—making Syria the only Arab or Islamic state to have done so. In both cases the basis for Syrian policy was entirely pragmatic. Having stonewalled Soviet efforts to gain influence in Syrian policy-making, Assad decided that supporting the U.S.S.R. on Afghanistan was a relatively inexpensive price to pay Moscow for its substantial military aid to Syria.

Syria and Iran make odd bed-fellows. Ideologically, the two regimes could not be more different. Although Syria is a Muslim country, its Baathist regime is secular and is strongly opposed by Muslim Brotherhood elements. Khomeini-led Iran, on the other hand, is imbued with religious fanaticism. At first Syria supported Khomeini because he had overthrown the hated Shah. The relationship blossomed into close military and economic cooperation after the Iran-Iraq war broke out. Mutual antipathy toward Iraq became the cement which bound the two countries closer.

There are hints, however, that Syria may be having second thoughts concerning this relationship. Not only does enmity with Iraq interfere with Assad's Arab ambitions, but Assad must realize that an Iranian victory would strengthen the forces of Muslim extremism—whether Shiite or Sunni—which he finds so uncongenial. What may be contributing most to a possible review by Syria of its pro-Iran policy is the recent shift in the power balance in the Gulf in Iraq's favor. Assad cannot be pleased with the prospect of having backed the wrong horse. This, together with Saudi urging, probably explains Syria's readiness in recent months to engage in efforts to try to persuade Iran to agree to a ceasefire.

Syria's relations with the Soviet Union will remain close as long as U.S.-supported Israel is viewed as both a threat and an obstacle to peace, on Assad's terms. The Soviet Union provides Syria with the military equipment it needs to maintain a fairly credible defensive military posture vis-a-vis Israel. The two Soviet-manned SA-5 missile sites are an important supplement and add a degree of deterrence that did not exist before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Assad is still not likely to start a war with Israel in the knowledge that, despite his improved military position, he is likely to be the loser. The Soviets are certainly not encouraging him in this regard since they have no desire to be drawn in any further. While the U.S.S.R. probably views Syria as its most important Arab "ally," the Soviets are not entirely pleased with the relationship. Soviet efforts to have important input into Syrian decision-making have been unavailing.

Talcott W. Seelye is a former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Tunisia and is currently a private consultant.