The Battle for Saudi, Jordan Arms

By Dennis J. Wamsted

Congressmen reconvening after their month-long August recess expect the Reagan Administration to notify the House and Senate shortly of its intentions to proceed with long-delayed arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Because of the Congressional calendar and the necessity of allowing Congress a minimum of 50 days to consider the proposals, the Administration must send the two proposed sales packages to Congress sometime between September 13th and 20th. [The exact date depends on the closing of the current Congressional session, now tentatively set for November 10th.] Failing that, the Administration would have to postpone the sales until the new congressional session convenes in early 1986.

The sales, parts of which have been planned for more than five years and which seemingly have been on the verge of submission throughout most of the past two years, will bring into the open a simmering confrontation between the Administration and Israel's supporters in Congress over sales of advanced U.S. weaponry to the moderate Arab countries. The controversy began in late February of last year when the Reagan Administration proposed selling a number of hand-held Stinger antiaircraft missiles to both Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

At that time vocal objections from a seemingly overwhelming number of congressmen convinced the Administration to withdraw the sale proposal—at least for the time being. Many congressmen expressed concern that the weapons might fall into the hands of "terrorists." For example, Senator Bob Packwood (D-OR)—a long-time supporter of Israel who already, has received in excess of $14,000 from pro-Israel Political Action Committees toward his 1986 reelection campaign*—led the opposition to the proposed sale in the Senate and managed to gather 55 signatures on a letter to President Ronald Reagan asking him to withdraw the sale from consideration. The Oregon Senator claimed that if the Stinger missiles were sold to any Arab nation it is likely "some are going to fall into the hands of terrorists, and that means there is not going to be a plane outside any major airport in the civilized world that will be safe."

The Politics of Intimidation

Then, in February, 1985, the Administration again considered sending the two sales before Congress. That time Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA)—another long-time supporter of Israel who already has received more than $14,000 from pro-Israel PACs toward his 1988 reelection campaign*—initiated a cautionary letter signed by 50 of his colleagues. That, together with quiet counseling from a number of prominent Republican senators, prompted President Reagan and his advisers to freeze all sales to the Middle East pending completion of a "comprehensive review" of defense needs of the moderate Arab states and Israel, Although government spokesmen said the Administration still strongly backed the arms requests of the U.S.'s moderate Arab allies, the decision to freeze all regional sales was generally interpreted as a victory for the pro-Israel lobby and its congressional supporters. Quipped one Senate staffer opposed to the sale: "I would rather be sitting in my Position than at State."

Although the review—quickly dubbed MEATS (for Middle East Arms Transfer Study)—was completed last spring, the Administration did not formally present the study to Congress until the end of July—just before Congress recessed for the summer, a fact which ruffled a number of Congressional feathers. Even before the Administration had briefed the House, two staunchly pro-Israel members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were expressing total opposition to arms sales to any Arab countries. One of these members, Representative Larry Smith (D-FL)—a recipient of more than $10,000 from pro-Israel PACs for his 1984 campaign*—said the Administration was setting itself "up in a very, very confrontational mode with both the House and the Senate. The other, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA)—who received some $7000 from pro-Israel PACs for his 1984 campaign*—said the study amounted to a preliminary request to sell advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and added that such a request came at "the least opportune time." Lantos said that for the Administration to expect Israel to engage in serious peace negotiations while the United States is proposing to sell still more advanced weaponry to its Arab neighbors "simply boggles the mind." Other congressional sources stated that Administration requests for arms for either Jordan or Saudi Arabia would provoke an "enormously divisive" debate in Congress, which the Administration could easily lose and which—no matter who won—would prove to be a "total fiasco" for the Administration's Middle East efforts.

* All figures cited for contributions to individual Congressmen are taken from the book Financing the Elections of the 99th Congress: Pro-Israel PACs by Edward Roeder of Sunshine News Services. The figures were compiled by totaling contributions from 54 pro-Israel PACs identified by Mr. Roeder They include contributions made between each candidate's previous election campaign and July, 31, 1984 They do not include contributions made after that date.

Since the sales have not yet been formally announced, their exact composition remains uncertain. However, informed sources say that the Administration has made two major decisions concerning the sales: (1) that two or three squadrons (either 36 or 54 planes) of advanced F-20 fighter aircraft will be offered to Jordan; and (2) that the 40 additional F-15s requested by Saudi Arabia will not be included. In addition to the F-20s, sources say that the Administration's proposal for Jordan will include six batteries of Improved Hawk antiaircraft missiles, some armored vehicles, an unknown number and type of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and possibly some of the hand-held Stinger missiles. All told this will amount to close to a one billion dollar deal, assuming that the Jordanians get three full F-20 squadrons. As for the Saudis, they are expected to get virtually all of the other items they have requested—including a number of helicopters, additional Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, as well as TOW anti-tank and Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

The Administration Holds a Strong Hand

Administration sources acknowledge that there is "a real brawl ahead" over these two arms sales. In particular, they say the proposed Jordanian sale is going to be difficult to shepherd through a reluctant Congress—primarily because it will require some type of concessionary U.S. financing, whereas the Saudis generally have paid cash for their weapons systems in past years. Despite this, these sources are optimistic that the Administration will prevail in both cases. They point out that the MEAT study justified the sales on their individual merits and, significantly, that neither sale by itself, nor the two combined, would adversely affect the security of Israel.

Following the same line of reasoning, informed sources note that, at least concerning the sale to Jordan, none of the proposed weapons systems would be delivered until 1989. In other words, the sale could not possibly change the military balance in the region in the near future. Further, Administration sources point out that Congress, although it has not been overly happy with several past arms sales requests, has never refused to allow a president to sell weapons to any country once he has made it clear he considers the sale important for long-term U.S. interests. Finally, these sources note that the outlook in 1981 for the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia was equally bleak when first announced. Despite strong pressure on Congress from the Israel lobby, however, the sale was ultimately approved.

A contrasting view of the outcome is held by congressional staffers opposed to the sale. They, for the most part, predict rough sledding for the Administration request, noting, for example, that 73 Senators already have signed a resolution opposing sales of advanced weaponry to Jordan until that country states its willingness to negotiate directly with Israel. These sources point out that the House also adopted an amendment, which was subsequently dropped, to this year's foreign aid bill actually forbidding any sales to Jordan until King Hussein began direct negotiations with Israel.

Just prior to the beginning of the August congressional recess, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy stated that the Administration would not act on the arms sales in August, because "that would be an act of bad faith." The Administration upheld its promise. It is now September, however, and it appears the battle is about to begin.

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.