The Conditions of Peace

By Robert G. Hazo

The Palestinian problem remains the core issue to be resolved in any peace arrangement between Israel and the Arabs—as it was in the beginning, is now and, seemingly, ever shall be. Since Middle East history is littered with any number of plans, false starts and aborted attempts to resolve it, the current stirrings are appropriately viewed with skepticism.

On the other hand, King Hussein is undoubtedly correct when he observes that this will be the last chance to resolve the problem peacefully along the traditional lines of carving out some sort of homeland on the West Bank for the Palestinians. Though Israel will probably not realize its announced goal of 100,000 Israeli settlers on the West Bank by 1990—or even by the year 2000—because its economic crisis has forced a slowdown in the settlement program, the point beyond which no Israeli government could cut a deal on the West Bank is fast approaching. When that point is reached and partition is thereby excluded, the Palestinians, not wanting to go anywhere else but home, probably will intensify their struggle. After over a third of a century they show absolutely no indication of abandoning that struggle, so it almost certainly will be indefinitely prolonged.

The urgency is there. The choice may not be between the hope for a tolerable outcome or the toleration of the present situation, but between an intolerable situation now and an even more intolerable one in the future. It is, therefore, of the highest urgency that the limits of possible action by the principals be explored and that the main conditions for an agreement be set forth and analyzed.

The first such condition is that the interests of all those who must participate be enhanced or, at least, not diminished by the outcome. The principals to whom such a test would have to be applied, since each holds a veto power over the result, are: the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Arafat wing of the Palestinians, Syria (including the Abu Musa wing of the Palestinians) and Saudi Arabia, since it would probably be required to help subsidize the results.

The second condition is that each of the parties to the process enjoys enough power and freedom from domestic or international constraints to push the process through to a successful conclusion. Diplomatic negotiations are not, after all, academic conversations, but a form of power brokering, of trading off advantages and disadvantages.

Missing Links for Peace

Two main elements—the presence of either of which would virtually assure some kind of settlement—are absent. One is the willingness of the United States to use economic leverage primarily on Israel—and secondarily, if necessary, or some Arab states—as a form of political pressure to produce a settlement. In the aftermath of the Reagan initiative, Secretary Shultz made it clear that the use of such economic leverage on Israel was ruled out as both ineffective and unnecessary since, as he argued, "Peace is a winner." Ergo, the U.S. role in the peace process—whether it takes the form of playing the middle man, as in shuttle diplomacy, or that of a partner in face to face negotiations—will ostensibly be based primarily on persuasion. More realistically, the U.S. will be expected to underwrite the bulk of the expenses of an outcome, as we did with the Sinai II and Camp David agreements.

The second missing element is the absence of a unified Arab front and of sufficient Arab military might to incline Israel to want to settle peacefully. Though Syria has substantially improved its military posture—even to the point where a clear-cut Syrian defeat is no longer a foregone conclusion—the balance of power is such that Israel is not forced to conclude that hostilities would involve unacceptable losses. It is not difficult to imagine this situation changing rapidly if, for instance, Russia decided to strengthen Syria's hand by putting 500 Migs into Syrian airfields overnight. But the likelihood of such an event actually taking place is, at least for the present, small. Therefore, the Arabs generally—with or without Syrian participation—approach the negotiations from a position of weakness.

The absence of these elements mandates the achievement of three specific conditions: The absence of active Russian opposition, the neutralization of Syrian opposition and the willingness of Israel to offer enough to satisfy minimal Arab demands, one of which is preserving Arab, particularly Palestinian, honor.

Russian acceptance of some sort of settlement should not be ruled out for a variety of reasons, despite the prevailing wisdom that the Russians do all they can to keep the Middle East in turmoil, First and foremost, the Soviet Union is probably just as concerned with avoiding a superpower nuclear confrontation as is the U.S. and thus just as interested in stabilizing the area in which such a confrontation is most likely to occur. Whether slumbering or snarling, the Russian bear's incursion into Afghanistan has not been a notable success—some even speak of it as Russia's Vietnam. The Soviets, therefore, are likely to be more cautious in the future.

In any case, we are now dealing with a new Russian leadership which has inherited a number of major problems from the geriatric leadership that preceded it. A new leadership anxious to consolidate its power might well passively accept a peace effort of which it is not a part, provided that its position as a major power in the area were somehow preserved.

The Syrian Connection

Russian acceptance would by no means guarantee the second specific condition: The neutralization of Syrian opposition to the peace initiative. Syria has demonstrated on a number of occasions that it can be as independent of the Soviet Union as Israel frequently is of the United States. Therefore, to secure its acceptance—if not its active support—of the peace process would require nothing less than rapprochement between Egypt and Syria.

Ever since Mubarak took power Egypt has been trying to reingratiate itself with the Arab world-by helping Iraq in its war with Iran, by reestablishing diplomatic relations with Jordan, by welcoming Arafat and by trying to persuade the U.S. to back the peace initiative. Were Mubarak to make a public overture to Syria—by making a dramatic Sadat-like visit to Damascus, for instance—Assad would be placed in a difficult position, particularly since such a gesture would likely be welcomed by both the Egyptian and Syrian people.

Despite his improved position and despite his having surrogates doing most of the fighting in Lebanon, Assad is militarily overextended and knows it. Moreover, after Hama he has faced a precarious domestic situation made worse by the fact that he has not broadened his base by including more Sunnis in government. He is also in poor health, Some claim that he is keeping the conflict with Israel alive to divert attention from domestic disunitv by stressing the foreign threat. He could finesse the hypothetical Egyptian overture by agreeing to the Mubarak request that he not actively oppose a peace process that included liberation of the Golan Heights. That way he could rebuff Mubarak, satisfy Arab nationalist sentiment and, at the same time, preserve his option to continue the struggle, since he would assume that Israel would reject the Golan demand.

Will Israel Make a Deal?

We thus arrive at the third and key condition in this scenario: Israeli willingness to satisfy minimal Arab demands. It is misleading to say that Israel is currently polarized between doves who are willing to trade land for peace (as represented by Labor) and hawks who are not (as represented by Likud). Apart from the Peace Now movement which comprises less than 5 percent of the population, the real division is between hawks who are willing to offer token incentives (such as half of the occupied territories—i.e., only 10 percent of original Palestine—under strict conditions of demilitarization and controlled immigration) and super-hawks who are willing to give nothing.

Sharon recently observed that Jordan can expect nothing more than peace out of peace negotiations. An overwhelming majority of Israelis reject any kind of serious Palestinian entity on the West Bank, Indeed, even the ultra-Zionist Kahane is making headway. Having won a Knesset seat in 1984, he predicted that his party would gain eight seats in the next election. A recent private poll in Israel showed that Kahane's Kach party would indeed get eight or nine times the vote it got in 1984. Another poll showed that over 40 percent of the youth in Israel agree with him about removing all Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories, Moreover, about 40 percent in the same poll supported the use of Jewish terrorism against Arabs living under Israeli rule.

As of now, an Israeli willingness to meet minimal Arab demands would require radical and rapid change, a reversal of Israel's traditional seige mentality as well as the current drift to the right in Israeli society. For those minimal Arab demands include no less than the liberation of the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza and—most importantly—Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem. No Arab or Moslem government could abandon the Arab claim to Jerusalem and not risk serious repercussions.

There are compelling arguments aplenty why Israel should so change. It is losing population. Its economy is a disaster. It cannot indefinitely expect ever-increasing subsidies from its distant American patron, but must seek economic self-sufficiency through trade and commerce with its neighbors. Overwhelmingly outnumbered, it cannot hope to live indefinitely by ever-increasing hostility.

Whether or not the conditions of peace will or can be met should be decided by a careful weighing of the risks against the gains sought. Should an agreement be struck, then the issues will be how to implement it and how long it will hold, Whatever the eventual outcome, one thing is clear: in the Middle East, more so perhaps than elsewhere, the political sins of the fathers shall be doubly paid for by their children.

Robert G. Hazo is Chairman of the Middle East Policy Association and Senior Public Policy consultant of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.