The PLO: Down or Up?

Once again, the man who likes to ask us questions about the Middle East dropped into our office. As usual, he had an anxious look on his face, but was shifting his feet uneasily.

Q Well, you've been right about a couple of things

A Gee, thanks.

Q Yeah. I mean you were right about saying it was a sure thing the Israelis would go into Lebanon, and about how the Egyptians were going to start getting mad at us. What you told me about security in the Gulf still holds up, too.

A Hmmm. Is there something you would like me to do for you?

Q No. I mean, the thing is, it looks as though you were wrong last time when you said the PLO was not finished. General Sharon says the PLO suffered a crushing defeat—that's how he put it, a crushing defeat—not just militarily, but politically as well.

A And General Sharon would never tell a lie—

Q Aw, c'mon—

A Just kidding. But the point is, we have to accept the fact that General Sharon is going to look at things a certain way. It would be terrible for him if after all he went through it turned out that the PLO was just as alive as ever, politically—or maybe even more influential than before, And it is even less likely that he would want to concede that the PLO's military defeat was not a crushing one—even though there are those who believe that it was not a military defeat at all.

Q Who in tarnation believes that?

A The PLO believes it, for one.

Q Does it really matter what the PLO thinks?

A Yes, it does. It matters, because the perception of the Palestinian fighters as to what happened in West Beirut will have an effect on their future outlook and behavior. Instead of wanting to hide themselves in shame, in the hope that the world will forget about them, they will want to carry on the fight with a renewed sense of commitment and pride themselves.

Q But how could the Palestinians not think that they lost militarily?

A Easy. They held out against the Israelis for nearly three months—longer than any other Arab armies have ever stood up to them since 1948. Yes, it's true that the Israelis could have gone into West Beirut, and with their overwhelming power could eventually have won there. But the thing is, they didn't.

Q Didn't the Israelis hold back because of fear of causing civilian casualties?

A So they said. But the PLO fighters are convinced that the Israelis held back mostly because they were afraid there would be heavy Israeli military casualties. Remember this: last August 4, the Israelis made a push into West Beirut with their tanks, and after fighting for several hours they managed to move only a couple of hundred yards. In the process according to the Israelis' own official count, they lost 19 soldiers killed, and 64 wounded. This would be the equivalent, in terms of population—and the Israelis are fond of making such analogies—of the U.S. losing 1,300 dead and 4,500 wounded in just one day of fighting. If you were a Palestinian fighter, wouldn't you think that your showing on that day had had a deterrent effect?

A Did you say something?

Q Er—well, you must admit that by being forced to leave Beirut, and leave behind all that mass of equipment, the PLO has got itself into a much weaker military position than before.

A That's quite true. But you have to keep in mind that the PLO military posture was never that strong anyway. Even though it had all that armament in southern Lebanon, the PLO didn't have a single aircraft. They couldn't expect to beat the Israelis on their own. All they could do was harass them. The idea was to let the Israelis know that they could not sit back comfortably while denying justice to the Palestinians, but would have to keep paying a price.

Q But now that they are dispersed in eight countries, they won't even be able to harass the Israelis, will they?

A Don't count on it. The dispersed PLO fighters do not feel humiliated, as I said, but they certainly do feel angry. It doesn't stretch the imagination too much to believe that they will find ways of keeping up pressure on the Israelis, particularly through covert activities. And some of the more radical groups are likely to step up their use of terrorism as a weapon.

Q What about the crushing political defeat that General Sharon was talking about—was he wrong there, too?

A It certainly looks that way. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon has made practically all the world's countries more convinced than ever that there will always be bloodshed in the Middle East—and the danger of a confrontation, someday, with the Soviet Union—until a fair solution is found for the Palestinian problem. None of them have written the PLO off, and practically all of them believe it's now more important than ever to get the PLO involved.

Q How about the U.S.?

A We're still keeping the PLO at arm's length. But now that the Lebanon invasion has given the Administration a sense of real urgency, there's a better chance than ever that we'll eventually begin to talk to them. And don't forget that the proposals on the West Bank, which Mr. Reagan made just after the PLO's evacuation, come closer to the PLO's own position than the President has ever come before.

Q Hasn't the PLO's image taken a real dive in the Arab world, though?

A It certainly hasn't. In fact, you could say that the PLO's image has never been better. The Arab man -in -the- street appears to share the perception of the PLO fighters as to what happened in West Beirut, and is proud of them. This grassroots feeling is not lost on the Arab governments themselves, many of which have been criticized not only by the PLO but by their own people for not having gone to the PLO's aid.

Q But isn't the PLO hated in Lebanon?

A By some Lebanese, yes. It's hard to keep liking someone who has set up a tent in your own backyard and started carrying on a feud with one of your neighbors—particularly if your neighbor ruins your garden when he fights back. There are lots of Lebanese, however, who understand that the Palestinians are not in Lebanon of their own choice—and would no longer be there if they had a state of their own to go to. So they support the PLO in its attempt to get a Palestinian homeland.

One thing the withdrawal of the PLO has reminded people of, though, is that the Lebanese are perfectly capable of making a shambles of their own garden even when the PLO is not around. In Beirut, with the PLO gone, they have gone back to their age-old feuding against one another.

Q Okay, I guess you win. General Sharon was wrong.

A So what else is new? Please come back soon. Maybe we can chat about Mr. Begin next time.