The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy

By David C. Gordon. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. 171 pp. $18.50

Reviewed by Lawrence Mosher

For anyone who has watched the tragic unfolding of Lebanon's destiny over the past two decades, the question of its inevitability lies like a fog, obscuring the answer and yet unavoidably present. On the one hand, the country's communally oriented internal problems have kept it teetering from one crisis to the next since its modern evolution under the French mandate following World War I. Yet Lebanon's vulnerability to external manipulation has been equally obvious.

The June, 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, however, may have marked a watershed with enduring geographical implications for Lebanon's future definition. As the Israelis reestablish their presence south of the Awwali River, the fear that this move will turn into a permanent partitioning of Lebanon grows. Indeed, Lebanon's 41-year-old Christian president, Amin Gemayel, felt obliged August 25 to make a rare admission. Instead of blaming it all on outsiders—the list could go well beyond the Israelis, Syrians and Palestinians—Gemayel told his audience, "In reality, Lebanon is living divided in itself. The time has come for us to work together."

Insight and Timeliness

Whether or not that is now a hopeless plea is now a critical question not only for the Lebanese, but for Americans, too. And in this respect, a small but insightful new book, "The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy," by David C. Gordon, provides a timely basis for thoughtful judgment. U.S. Mideast policy has played no small part in moving Lebanon to its present predicament. Hence, understanding better all the forces at work in that provocative corner of the Mediterranean is a must for anyone who would influence what happens there, or who cares a whit for Lebanon's survival as a modern, pluralistic society.

Dr. Gordon, a professor of history at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio, spent many years examining the Lebanese scene when he taught at the American University of Beirut. In his book he has done a remarkably clear job of explaining a very complicated country's social, religious and political parts. He not only sets the stage for understanding what has most recently occurred there by providing useful historical background, but inserts handfuls of illuminating insights with an admirable objectivity.

In discussing the civil war that erupted in 1975, Dr. Gordon describes Lebanon's failure to develop an inner nucleus this way: "Even if in times of prosperity there was a degree of consensus, grounded in common vested interest if nothing else, this consensus was negative, it was based too much upon agreement as to what to avoid, not what to accomplish in common." It is this kind of shading that gives this book the kind of authoritative ring that is often lacking in others of this genre.

The author, of course, also lists "the extrinsic factors beyond Lebanon's own control" in trying to explain Lebanon's demise. But, as if to coax more admissions like Gemayel's recent plea, Dr. Gordon concludes by noting that even if Lebanon were to be left alone by the host of international meddlers involved, she would still have to resolve her own divisions. "The Lebanese themselves," Dr. Gordon writes, "need to confront and answer the question of what the intrinsic reasons were for the collapse of 1975—and not, as some are prone to do, to simply take the facile approach of blaming others exclusively for their woes. Extrinsic reasons, to be sure, are of crucial importance, and fate has been unkind to Lebanon, but others have overcome extreme adversity, and no nation can hope to survive on international sympathy alone."

Unraveling the Complexities

For me, a reporter who lived in Beirut during the 1960s and who returned several times later under unhappier circumstances, the author is at his best in unraveling the country's communal complexities at the core of its current dilemma. Most American journalists never really succeeded in explaining the players and motivations involved in Lebanon's "civil" war, leaving most readers and viewers, I'm sure, totally confused.

"This was not a class war," Gordon writes, although class consciousness played a role in it; it was not a war of Christian against Muslim, although in terms of numbers on either side this would seem to be true; and it was not a clash simply between left and right, although 'leftist' and Marxist predominated on one side."

The author then goes on to suggest a different set of terms to make better sense out of the admittedly perplexing Lebanese mosaic. The term "ultras," Gordon proposes, could describe "the hard-core defenders of an integral Lebanon" comprised of its Maronite Christian "Mountain" center and part of Beirut, which now may well come to pass as the new Lebanon. The "traditionals" are those Muslim and Christian leaders who basically want to preserve the status quo ante bellum. Those on the "left," he concludes, represent the "extragovernmental forces" that have sought a radical transformation of Lebanon into a secular and possibly socialist state.

Lawrence Mosher is a staff correspondent for the National Journal.