Turkey's Islamist-Led Government Seeking to Call New Elections

by James M. Dorsey

After less than one year, Turkey's Islamist-led government is crumbling under mounting military-backed secular pressure that it resign.

As a result, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, hoping to return to government with an even stronger popular mandate, has announced that his embattled coalition government may seek an early election. He says he could allow Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller, leader of the center-right True Path Party (DYP), the junior partner in the coalition, to head a caretaker government until the election takes place. Under the government protocol, Mrs. Ciller was originally due to take over as prime minister in June 1998.

Tough Conditions

But Erbakan has some tough conditions that need to be fulfilled before a handover takes place: parliament must first vote in favor of an early election and shield his pro-Islamic Welfare Party from the threat of a ban by the Constitutional Court. Top Turkish prosecutor Vural Savas petitioned the Constitutional Court in May to ban the Welfare Party on charges that the party's Islamist stance violates the secular nature of the constitution and is pushing Turkey toward a civil war.

Erbakan's conditions also are designed to force President Suleyman Demirel's hand. Senior government officials say that Demirel was more inclined to adhere to traditional practice in forming governments than simply giving Erbakan and Ciller a green light.

Under Turkish law Erbakan would first have to resign, after which Demirel would then ask a politician of his choice to form a government. Traditionally that would be the leader of the largest political party, in this case Erbakan. If he fails, Demirel would ask opposition Motherland Party (ANAP) leader Mesut Yilmaz as head of the second largest party, and only in case he too proves unable to form a government would it be the turn of Mrs. Ciller, whose party is the third largest in parliament.

Both Erbakan's Welfare and Ciller's DYP believe early elections could defeat mounting military-backed pressure for a government that would exclude the Islamists and crack down on Islamic activism. The government and the powerful and staunchly secular military have been on a collision course ever since the armed forces in February began demanding that it curb the role of Islam in public life.

With military-backed pressure increasing, the government already has lost its formal majority in the country's 550-member parliament. In recent weeks, several DYP deputies have resigned, reducing the number of government party deputies to 275. The resignations follow the earlier departure of three of Ciller's ministers. Equally serious is the withdrawal of DYP deputy chairman Necmettin Cevheri, one of Ciller's staunchest supporters in recent years.

With military-backed pressure increasing, the government already has lost its majority in parliament.

The weakening of the DYP comes as the government faces a multi-pronged attack from its opponents:

The main opposition Motherland Party (ANAP), headed by Mesut Yilmaz, is preparing to introduce yet another no-confidence motion in parliament, following the government's narrow victory over a similar earlier bid. Preparations are certain to include stepped-up efforts to persuade additional DYP deputies to defect. As a result, Ciller could find that the only way to salvage her leadership of the party might be to pull the DYP out of its coalition with Prime Minister Erbakan's pro-Islamic Refah (Welfare) Party
At a recent meeting the Supreme Military Council forced Erbakan to sign off on the expulsion of more than 100 military officers suspected of Islamist sympathies. In this way, senior commanders hoped to drive a wedge between the prime minister and his party rank-and-file by forcing him to endorse the expulsions from the armed forces. The meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which groups the 15 most senior commanders of the armed forces alongside the prime minister and the defense minister, also served to demonstrate to Erbakan unanimity in the military and to dash his hopes that retirement this year of several of the most senior commanders would reduce the pressure on him to curb the role of Islam in public life. Erbakan has yet to comply with measures against religious activism ordered in February by the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC), which groups the five most senior military commanders alongside the president, prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense and interior
Some officials with close ties to the military suggest that the prosecutors' petition to the Constitutional Court, which could take the court six months to review, could effectively block Welfare from calling an early election. They cite the example of similar proceedings against the DYP in the mid-1980s, when the court restricted that party's ability to hold party primaries or local congresses as long as it was under investigation. What was under investigation was a petition against the DYP that called for its closure on the grounds that it was simply a re-make of the Justice Party that had been banned after the 1980 military coup. The Constitutional Court subsequently dismissed the petition. This time constitutional lawyers say Welfare's ability to call an election would only be hampered if the court decides to do so.

The military is likely to prefer the creation of another government rather than an early election, which it says could provide results as inconclusive as those of the December 1995 polls that ultimately brought Welfare to office. Welfare, which received more votes than any other party in the 1995 election, but not enough to form a government by itself, hopes to increase its share of parliamentary seats next time.

The military, however, would like to see a government including ANAP and other secular parties that would introduce electoral reform a two-tier election system similar to France and changes to the political party law to ensure greater internal democracy and loosen the grip of party leaders on the party apparatus.