August/September 1996, Page 22
Translations From the Hebrew Press
Netanyahu: Palestinian Authority Can Halt Terror
When It Wants To
Translated and with explanatory notes by Dr. Israel
Shahak
—Ma’ariv, June 28, 1996. (Excerpts from
an interview with Binyamin Netanyahu by Khami Shalev, Ben Kaspit
and Menahem Rahat.)
Question: What mark would you give to the Palestinian Authority’s
struggle against terror? Were you surprised?
Netanyahu: I was not surprised. The real situation could
be seen and grasped by everyone who wanted to see it. Since the
last wave of terror acts, about three months ago1 we
have all seen that for the first time ever, the Palestinian Authority
actually did something. Its actions were not sufficient, were partial;
but still it did something against terror groups which act from
its territory. I think that they should do a lot more. They still
didn’t demolish Hamas’ infrastructure. They still didn’t
imprison its main activists. They still didn’t extradite a
single murderer to us. However, they have shown that they can act
if they want to, and thus they will not ever be capable of saying
that a Palestinian act of terror occurs because they are incapable
of acting against it. I have clarified to them that we will demand
that they honor their undertakings and that we are keeping our right
to act against terror. We will act against terror if they will not
act. 2
Q: Do you mean to liberalize the closure?
N: Any sort of closure does not represent our policy. We
have no wish to put pressure on the Palestinian population for any
reason.3 On the contrary, all my policies are intended
to benefit economically not only the Palestinians in the territories
but the Arab citizens of Israel. I am a firm believer in this. The
closure, in my view, could be justified only by the collapse in
security of the Israelis, which in turn was caused by the fact that
the issue of security was not dealt with properly by the Palestinian
Authority and also, perhaps, by us. If the security threat will
cease I see no reason for continuing a closure. We don’t believe
in closure as a way of life.
Q: When are you going to test this concept?
N: I am doing it already.
Q: When are you going to meet Yasser Arafat?
N: I opened negotiations with the Palestinian Authority
on the day I was elected. We are constantly widening those negotiations
using many channels and different levels. I repeat: there are many
differences and problems together with a wish for cooperation, but
I oppose the tenet that an agreement on some issues will be prevented,
or the differences will increase merely because there is no communication.
I promise: there will be communication.
Q: Is there a problem in a meeting between you and Arafat?
N: I have already said that if I think that a meeting between
myself and Arafat will benefit the State of Israel—I will consider
it.
NOTES:
1 The reference is to Feb. 26 and March 3 and 4 terror assaults.
2 The reference is to the Israeli right of “hot pursuit”
admitted in all Oslo accords but never yet exercised.
3 The reference is to the declared aim of Meretz and part of Labor
who were claiming that the closure is a beginning of a “blessed”
separation between Palestinians and Israelis. Apart from the absurdity
of the claim, since the existence of the settlements and a free
movement of not only the settlers themselves but of every Jew who
wants to visit them makes nonsense of the “separation,”
it is true that apartheid has always been desired mostly by the
Zionist “left” and opposed by Likud.
Netanyahu, The First Steps, Interview and Comments
(Abridged)
Yediot Ahronot, June 28, 1996.
By Shimon Shiffer and Nahum Barnea
The general message Binyamin Netanyahu tries to convey is that
instead of the old formula which had been sanctified by Rabin and
Peres he brings a new one, equally sacred. Rabin and Peres said
that terror should be separated from the peace negotiations. “We
shall not allow the enemies of peace to win.” “We will
continue with the negotiations in spite of terror.” 1
Netanyahu has other mantras. He sees Hezbollah as an arm of the
Syrian government and Hamas as an arm of Yasser Arafat. If there
are acts of terror, all negotiations will cease. Netanyahu believes
that this formula will create an incentive, at least for Yasser
Arafat, to prevent terror.
But Netanyahu also has other aims in introduction of the new formula.
To say “either terror or peace” is certain to succeed
in the U.S. The saying is short, simple and can be easily grasped.
The most important columnists of the U.S. press are certain to praise
it. The Senate and House members are certain to give it a standing
ovation. The Israeli problem is that the applauding congressmen
will refuse to send their sons to either Lebanon or Hebron. It is
not sure whether they will continue to want to send their sons to
Dhahran, where an act of terror occurred this week.
Rabin and Peres didn’t invent their sacred formula from any
love of the Arabs. Neither did the U.S. prompt them. They had a
feeling that this was the best way. Netanyahu is sure that another
way should be tried. In the present stage of his leadership he is
sure that he should try his own way and that, if he succeeds, he
will get a Nobel Prize too.
However, the results of the Israeli elections have brought about
a weakening in the cooperation between the Palestinian Shabak—represented
by Jibril Rajub, Muhammad Dahlan and others—and the Israeli
Shabak. There is no dissociation, but some keeping of a distance.
The seniors of the [Israeli] security system and people close to
the prime minister admit the fact. The cooperation, which before
the elections was so derided,2 now has become an essential
part of Netanyahu’s efforts to maintain the necessary relations
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Netanyahu denies this. “I don’t feel that there was any
operational change,” he told us, “at least until now.”
However, in the talks held by his political adviser, Dore Gold,
with Abu Maazen, Gold put pressure on Abu Maazen to return the cooperation
to its former state. Gold is due to meet soon with Yasser Arafat.3
Arafat’s friends in the [Israeli] security system consider
the meeting to be very important. “We must pass a message to
Arafat that he is our equal partner, in spite of the fact that there
is no equality whatsoever. We must cheer him up, we cannot allow
ourselves to isolate him. Any talk with Abu Maazen, his rival, only
angers Arafat and harms us.”
NOTES:
1 Slogans constantly used by Rabin and Peres and hence recognizable
in Israel without a need of attribution.
2 By Netanyahu and all his present coalition partners.
3 They met on June 27.
The Cleavages in Israeli Society Revealed By the Elections
Foreword: If one deducts the two groups whose vote approached
unanimity, the religious Jews and the Israeli Arabs, the rest of
the vote was heavily influenced by income: the poorer the locality,
the larger the vote for Netanyahu. It is clear that, had not the
Israeli media supported Peres so overwhelmingly, and often quite
unfairly, Netanyahu’s majority would have been much greater
than it was. The fact that Labor is the party of the wealthy also
meant that Peres’ campaign funding was much larger than Netanyahu’s.
In spite of all this, the parties supporting Netanyahu in the Knesset
have 68 seats (59 in the 1992 election) and those supporting Peres
52 (61 in 1992). This change, amounting to about 15 percent, is
an upheaval in Israeli politics.
The Election Reveals the Deep Division of the Israeli
Jewish Nation
Maariv, May 31, 1996.
By Ron Miberg
A ten-minute drive separates the Morasha neighborhood in Ramat-Ha’sharaon
from Herzliya Pituach. Ten minutes and 100 years. Morasha seemed
like the battleground of God’s army after Rabbi Kaduri gave
the order to attack. Old private cars and commercial vehicles zig-zagged
through the streets transporting elderly voters. Talmudic scholars,
never seen in the streets, stood at the entrances of the houses,
checking whether potential voters were hiding in their beds.
Herzliya Pituach seemed like a town in the Mediterranean Riviera.
The streets in the largest restaurant quarter in Israel were jammed.
Long lines formed in front of restaurants. Wealthy Israelis, self-assured
or even very complacent, lent the day a pronounced American interpretation.
Shiny cars, current fashions and a wonderful feeling of victory
attended a culinary picnic. Shimon Peres ate there. First we saw
the many security men in front of the expensive “Dona Flor”
restaurant. Then the silver Cadillac parked on the sidewalk, touching
the door of the restaurant.
If Peres is eating at “Dona Flor” in the heart of Israeli
yuppiedom, I told my family that the situation must be fine. I actually
believed that. Otherwise how could one explain that arrogant whim
on the afternoon of election day. The world is in turmoil and he
is sipping fine wine. The Latin-style lunch that Peres and his numerous
staff ate at “Dona Flor” was merely a symptom. The illness
that was revealed this week is that, even if the final vote result
is still open and wobbling on one single vote, Yitzhak Rabin’s
death left his colleague wallowing in the failures and stigmas of
his past.
Despite their joint work, the reconciliation, the great achievements,
the wave of construction and development and the worldwide sympathy,
Rabin alone carried the burden and glory of history on his shoulders.
Netanyahu’s victory proves that the direct elections for prime
minister were already held in 1992. Then Rabin defeated Yitzhak
Shamir. These direct elections jump-started the peace process and
created the false image of a people seeking peace and prepared for
concessions. In hindsight it turns out that it was not a victory
of a road to peace nor of an outlook, but rather a very personal
victory. Yitzhak Rabin bested Yitzhak Shamir, it was that simple.
Shimon Peres did not succeed in besting Binyamin Netanyahu. Rabin’s
true legacy to Peres is that it is impossible to win without Rabin.
In an amazing historic twist, Israel showed the world that Rabin’s
murder was perceived as only Rabin’s murder. Without waves
of political shock. Without circles of consequences. Apparently,
this is a sane and correct state of affairs. The assassination of
the prime minister is not supposed to change the voting patterns
of the voter.
Even if he does not vote for Peres and for Labor, we have no right
to suspect the average voter of not feeling deep and honest sorrow
for Rabin’s death. Because if we suspect that Rabin’s
murder caused joy among half of the nation, we should fold up the
Zionist tent right now and pack our belongings. I do not think that
this is the situation. The two Jewish peoples living now in Israel
have two leaders: Shimon Peres and Binyamin Netanyahu. One of those
two peoples bested the opponent by several tens of thousands of
votes and forced its leader on them. That is not pleasant, it is
annoying, it arouses concern and great anxiety, but that is the
situation.
A less terrible alternative is national unity government. In any
event, especially at the end of the 20th century when the character
of most nations of the world is becoming clearer and their course
is becoming more obvious, our own skies have darkened. With all
due respect to our democratic traditions, I suspect that the next
prime minister will be the prime minister of us all only on paper
and of half the nation in practice. There is no ideological compromise
between the two political roads. Such a compromise would mean running
in one place. Running in place is regression. After that come the
slogans: “Our situation was never better,” and “Time
is working in our favor.” We have already seen how they work.1
Israel has really become a binational state. Starting from this
morning we are two nations: Jews A and Jews B.2 The Kingdom
of Israel and the Kingdom of Judea. This is a tragic state of affairs
because the manner of voting, the massive mobilization of the Orthodox
Jews and the Arabs have clashed in an irreparable manner. The right
wing will not be satisfied until it finds a way to delegitimize
the Arabs in Israel and remove them at least partially from the
democratic decision-making process. The left will never adjust to
the fact that the people who dashed its dreams were the Orthodox
Jews and their rabbis, a significant part of whom do not recognize
the sovereignty of the government of Israel. The Orthodox Jews used
Netanyahu as their tool. Not flesh of their own flesh, but someone
who would do good for them. Peres and Netanyahu identified the close
tie between them and ordered their people to apply psychological
pressure. Labor recruited the Arab muezzins3 and
religious leaders in order to win. The Likud recruited Rabbi Shach
and other Orthodox rabbis. The latter determined our fate. It may
be democratic but it stinks.
It is not too early to analyze the failure of Labor. On one hand
they believed in the silent power of Rabin’s legacy, in the
scar of pain that his death branded into the voter’s conscience.
On the other hand, they did not make intelligent use of that. Peoples
with pagan mourning rites used to embalm their dead. Not only did
Labor not embalm Rabin, it hid him.
If that order came from Peres himself, then he has paid for it
in full. First he tried to be balanced and hold elections on time.
Then he capitulated to his impulses and held them earlier but not
early enough. If he had set the elections for February perhaps things
would have been different. That was how capricious and impulsive
this election campaign really was. In the interim we suffered the
series of terrorist attacks that gave Likud and Netanyahu that strange
balance—Rabin’s murder vis-â-vis the attacks. When
Peres curbed Hamas, it was already too late.
What is to be done? A state cannot decide to split. According to
the election results we need three states for three peoples. The
two Jewish peoples and one Palestinian people. That will not happen
in reality, but the results threaten to poison our lives for the
next four years. The division of the Knesset seats guarantees that
it does not matter who is the next prime minister. The rabbinical
supervisors will control him. Peres, as the Likud so effectively
threatened, wanted to divide Jerusalem. The denials were to no avail.
Netanyahu might divide Israel itself.
NOTES:
1 The two slogans were used in 1967-73.
2 This has been clear for a long time, at least since 1977.
3 A reference to the fact that in some Arab villages on election
day the muezzins added to the call for prayer a call to vote
for Peres. |
