Reconstructing a Shattered Somalia

By Stanley B. Andrews

Somalia, once a Cold War ally of the US, is a country desperately in need of the values of "a kinder and gentler society." Reports of starving and dying women and children in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, reflect some of the consequences of emphasizing strategic assistance policies to the exclusion of "people-centered development."

In May 1988, an apocalyptic civil war erupted which has continued to wreak widespread havoc and destruction on this drought-prone nation on the Horn of Africa. Despite installation of Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim president on Jan. 29, 1991, deep divisions continue along traditional clan lines. Approximately 75 percent of the farming land hasn't been planted this year. Out of a population of 6 million, an estimated half million persons face immediate starvation, and this number could increase to two or three million in the absence of extensive international aid.

Strategic Priorities

Historically, Somalia was known for camels, frankincense and, at mid-century, beef for British Aden. Unification of British Somaliland in the north with Italian Somaliland in the south led to independence in 1960, and Somalia joined the League of Arab States. Subsequently, when Somalia requested assistance to upgrade its security forces, it was rebuffed by the West because of Western alliances with rival Ethiopia.

In 1962, the Soviet Union began to supply military and other aid to Somalia, whose chief value in the Cold War was its airfield and deepwater ports at Berbera. Particularly significant was Soviet help in establishing a KGB-type National Security Service (NSS), which engineered a military takeover in 1969 by Mohammad Siad Barre.

During the next 21 years of his regime, Barre consolidated power by appointment of his minority Marehan clan members from the south to key government posts and by using the NSS to further fragment traditional clan alliances.

Greater Somalia

Morning calls to prayer in Hammarweyn, the old Arab quarter of Mogadishu, are a reminder that Somalis are unique in Africa by having a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, a common language (Somali), and a predominantly Sunni Muslim religion. Most of its political problems result from clan rather than ethnic divisions. Before and after independence, therefore, Somali leaders attempted to merge all ethnic Somalis into one nation-state. Constantly in search of water and grazing for their flocks, Somalis inhabit the southeastern Ogaden region of Ethiopia, northern Kenya, and Djibouti.

Barre recognized the political potential of "irridentism, " e.g., a Greater Somalia, for mobilizing disparate Somali clans across borders around the goal of realignment of colonial boundaries. With the ouster of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, and the establishment of a Marxist state in Ethiopia, cracks appeared in the Soviet-Somalia alliance.

Despite Soviet warnings, Barre rolled tanks and troops into the Ogaden and Haud areas of Ethiopia in July of 1977. The battle was over by the following March with the crushing defeat of Somalia's forces by Ethiopians backed up by Soviet and Cuban support.

As a consequence of the Ogaden war, Somalia shifted to American patronage, and became a strategic component of US Middle Eastern policy. In the mid-1980s, the West donated more than $100 million worth of food and other commodities to Somalia, which became recognized as having one of the largest refugee populations in the modem world (estimated at 1.5 million persons in 35 camps, and 500,000 persons in urban areas). Barre was able to divert much of the international and American assistance away from clans in areas of Somalia which were not supportive of his administration.

Civil War in the North

In 1981, Isaak clan leaders, soldiers and well-educated professionals had organized the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London. In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed that neither government would support the other's opposition movements. As a result, the SNM had to either leave Ethiopia or go on the offensive.

SNM guerrillas attacked the northern Somali towns of Hargeisa, Burao, and Erigabo and Berbera. Government troops moved to retake territory and Barre requested US military aid. The US airlifted military supplies to government troops, who bombarded civilian urban areas. An estimated 50,000 persons—many of whom were women and children—were killed, and 450,000 refugees fled to Ethiopia. During the hostilities which followed, government troops gradually lost control of the countryside. In 1989, clashes intensified as the military fired upon civilians leaving a mosque in Mogadishu, resulting in 450 persons dead. Hostilities accelerated as other clans in the south and the Hawiye clan in the Mogadishu area joined the growing opposition.

US Ambassador James Keough Bishop arrived in late 1989 and wound down US assistance programs and legitimacy for the Barre government, but too little and too late. In early 1991, the US and other embassies started to evacuate, and American Marines airlifted the last 100 Embassy officials just ahead of the arrival of hostile rebels.

Disaffected government troops shelled Mogadishu—including the new $35 million US Embassy. Finally, on Jan. 27, 1991, Mohammed S. Barre fled with his Red Berets in a convoy of tanks and military vehicles heading south toward Kismayo. He is now believed to be in his home village of Garba Harye.

Reconstructing a Nation-State

Somalia's new interim president, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, has called for free elections, although no timetable has been set for a vote. As a member of the Hawiye clan in central Somalia (United Somali Congress), he lacks the support of other key clans in the south which back the Somali Patriotic Movement and the SNM in the north. The SNM, which now controls the strategic port of Berbera, received much of its support from Ethiopia and has disdained joining a federal union without playing a decisive leadership role. The SNM has suggested that the present capital be moved to a location between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the former capital of British Somaliland.

There is room for optimism, however. Somali culture is inherently democratic and egalitarian. Even though diplomatic and governmental infrastructures remain to be established, and security remains a significant problem, Somalis are attempting to rebuild their nation, with whatever foreign aid is available.

Making an Impact

There is general concern by most aid organizations that only humanitarian assistance be given to opposing Somali political organizations, so that conciliation attempts will have a chance. Conventional development assistance through such organizations as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program are on hold. Other multilateral agencies such as UNICEF and the International Committee for the Red Cross will provide basic health care and related services as soon as security improves. UNHCR is planning for repatriation of large refugee populations from Somalia which are in Ethiopia and Kenya.

The dimensions of a new American and multilateral policy for foreign aid to Somalia are emerging. There is an emphasis upon humanitarian aid geared to short- and long-term human needs, apart from former Cold War strategic priorities. Herman J. Cohen, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recently intimated that the aid pipeline might soon start to flow again, and that the American Embassy could be reopened in Mogadishu as early as October.

Somalia is an example of how US foreign policy often has been neither strategic (in a military sense) nor in the interests of the American or Somali people. In any case, US State Department spokespersons have asserted that there no longer are geopolitical stakes in the Horn of Africa.

Many legislators now recognize the need for reform of US governmental agencies, and utilization of alternative channels such as private voluntary organizations. In the absence of a domestic constituency for most categories of foreign aid, it will be difficult to obtain support unless both local and international concerns are included in the development of a "people-centered" foreign policy.

Dr. Stanley B. Andrews is director of the Division of Sponsored Research at Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL.