Arab Petro Politics

By Abdulaziz Al-Sowayegh. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 207 pp. $25.00

Reviewed by Ibrahim M. Oweiss

Exactly 11 years ago Salem Sabah, then Kuwait's Ambassador to the United States and now Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, told an audience of American businessmen in Dallas that "crude oil can be refined into high-octane political fuel." His warning was delivered just two months before the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli War, during which the Arabs used their oil successfully as a political weapon for the first time.

This book is a history of the use of oil as a political vehicle, and a discussion of strategies for its future use by the Arab oil exporting countries to achieve political goals.

Echoing a theme adopted almost 20 years ago at the Fifth Petroleum Congress held in Cairo under the auspices of the League of Arab States, the author argues that the oil weapon should not be used only in response to acts of aggression by Israel—or its allies—against the Arabs or their lands. It also should be used actively as a means to liberate Palestine.

"Actors in the Oil Game"

Dr. Al-Sowayegh, an assistant deputy minister in Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Information, has divided his book into five parts. The first part is a brief review of the importance of Arab oil and the manner in which the principal actors in the oil game have interacted. These actors are (1) the major oil companies, (2) the oil importing nations, whether industrialized or developing, and (3) the oil exporting nations. In this section the author also provides an historical review of OPEC's achievements during the period from 1970 to 1973, when OPEC dictated production and pricing policies in a manner compatible with the political aspirations of the Arab nations.

The second part is a brief presentation of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of the strategies pursued by Israel—and by the West, the author says—to gain control of Palestine and other Arab lands. In the same section he discusses strategies pursued by Arab League states and how they have used the "oil weapon" to face up to the Israeli challenge.

The third and fourth parts of the book seek to explain the evolution of Arab oil as a political weapon and how it was used both before and during the October, 1973, war. Elements of the Arab oil strategy at the time included: (1) An oil production policy in which output was reduced; (2) an Arab oil embargo which was hardly felt in 1956, somewhat felt in 1967, and had its greatest impact in 1973; and (3) a pricing policy under which OPEC increased the price of oil fivefold by January, 1974.

Dr. Al-Sowayegh describes the impact of these measures on the West. In this section he quotes a remark by former Saudi Minister of Industry Ghazi al-Gosaibi who, in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, told his U.S. audience that, had it not been for America's "uncritical support" for Israel during the 1973 war, U.S.-Saudi relations would have developed into "a textbook case of superpower-smallpower partnership."

The last section of this book focuses on the basic elements governing the use of oil to achieve Arab political goals: Its role as a major source of world energy, the presence of the bulk of world oil reserves in Arab lands, the huge expansion of trade between the Arab nations and the U.S. and between the Arabs and the European nations, and the recycling of petrodollars into U.S. and European banking institutions.

The questions that arise are: Do the Arabs really possess a petro-political power and, if so, can they utilize it effectively? Dr. Al-Sowayegh, who received his doctorate in international relations from Claremont University in 1976 and who taught at King Saud University in Riyadh before joining the Saudi Ministry of Information in 1979, answers both questions with a clear affirmative.

Less Petro-power

In spite of his strong convictions and his careful documentation of his thesis, however, questions remain. The glut that has persisted in international oil markets since 1980, and the reduction in demand due—among other reasons—to the 1980-83 world recession, have made the U. S. and Europe less dependent on imported oil. With such developments, Arab petro-power has in fact become more limited than before.

It can also be argued that if the Arabs have the petro-power, they are not utilizing it adequately. An example is the failure to use it to deter Israel from its attack on Lebanon in 1982 and its continued occupation of southern Lebanon.

Designed as a brief study of a complex subject, the book is almost too concise. It would have been particularly useful if the author had expanded his discussion of one aspect of Petropower which clearly can still be used as a political weapon: The political management of petrodollar deposits now in American and European institutions. Other important points also are summarized in a short paragraph or two, leaving the reader wishing for more.

The book, however, is a useful and well-documented study. It serves very effectively as a quick reference and, in so doing, it certainly fills an important gap in the existing literature.

Ibrahim M. Oweiss is Professor of Economics at Georgetown University and a member of the Executive Committee of the University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.