Mondale/Reagan and Mideast

By Claire Pettengill

As the Republicans return home from Dallas and the final phase of the 1984 presidential campaign gets underway, it is hard to see much difference between Democrats and Republicans on Middle East issues. Still it is possible to make some distinctions concerning how the candidates of the two parties are likely to approach the formulation of policy.

Both presidential candidates and both party platforms advocate a U.S. policy based on strong support for and cooperation with the state of Israel. Both parties (and candidates) refuse to deal with the PLO unless it first recognizes Israel, and both oppose creation of an independent Palestinian state. The 1984 Democratic platform advocates—as it has since 1972—official recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and says the U.S. should move its embassy there from Tel Aviv. The Republicans oppose moving the embassy, while saying in their platform that Jerusalem should be "undivided." (For excerpts from the Republican platform, see p. 6.)

As everyone knows, however, campaign promises are not necessarily a guide to future behavior.

Flip-flopping Positions

The Jerusalem issue is a perfect example. Candidate Ronald Reagan said in 1980 that Israel should retain sovereignty over a united Jerusalem. As President, however, Mr. Reagan has firmly opposed the congressional initiative to force his Administration to change over 30 years of U.S. policy by moving the embassy.

Similarly, Presidential Candidate Walter Mondale, an ardent supporter of Israel, says he opposes a Palestinian homeland. But in 1977, when he was Vice President under Jimmy Carter, Mr. Mondale told the World Affairs Council of Northern California that the Palestinians needed "a stake in peace ... including the possibility of a Palestinian homeland or entity, preferably in association with Jordan."

In the case of arms sales to Arab nations, both Mr. Reagan (in 1980) and Mr. Mondale (in 1984) have campaigned against the sale of sophisticated U.S. weapons to countries refusing to recognize Israel. But in office, both men sang a different tune. Vice President Mondale publicly supported the Carter Administration's decision to sell F-15 fighter bombers to Saudi Arabia. And President Reagan lobbied hard for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981, and has since sold the Saudis "Stinger" missiles.

These flip-flops demonstrate the gap between campaign rhetoric and the realities that shape U.S. Middle East policy. But there are other factors at work. Despite superficial similarities in both rhetoric and behavior between Messrs. Reagan and Mondale, a look at the basic ideology which has shaped each candidate's view of the Middle East provides a better idea of how a Reagan Administration and a Mondale Administration might differ.

Ronald Reagan has always seen the Middle East through the prism of his fundamental, anti-Soviet ideology. In a 1978 speech at an Israeli Bond dinner, he characteristically blamed Middle East conflicts on "the Soviet Union stirring a witches' brew, furthering its own imperialistic ambition." His support of Israel, which he has called "a deterrent to Soviet aggression," and his condemnation of the PLO, which he considers a Soviet pawn, are best understood in the context of this basic world view.

Before 1980, President Reagan often displayed ignorance of purely regional issues that did not fit into his anti-Soviet theories. His campaign statements of 1976 and 1980, for example, show that he believed the Palestinian issue to be basically a matter of settling refugees. In 1980, he blithely suggested settling homeless Palestinians in Jordan, which he erroneously said had been "designated by the United Nations as the Arab Palestinian state."

Gaining a Better Understanding

As President, however, he seems to have gained a deeper understanding of the Palestinian tragedy, largely as a result of the war in Lebanon. His 1982 peace initiative states that while the U.S. will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, it also rejects "annexation or permanent control by Israel." Mr. Reagan's support for a Palestinian homeland in association with Jordan is a significant departure from his previous view that Jordan is the Palestinian state.

Nevertheless, Reagan's experience in office has not altered his fundamental view of the Middle East as a strategic prize in the tug-of-war between East and West. The rise of Syria as a regional power supported by the Soviet Union, as well as American losses in the Lebanon fiasco, have on the contrary strengthened this conviction in recent months. The Administration's attack on "state sponsored terrorism," as well as the November, 1983, strategic cooperation agreement with Israel, are concrete signs that an anti-Soviet rationale for U.S. Middle East policy is still very much alive.

Walter Mondale's view of the Middle East is also determined by ideology, but his is different from Ronald Reagan's. Although Mr. Mondale is strongly anti-communist and suspicious of Soviet motives, especially in the Persian Gulf, his commitment to Israel and his belief in the identity of U.S. and Israeli interests seem to transcend his fear of the Russians. Mr. Mondale asserts that the "bedrock" of U.S. Middle East policy must be the "special relationship" between the U.S. and Israel. He describes U.S. support of Israel as a moral imperative, a view he absorbed from his political mentor, Hubert H. Humphrey.

Despite his experience as vice president, Mr. Mondale's positions today are often closer to those of the Israeli government than to U.S. policy under either Presidents Carter or Reagan. Mr. Mondale has condemned the Reagan Administration for "abandoning" the Camp David peace process. This echoes Israel's rejection of the Reagan initiative as "incompatible" with Camp David. Similarly, Mr. Mondale refuses to describe Israeli settlements as illegal, even though Jimmy Carter and presidents before him did.

Partly in response to the candidacy of Jesse Jackson, whose Middle East views alarmed pro-Israel Democrats, Mr. Mondale has drawn attention to his pro-Israel credentials throughout the 1984 campaign. He says that he has supported moving the U.S. embassy in Israel for over 20 years, well before his own party included the issue in its platform. And when challenged by Senator Gary Hart during the New York primary, Mr. Mondale boasted that "if Mr. Hart wants to debate who has been the most consistent supporter of Israel, he is going to regret it."

It appears, therefore, that Walter Mondale's moderate views on the Palestinians and arms sales during the Carter Administration were more a function of his loyalty to the President than of a genuine evolution of his own beliefs. In fact, Mr. Mondale's views on the Middle East seem not to have changed for more than 20 years, despite changes in the issues and in the area. Given the duration and strength of his commitment to Israel, it is not certain that even a term as President would temper Mr. Mondale's position.

Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, while strongly committed to Israel as a strategic asset of the U.S., has demonstrated a capacity to moderate his views on some Mideast issues—especially those based on ignorance rather than ideology.

For many years, observers of U.S. Middle East policy have speculated that any second-term president would be less deterred by domestic political considerations in pushing ahead with the Middle East peace process. This factor, combined with signs that experience has deepened Ronald Reagan's understanding of complex Middle East realities, could be important in a second Reagan term.

Claire Pettengill is a freelance writer on Middle East affairs.