A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute

By Richard H. Curtiss, American Educational Trust Washington, D.C. 1982 216 pp. $9.95

Reviewed by John P. Richardson

One of the most intriguing aspects of Richard Curtiss's new book on American perceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict is its timeliness. The book, available in major bookstores as well as through its publisher, the American Educational Trust, documents the thesis that in recent years the American public has developed a broader understanding of the Arab-Israel conflict, resulting in a more balanced view of rights and wrongs on both sides.

Publication came just as the strong American reaction of shock and revulsion to the carnage in Lebanon as shown on television was itself contributing to the changing American image of the Middle East conflict.

A Changing Image is really two books—the first half a brisk summary of the history of the Arab-Israel conflict and American policy toward it, and the second half elaborating on the title and providing insights into how the war for the hearts and minds—not to mention the votes—of policy makers is waged.

King-Crane and Lavon

Among less-known but historically significant points illuminated in the study are the King-Crane Commission and the notorious "Lavon Affair." The King-Crane Commission was an official American investigating mission sent by President Wilson to Palestine and Syria in 1919 to determine the wishes of the population concerning its political future. The team, headed by two distinguished Americans, Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, a prominent businessman, reported that the people wanted above all to be independent. The team also reported a prescient concern among the 90% Christian and Muslim majority in Palestine that creation of a Jewish state would mean loss of their homeland.

The Lavon Affair was a little-known campaign by Israeli intelligence in 1954 to derail growing Egyptian-American friendship by having spies plant bombs in American offices in Cairo. Bombs were set off, but the saboteurs were caught and the plot's origins revealed before further damage was done.

The second half of the book, dealing with the "lobbies" skirmishing in Washington and around the country, confirms that while the Israel lobby both the Jewish and the non-Jewish-has gained in strength and sophistication over the years, its once-virtual monopoly on attitudes has eroded. The main reasons, as noted by the author, lay in events that took place in the Middle East: the 1973 war and the first credible Arab military performance against Israel; the Arab oil embargo, signaling new power; and the twin phenomena of Anwar Sadat (who created American support) and Menahem Begin (who threw it away). However, as the author suggests, while there has been an increase in the number and visibility of Arab and Arab-American groups in the United States, their impact on American attitudes and policy is difficult to assess.

Trickle-down Opinions

The final section of the book, dealing with opinion trends reflected in American attitudes toward the Middle East over the years, makes a number of significant observations based on a study of opinion polls. One is that for many years the results of polls conducted by the various major polling organizations demonstrated "a high degree of consistency" concerning the Middle East. Another important point revealed by the polls is that whereas in the past it was the better-educated and affluent Americans who were "more favorably inclined" toward Israel than the total population, "today the reverse is true." Over the longer term what the author calls the "trickle down" effect of such views is likely to be reflected more widely.

It is ironic that the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, though denounced in the Arab World for what was regarded as his separate peace with Israel, was nevertheless responsible for the single greatest increase in American support for the Arabs. Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem more than doubled the percentage of Americans sympathetic to the Arabs. It is interesting that polls asking about the Palestinian goal of a homeland generate a positive reaction, whereas similar questions mentioning the PLO generate little support despite the fact that most Palestinians see no contradiction between the two.

Americans trying to come to grips with the Arab- Israel conflict would do well to keep in mind the author's observation, after one-quarter of a century of Middle East-related government service, of this point: whereas American officials in most parts of the world are proud to articulate and defend national policy toward the country in which they serve, the majority of American officials posted in the Middle East regard American policy as "a prescription for disaster." We hope it will not always be so.

Mr. Richardson is President of the Center for Middle East Policy, based in Washington.