Washington Report, August 23, 1982, Page 3

Humiliation For U.S.

It was not the PLO which was humiliated during the siege of Beirut. Even the Israeli troops on the ground acknowledged that the guerrillas fought bravely—and with unexpected effectiveness. The humiliation was suffered by the U.S. Administration. This was the view not only of the Administration's critics but of a growing number of its supporters.

The basic problem, which became more pronounced as the siege went on, was a pattern of contempt by Israel for U.S. actions and statements—and a failure by the U.S. to insist openly that it meant what it said.

For many, the process of progressive humiliation began its course back on July 4, when Israel chose to ignore the U.S.'s first public request to give a break to the battered civilian population of West Beirut. The request of that day was made through the United Nations, when the U.S. took the unusual step of voting for a Security Council resolution critical of Israel—one which called for "the restoration of the normal supply of vital facilities, such as water, electricity, food and medical provisions." Israel not only ignored the U.S.-backed resolution at the time it was voted, but continued to ignore it throughout practically all of the siege.

As Israel began to step up the intensity of its bombing and shelling assaults on the besieged capital, its barely concealed scorn of U.S. government views became even more evident.

For example, on July 28 U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer said that the bombing of Beirut the previous day was "the source of the greatest possible regret to us." Four days later on August 1, the Israelis proceeded to bomb Beirut non-stop for 14 hours: making its biggest sustained attack since the invasion of Lebanon. So much for the opinion of the State Department.

When President Reagan himself got into the act it might have been reasonable to assume that Israel would pay closer attention. But it was not to be. On August 1, apparently annoyed at Israel's defiance, Mr. Reagan stated the U.S. position more bluntly. "I think it's absolutely imperative." he said, "that this cease-fire at this stage of the negotiations must not be violated by anyone." He also had himself photographed looking uncharacteristically grim prior to a meeting at the White House with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, during which he told Mr. Shamir that "the world can no longer accept a situation of constantly escalating violence."

Was anybody in Jerusalem bothering to listen? Apparently not, because on August 4, three days after Mr. Reagan's pronouncement from the summit, the violence in Beirut escalated to the greatest level yet when the Israelis not only unleashed a record -breaking, 20-hour bombardment (during which, with symbolic irony, the American University hospital was hit by nine shells) but also moved their tanks several hundred yards into West Beirut for the first time since the siege began.

During the middle of the bombardment, Mr. Reagan issued a statement which was by now becoming as familiar as it was devoid of any real meaning. He announced that he had "expressed to the government of Israel the absolute necessity" (after the previous assault, he had used the phrase "absolutely imperative") "of re-establishing and maintaining a strict cease-fire in place." Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes spelled it out even more clearly by stating: "our desire is (that the Israelis) back off from their advance. . ." The Israelis, of course, did no such thing. They turned down the Presidential wish, and did not back off from any of the advances made by their tanks until preparations got underway for the evacuation of the guerrillas more than two weeks later.

For many Americans and a growing number of foreign leaders, it was becoming increasingly hard to believe that the President of the nation which was Israel's chief patron would allow his publicly-stated pleas and warnings to be consistently flouted without making any complaint—much less taking any overt action. Yet there was worse to come.

On August 7, two Israeli jet fighters, both of them U.S.-made F-16's, made several mock attacks—passing "dangerously" close and lasting for 15 minutes, according to Pentagon officials—at two U.S. helicopters which were carrying an American military liaison team from the aircraft carrier Forrestal to the Lebanese port of Juniyah. The team had been on its way to a meeting with U.S. mediator Philip Habib to discuss evacuation plans for the PLO. The very next day, when the helicopters were again heading towards Juniyah with the liaison team, a gunboat believed by the pilots to be Israeli aimed its machine gun at them. When the U.S. officers landed, Israeli troops prevented them from going to meet Mr. Habib on schedule, and drove trucks onto the landing zone to prevent the helicopters from returning to pick up the Americans.

The U.S. government made "strong protests" to Israel, which blamed the incidents on a "communications" breakdown, and apologized. As far as is known, no further action was taken by the U.S. government.

In the meantime, the Israelis continued to defy U.S. wishes in the matter of the bombardments. After the Israeli government accepted "in principle" the U.S. proposal, already approved by the Palestinians, for evacuation of the PLO, the United States asked Israel to suspend shelling and bombing for a period of two weeks to allow Mr. Habib to wrap up the deal—but received short shrift. The Israeli attacks continued on a daily basis—generally coinciding with reports that Mr. Habib was making "progress" in his talks—while the Administration held back from any public criticism.

Finally, however, after two months of forbearance that had become a national embarrassment, President Reagan did raise his voice in public displeasure. On August 12, after watching a pivotal and highly delicate meeting of Ambassador Habib, the PLO go-between and the Prime Minister of Lebanon broken off during a particularly intense period of bombing and shelling (the Prime Minister said, "I cannot go on with the negotiations while my capital is being destroyed"), the President announced his "shock" and "outrage" and gave Prime Minister Begin a piece of his mind over the telephone. It seemed to make a difference, since the bombing raids were halted indefinitely. Israeli officials, however, made a point of spreading the word that they had intended to stop the raids anyway.

Many observers were encouraged at the President's new tack. And Secretary of State George Shultz, in acknowledging during a meeting with Congressmen on August 16 that events of the past few weeks had created the impression that the U.S. was hostage to Israeli policies, affirmed that there would be no basis for any such perceptions in the future.

As the siege wound to an end, men of good will were showing readiness to give the Administration the benefit of the doubt regarding its stated intentions. But the humiliation of the U.S. during the siege of Beirut had now become an unalterable fact of history.