Peace in the Gulf: The Outlook

By Phebe Ann Marr

Recent signs that Iran may be seeking to end its war with Iraq raise hopes that a resolution of the nearly four year old conflict may be nearing. But while these signs are encouraging, a peaceful settlement remains unlikely in the near term, since the main conditions for a truce which Iran continues to demand are still far from acceptable to Iraq.

The latest example of Iran's apparent desire for peace was a comment by Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's speaker of the parliament, who said July 27 that his country was now pursuing "the* diplomatic way" to end the war. Iran has, in fact, offered to discuss ways of ending the conflict with the Gulf Cooperation Council, an alliance of six Arab Gulf states. Earlier this year Iran also accepted a U.N. sponsored moratorium on civilian bombing and also indicated its willingness to extend this to Gulf shipping, provided Iraq also agreed.

Nonetheless, Iran is still saying unequivocally that it will continue the war until Iraq's President Saddam Hussein either resigns or is overthrown. It is also calling for an end to Arab Gulf financial support for Iraq and for a financial indemnity amounting to billions of dollars.

The U.S., in a move designed to encourage Iraq's trend toward pragmatism and moderation, has backed the construction of a new Iraqi pipeline to be laid through Jordan. The U. S. Export Import Bank recently agreed to guarantee up to 85 percent of $500 million worth of commercial loans which amounts to half of the project's total cost. The U.S.'s Bechtel Group is currently negotiating a contract to build the 540 mile pipeline, and Iraq has agreed to buy about $100 million worth of American steel for the project.

Whether intended or not, the U.S. government's have the effect of helping Iraq's President Saddam Hussein stay in power since that support could be viewed by Iran as further evidence that Iraq is far better able to fight a protracted economic war of attrition. What is clear is that Hussein's removal would create serious consequences for U.S. interests in the area by upsetting the balance of power both inside and outside Iraq.

If Saddam Hussein should step down, or be overthrown, it is doubtful that he could be replaced by a figure capable of mobilizing a sufficiently large constituency soon enough to negotiate a satisfactory peace with Iran. While Iraq has several experienced leaders at the top of the party, Hussein has prevented rivals from developing support systems capable of challenging him. Periodic purges in the party, in the security apparatus, and in the military, have all given Iraq's president a tight grip on the country that will not be easily loosened.

Worse, his removal could lead not just to a struggle for power, but to a civil war, particularly if the Iranians attempt to force upon Iraq a leadership stamped in its own mold. The ArabSunnis, who make up just over 20 percent of the total population, dominate the top political and military posts at the expense of the Shiites (about 55 percent of the population) and the Sunni Kurds (approximately 15 to 20 percent). The Hussein regime has taken steps to remedy this imbalance, however. While the Shiites are not satisfied with their share of power, their dissatisfaction has not led them so far to side with Iran against Hussein.

Besides creating instability in Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein would be a clear triumph for the Iranians and would be interpreted as such by both Iran and the Arab Gulf states. A weakened Iraq would remove the one effective bulwark against Iranian penetration further down the Gulf. If Iraq is seen as capitulating, the smaller Gulf states are likely to be faced with making their own accommodations with Iran a prospect the U.S. would surely like to avoid.

Whatever the causes of the war (see box on this page for a refresher), Iraq now wants to end it through a negotiated settlement and a return to pre war boundaries. Iraq is seeking arbitration over reparations, and a cessation of attacks on Gulf shipping that will enable it to open its own Gulf ports closed since November, 1980 and thus restore its economic fortunes. Iraq also wants enforcement of the principle of mutual non intervention in the internal affairs of both countries that was part of the 1975 agreement it signed with the former Shah of Iran. However, Iraq is not willing to sacrifice its leadership or its secular regime. On these points, Hussein has the Iraqi people behind him.

Dr. Marr is Associate Professor of History at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the author of a forthcoming book, The Modern History of Iraq (Westview).

SIDEBAR

CAUSES OF THE WAR

The nearly four year old Iran Iraq war has dragged on so long that some people may have forgotten how it started. Here is a rough tally sheet of the more recent causes. Many of the motives impelling Iraq are shared by the Arab Gulf states, while some Shiites and religious conservatives on the Arab side of the Gulf share Iran's aims.

Iranian Motives

Iran claims that the border between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt al Arab should be at the thalweg, or deep water channel, roughly in the middle of the waterway. (The eastern bank was assigned to Iran by a 1975 IranIraq agreement.)

A deep commitment to extend its militant, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, strongly tinged with Shiism.

Disavowal of Iraq's secular nationalist regime as illegitimate. Iraq's attempts to incite Iranian Kurds and Arabs in Khuzistan against the Khomeini regime.

The Ayatollah Khomeini's personal animosity toward Saddam Hussein, who exiled him from Iraq in 1978 in response to the Shah's request. Khomeini had sent 13 years in exile in Najaf, Iraq, after his ouster from Iran.

Iraqi abrogation in September, 1980, of the 1975 Shatt al Arab agreement; Iraqi bombardment of Tehran in September, 1980, in response to Iranian bombardment of Iraq; and finally, the invasion of Khuzistan by Iraqi troops on September 23, 1980 the act generally considered the start of the war.

Misjudgment of the willingness of the Iraqi Shiites to revolt against Saddam, and the degree of support in Iraq for secular nationalist aims, leading to the decision to continue the war.

Iraqi Motives

Iraq claims that Iran has been encroaching on Arab territory. Specifically: the Shah's occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands at the foot of the Gulf in 1971, and Khomeini's refusal to return them; the Shah's 1969 extension of sovereignty over the eastern bank of the Shatt al Arab waterway, dividing Iran and Iraq. Control over both banks of the river is important to Iraq since the Shatt is Iraq's main access to the Gulf.

Fear that the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution will spread to Iraq. Iranian incitement of the Shiite and Kurdish populations of Iraq to overthrow the government.

Personal dislike by Saddam Hussein of Khomeini. Fear of the threat Khomeini represents to Hussein's revolutionary credentials and the secular nationalist ideology he espouses.

Iranian support for assassination attempts against Iraqi leaders in April', 1980; Iranian refusal to police its frontier and prevent the crossing of anti Iraqi Kurds into Iraq; Iranian bombardment of Iraqi border towns in September, 1980.

Misjudgment of the weaknesses of the revolutionary Iranian government, and the possibility of support from the Arab population of Khuzistan, leading to the decision to invade.