Albright Delivers Her First Speech on Middle East

By Donald Neff

It was a year ago, on Aug. 6, 1997, that Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright gave her first speech on the Middle East, nearly eight months after taking office. She reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the land-for-peace formula, the “legitimate political rights of the Palestinians” and security for Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Albright also listed three principles both sides needed to adopt to achieve successful negotiations: “First, the sine qua non for progress is a mutual commitment to security and against violence. This is basic. This is common sense. There is no place in the peace process for violence or terror and there is no room for using security cooperation as leverage in a negotiation. That approach destroys confidence, fuels extremism and undermines prospects for peace....On this issue, there can be no winks, no double meanings, no double standards and with respect to the imprisonment of terrorists—no revolving doors. Nor can the level of security cooperation ebb and flow with the ups and downs of negotiation. The Palestinian commitment to fight terror must be constant and absolute....

“The second principle is that both sides agree to settle their differences over the subjects of negotiation at the bargaining table, and not somewhere else. It is in the interests of each party to avoid steps that undermine the other’s confidence and trust in the process. In practice, this means foregoing unilateral acts which pre-judge or pre-determine issues reserved for permanent status negotiations.

“Let me be clear. There is no moral equivalency between suicide bombers and bulldozers, between killing innocent people and building houses. It is simply not possible to address political issues seriously in a climate of intimidation and terror. But the principle of refraining from unhelpful unilateral acts is central to maintaining mutual confidence. Especially as we look ahead to permanent status negotiations, it is essential that the parties think through how their actions will affect the environment for those negotiations.

“Palestinians argue that Israel has taken some actions in recent months that pre-judge issues reserved for permanent status negotiations. These include settlement activity, construction at Har Homa and the confiscation of land. These actions have generated uncertainty among many Palestinians about Israeli intentions, undermined for them the very logic of negotiations and caused a crisis of confidence in their Israeli partner.

“It is fair to ask: how can you create a credible environment for negotiation when actions are being taken that seem to pre-determine the outcome? To restore confidence, both sides must think seriously and in advance about the potential impact of what they do and say. They must do more than ask whether an action is technically legal; they must ask whether it is wise, whether it is consistent with the spirit of their partnership, and whether it brings them closer to the goals of their agreements.

“The third rule of the road for the negotiating process is that both parties must demonstrate, in word and deed, their understanding of peace not as one option among many, but as the only option that will provide for the security and well-being of their people. It was this mutual recognition that made Israel and the Palestinians partners in pursuing peace.”

Albright also outlined a new process: “The Israeli-Palestinian crisis of confidence has cost the peace process six months. Suspicions and mistrust are running high. The logic of Oslo, based on mutual recognition, is sound, but the incremental approach of the interim agreement needs to be married to an accelerated approach to permanent status. To restore momentum, we have to increase confidence on both sides about where the negotiating process is leading and what the outcome of permanent status talks might be.

“If the parties have a clear, mutual and favorable sense of the ultimate direction of negotiation, it will be easier for them to overcome setbacks and avoid distractions along the way. This will require accelerating permanent status negotiations. Today, this step is urgent and important.

“Accordingly, provided there is some progress on security issues, I am prepared to travel to the Middle East at the end of this month. I will consult closely with the leaders of the region and especially with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, to improve the climate for negotiations, and to discuss the procedural and substantive aspects of the permanent status issues....

“We have come too far in the process of Arab-Israeli peacemaking to allow the vultures of violence to shape the region’s future. The stakes are too high, past sacrifices have been too great, and the peoples of the region have been burdened for too long by bloodshed and strife....

“At the same time, the United States is not a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. We do not assume the same risks and responsibilities as parties struggling with the issues of political identity and physical survival. As a consequence, we cannot, should not, and will not impose solutions. Nor can we create the political will required for Arabs and Israelis to make the tough decisions for peace. These are their decisions—not ours....

“We will continue to play our role as a full partner. In this partnership, only the parties must make the decisions, but we can support them. In this partnership, only the parties must conduct the negotiations, but we can be with them at the table. In this partnership, only the parties must determine the shape of peace, but we can work with them to facilitate, protect and broaden that peace....It is absolutely essential that hard decisions be made. We cannot make them; the parties have to make them. The people of the area want peace.”¹

The next day, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin elaborated on the new U.S. strategy: “Earlier this year, Prime Minister Netanyahu talked about moving directly to the final status, the permanent status negotiations. That is not what we’re talking about. What we are talking about, what the secretary is talking about, is marrying an accelerated permanent status negotiation with implementation of the interim agreement that has been previously negotiated. So we are trying to marry the two. We’re not trying to leave behind the requirement for steps to be taken in areas like the seaport, the airport, the safe passage and further redeployment....

“I spoke to Ambassador [Dennis} Ross this morning about the differences between Prime Minister Netanyahu’s plan and the ideas that we have and the specific reference to accelerating permanent status. He made clear to me that we are not implying that the parties should forego implementation of other aspects of the agreements they’ve already reached. That differs from the ideas that Prime Minister Netanyahu was talking about earlier in the year.

“As far as our time frame is concerned, all I can tell you is that the permanent status negotiations began last year very briefly in May, I believe. They were designed to end in mid-1999. That’s roughly two years from now. Two years is too long to hold out as a hope for the people to see, to have the understanding that there is an end point to this process. So we’re talking about a significantly shorter timeframe, but I’m not going to be able to say specifically.”²

The problem with Albright’s approach, as with the approach of previous administrations, was her emphasis on the idea that the United States could not make decisions—that the Israelis and Palestinians had to make the “hard decisions.” The fact was that the United States had major moral and material responsibility for the conflict and obligations under international law to rein in Israel’s territorial ambitions. Israel came into being largely because of U.S. efforts and it had grown to the status of a regional superpower because of unprecedented economic and military aid from the United States. Israel’s strength so overwhelmed the Palestinians that there could be no possibility of a fair negotiation between them without direct and active U.S. intervention.

This became clear over the following months. Despite strenuous efforts by Albright, including a visit to Israel and a number of meetings with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel refused to make major concessions, leaving the Palestinians high and dry and the peace process slowly withering away.

RECOMMENDED READING:

*Kerr, Malcolm H., America’s Middle East Policy: Kissinger, Carter and the Future, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1980.

*Hersh, Seymour M., The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, New York, Random House, 1991.

*Lesch, David W. (ed.), The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, Oxford, Westview Press, 1966.

*Neff, Donald, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, Washington, DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995.

*Quandt, William B., Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977.

*Said, Edward W., The Question of Palestine, New York, Times Books, 1980.

*Spiegel, Steven L., The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985.

FOOTNOTES

1 State department text, 8/6/97.

2 State department text, 9/7/97.

Donald Neff is the author of Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Toward Palestine and Israel since 1945. It, along with his Warriors trilogy on U.S.-Mideast relations, is available through the AET Book Club.