Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 1998, Pages 54, 91

Special Report

Evolving Democracy in Yemen: No Surprise After All

By David Nassar

The Republic of Yemen has been an unexpected leader of the fledgling democratic reform movement in the Middle East since 1990. This seems surprising because Yemen is one of the poorest Arab countries and has an undereducated population and a tiny middle class.

While such nations in the region as Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait have taken steps toward parliamentary democracy, Yemen has held more transparent elections, built stronger democratic institutions, and allowed a more participatory process than other countries within the region.

Upon closer inspection, however, Yemen’s success is no surprise. Three factors are primarily responsible.

First, the end of the Cold War created the need for change. Second, the unification of North and South Yemen motivated the leadership of both countries to develop democratic underpinnings for the united Yemen. Most importantly, elements of Yemen’s pre-existing political culture provided the foundation for a democratic system.

Cold War

The end of the Cold War led to the cessation of economic and military support that the Soviets and the U.S. had been supplying to undemocratic governments around the world. The absence of such funding eliminated the capability of dozens of formerly intransigent leaders to crush domestic dissent and sparked policies of accommodation with their citizens.

The peoples of the Middle East did not reap these benefits as quickly or as clearly as some of those in other regions. The Arab-Israeli dispute and the presence of oil have played roles in delaying or distorting the democratic wave that washed over almost every continent in this decade.

Yemen, however, does not have much oil and is far from the borders of Israel. The inevitable discontinuation of economic and military aid meant that it would become extremely difficult for either North or South Yemen to maintain their heavy-handed regimes.

At the same time, there was a mutual recognition by both sides that unity would improve prospects for economic development. While a discussion about reunification had been developing throughout the 1980s, it became clear with the end of the Cold War that unity offered the best hope for political stability and economic vitality in the 1990s and beyond.

Reunification

More than ideology or history divided North and South Yemen. Their two systems of government were totally incompatible when they joined together in 1990.

South Yemen was based on 20 years of hard-line Marxist control which emphasized a strong central authority. By contrast, in North Yemen the central government remained weak except in Sana’a and the cities of Hodeida and Taiz. Elsewhere, tribal authority imposed itself on and competed with the central government in Sana’a.

These pre-existing differences made the process of reunification exceptionally difficult. Maintaining the unity, once achieved, became the ultimate objective for the new Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and democracy offered the best hope for success.

It has been apparent since 1990 that the most dangerous threats to unity were to be economic reform and the mistrust between the leadership of both countries. The necessary economic reforms promised to upset Yemen’s citizenry. As in many countries, political rights were offered in lieu of economic recovery. Democracy offered the people a larger voice, potentially providing a release valve for their anger at a time when the leadership knew that things were going to get worse before they got better.

Politically, however, the mistrust between the leadership of North and South Yemen promised to tear the country apart and almost did. During pre-unification negotiations neither side was anxious to give up power. Democracy offered the best alternative—to let the people decide—for avoiding a breakdown of the unification process.

Culture

Many Western “experts” might not see a political culture in Yemen that favors democracy. However, organization and deliberation are an important part of traditional Yemeni society. Many Yemenis are tribal people. The tribes aggregate interests, suggest attitudes, and lobby for resources.

As a tribally-based society, Yemen has depended on consensus building, persuasion and eventually decision-making that usually includes concessions to all parties. A local sheikh (tribal leader) rarely has the power to issue a decision that affects the tribe without consulting with others.

The Yemenis’ sense of organization and civic responsibility is reflected in their modern history of labor unions and trade organizations, particularly in the South. They have also had political parties since the 1940s. More recently, Yemenis surprised the world when local organizations were able to mobilize more than 10,000 citizens to monitor their April 1997 elections.

Strengthening Democracy

The future of the democratic transition, however, is uncertain because of a second transition that is occurring simultaneously with the first. This is the transition from local to national authority.

In most parts of Yemen, the tribes remain responsible for representing public interests, facilitating the distribution of resources and services, enforcing the law and providing protection. This has weakened the legitimacy of the parliament, the courts, and political parties.

In the absence of a strong middle class that would be tied by economics to the affairs of a national authority, the tribes are the dominant power brokers in Yemen. They directly challenge the state for authority and compete with it for the loyalty of the public at the local level.

The competition has a direct effect on the development of national democratic institutions in Yemen. As local authorities overshadow the national government in the provision of services, resources and even protection, broad-based support for institutions like the parliament is diminished. The debate in Yemen about the legitimacy of local versus national authority and the transition from one to the other is at the very heart of Yemen’s democratic development as a nation-state.

This situation partly explains enthusiastic calls by Yemen’s citizens for local government. A lot of expectations are being raised among the public that a devolution of power from the center will be the first step in the democratization process.

It may be possible through local government to improve the allocation of resources and services from the national government, but what will inevitably come with that is more state control over local affairs. If this is accepted, it could lead to a stronger Yemeni nation-state.

If, however, traditional local leaders become part of the state bureaucracy through election to local government, some might use that office to strengthen their traditional power. This could create a weaker state and stronger communities with the center beholden to hundreds of local strongmen, all of whom would compete with the parliament for control over resources.

The transition from local to national authority must be resolved in a way that is acceptable to all parties or the two sides will continue to compete and endanger the development of democratic institutions in Yemen. In the parts of Yemen where the government does not find a peaceful and honorable way to include traditional leaders in the new institutions it is trying to build, a zero-sum power game between the national and local authorities will remain the status quo.