Two Ways to Make U.S. Mideast Policy Even-Handed: Arab Economic Unity or U.S. Muslim Bloc Vote

By Richard H. Curtiss

“The world did not have to be told about the pro-Israel bias of American foreign policy, but for 81 senators belonging to both parties to write to Clinton asking that Washington should not put the slightest pressure on Tel Aviv to be less bloody-minded than it is toward the Palestinians surpasses logic.”—Editor S. Nihal Singh, Khaleej Times, Dubai, UAE, April 5, 1998.

The self-destructive tilt in American Middle East policy toward fewer than six million Israelis and away from more than 250 million Arabs and one billion Muslims is motivated solely by U.S. domestic politics, and not at all by any U.S. national or strategic interest. Once that lesson is absorbed, there are two, and only two, ways to nudge American Middle East policy back to a semblance of even-handedness:

One is for the 22 Arab League members to work together, instead of separately, on the matter. The other is for the six to eight million American Muslims to start voting as a bloc in U.S. federal elections.

I had gotten exactly that far in an April conversation when the director of a major cultural institution in an Arabian Gulf state stopped me: “Forget about the Arab unity alternative,” he said sadly. “It’s impossible. Just look at Iraq and Kuwait. So tell me about how to get American Muslims to vote together.”

In fact, I don’t believe either route is impossible. Logically, it should be easier to persuade 22 Arab heads of state to take two simple steps in unison than to persuade six to eight million ethnically diverse Muslim Americans to agree to vote for the same candidates. So before I discussed what the Gulf leader wanted to hear about U.S. Muslims, I insisted on devoting a few sentences to what he didn’t want to hear about what Muslims could do in the Arab world itself.

Step one is to acknowledge the obvious failure of the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” by reinstating a simplified version of the Arab League boycott of Israel. That shouldn’t be difficult since the previous one was never rescinded. It just fell into disuse by some countries when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seemed to be moving forward under Israel’s previous Labor Party government.

If every product imported into any Arab country were required to be accompanied by a certificate from the original manufacturer stating that nothing in that product originated in Israel, the American political world would be turned upside down. You see, under an Israel lobby-inspired law, it’s illegal for any U.S. company to sign such a certificate, even if the product is 100 percent U.S.-made.

A reasonable primary boycott is not against the law in any country.

For U.S. aircraft, U.S. automobiles, U.S. cigarettes and even U.S. medicines and foodstuffs to be sold in any Arab country, and perhaps in cooperating non-Arab Muslim countries as well, the manufacturers would have to break U.S. law. Obviously they can’t do that. Nor can major U.S. companies do without their Middle East markets. So their lobbyists would have to get the U.S. law changed.

If the senators from the State of Washington have to choose between lobbyists for Israel—who give campaign donations to the senators but nothing to their constituents—and lobbyists for the Boeing aircraft company—which provides jobs to thousands of their constituents—the senators are going to go with Boeing. And since similar dramas would be taking place in all 50 U.S. states, the U.S. law would be changed in a hurry.

In 1981 exactly this drama was played out. The Boeing aircraft corporation in the state of Washington, supported by subcontractors in every one of the other 49 states who made parts for the Boeing-made AWACS aircraft Saudi Arabia wanted to buy, squared off against the Israel lobby, which tried to get the U.S. Congress to ban the sale. Boeing won. It was the last such victory of American industry over Israel, because U.S. manufacturers have never again been similarly challenged.

Arab unity over a reasonable primary boycott, which is not against the law in any country, could provide an even stronger challenge to Israel. The Israel lobby would suffer a huge defeat and with continued shrewd, but reasonable, use of Arab purchasing power, it would be first of many.

Three Vital Assets

That said, let’s move on to the bloc voting on which American Muslims already are working. First, it has to be understood that American Muslims have three vitally important potential assets. First, most are concentrated in major urban areas in a few key states such as California, New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, New York and Florida. No presidential candidate can win a national election without winning in at least three of those states.

Second, whether they are of recent Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrant stock or are so-called “indigenous Muslims” of African-American ancestry, most U.S. Muslims put their allegiance to Islam well ahead of their affiliation to either of the two major U.S. political parties.

Finally, although Muslims in most urban areas justifiably complain that they have little real access to the mainstream media, they have a uniquely effective communications network of their own. Of an estimated 1,500 mosques and Islamic centers in the United States, perhaps 1,200 have direct ties to the Islamic Society of North America. It is a non-political roof organization which makes available training for imams and self-help books, pamphlets, videotapes and periodicals to solve the personal problems of North American Muslims raising their children in a non-Islamic society.

If a recognized coordinating council of Islamic political organizations in the United States agreed on voting recommendations for American Muslims, ISNA would happily convey these recommendations to the imams of these 1,200 mosques—guaranteeing that after they had been mentioned in sermons on the final two Fridays before national elections, they would reach virtually every Muslim family in the United States.

So there is no question that a bloc vote by all the Muslims in those key states could have a major effect on U.S. elections. Nor is there any question that a joint recommendation by authentic representatives of American Muslims would reach Muslim voters in time for effective action.

A remaining and very legitimate question is how to arrive at an authentic consensus on Islamic voting recommendations. In fact, although there was no national recommendation at the presidential level in 1996, there were such agreed recommendations at the local level in many places. For example, members of all the dozens of mosques in the Detroit area circulated a card giving Muslim voters recommendations on everything from state and local initiatives to picks for municipal and county offices, state legislatures, and the U.S. House and Senate.

Similar recommendations were made by Islamic communities in some other states. In New Jersey, Muslims first endorsed one senatorial candidate, then changed their endorsement to his opponent. They were credited publicly by the winner, Sen. Robert Torricelli, for his victory. In South Dakota, just one segment of the Muslim community, Pakistani Americans, concentrated their political contributions on supporting Tim Johnson, challenger to Sen. Larry Pressler, who authored the infamous Pressler amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan. Johnson won by a very narrow margin that would not have been possible without the Pakistani-American financial contributions that arrived from all over the United States.

Emboldened by these successes, American Muslims are gearing up in major U.S. cities for similar activities on a considerably larger scale in the 1998 elections. There is little doubt that they will have additional success stories to report by the end of the year.

The Detroit Muslims also formally endorsed one of the presidential contenders—a recommendation that was accepted only after a spirited debate by partisans of both major candidates. But all recognized that the only way to consolidate Islamic political power was to agree among themselves, and then abide by the recommendations, rather than cancel each other’s votes through disunity.

Looking toward nation-wide recommendations for the presidential primaries and then the general election in November 2000, several national and regional Muslim political groups agreed in St. Louis last October to form a national coordinating council. In March that council held its first national meeting in Dallas, to which only two representatives of each participating group were accredited. In working out their own ground rules, council members will bear three things in mind.

The first point is not to try to pick the winner, but instead to recommend the candidate who measures up best in terms of Islamic concerns. That way the candidates must vie for the Muslim vote, which is what will wean them away from their present obsession with pleasing the Israel lobby.

Second, the choice will be immensely simplified if the “Islamic issues” are narrowed to one or two at the most. Unimpeded Muslim access and authority over Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, and human rights for Palestinians are issues upon which all Muslims in the world agree. Once that issue is solved, Kashmir or Bosnia or some domestic U.S. issue may become the dominant Islamic issue in a future election.

Third, it is good that there are Muslim activists in both major U.S. political parties. Those very few who actually are employed by members of Congress perform an immense service in making their employers aware of how to shape federal legislation to meet Muslim concerns. When it comes to creating a bloc vote, however, the contributions of these party loyalists should be limited to presenting the case for their party. They should not be involved in making the final choice for the simple reason that their first loyalty is to a specific party, not the Islamic community as a whole.

Similarly, full-time leaders of national Islamic organizations inevitably are subject to temptations to put their organization’s interest ahead of the interests of the community. If a candidate promises the leader of one national Muslim organization that he will be that candidate’s preferred liaison to the Islamic community, it is going to prejudice that Islamic leader’s endorsement. Therefore the coordinating council to make a final presidential endorsement might best be composed of respected leaders from the various Islamic communities within the U.S., ensuring both an appropriate geographic and ethnic spread, and no organizational prejudices.

Finally, it should be understood in advance that, regardless of individual preferences, once the previously designated representatives of the Islamic community as a whole have made their choices, the great majority of American Muslims from all backgrounds will support them.

Difficult? Yes. Impossible? No.

Important? There is nothing more essential to right the wrongs in American foreign policy that so preoccupy Muslims both inside and outside the United States.

And maybe, while six to eight million American Muslims are working on how to agree, those 22 Arab heads of state will, after all, give it a try as well.

Richard H. Curtiss is the executive editor of the Washington Report.