Egypt’s Travails: Perilous Storms or Passing Squalls?

by Greg Noakes

Egypt currently is facing, by all accounts, a daunting set of political and economic dilemmas both at home and abroad. After nearly 15 years in power, some observers are predicting that President Hosni Mubarak and his government are on their last legs. These commentators are in some disagreement over the likely timing and cause of that demise (will Islamist insurgents overthrow the regime, or will the military beat them to it?), but the picture these analysts present is indeed bleak. Are their prognoses realistic, or are there silver linings to the dark cloud which seems to hover over the Nile?

Egypt’s myriad problems can be broken into four principal areas of concern: the domestic political situation, Egypt’s place on the international stage, economics and, finally, a faltering infrastructure coupled with a booming population. Each area is affected by, and in turn affects, the other three; political unrest at home discourages international investment, for example, weakening the Egyptian economy and in turn undercutting the nation’s profile in international affairs.

Domestic Despair

The state of domestic Egyptian politics has received the most amount of ink from the doomsayers—and small wonder. The Mubarak regime has sealed off most avenues of political expression and dissent, with no sign on the horizon of a relaxation in those restrictions. Party politics in the country is moribund, with the main opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, officially banned and most other opposition political parties boycotting elections. In the People’s Assembly, fewer than 3 percent of the 454 seats are occupied by opposition politicians.

Other arenas for political expression also have been closed off. The press is gun-shy after a series of high-profile arrests and newspaper shutdowns, while new laws passed over the past several years have reduced the autonomy of professional associations and syndicatestraditionally an important alternative field for opposition politics. All of this has helped to silence the government’s critics, but it also denies the regime an important safety valve for overheated political discontent.

Frustrated with the system, younger politicians of all stripes increasingly are opting out of the old established parties, and in some cases giving up on party politics altogether, further weakening the health of the overall political system. Among Islamists, many younger activists are seeking alternatives to the aging traditional leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, while a few are opting for the gun and joining one of the gama’a groups of armed militants. Islamist insurgency, particularly in the southern Sa’id region, seems set to continue indefinitely at its present low intensity, though no doubt with an occasional outburst of spectacular violence.

Economic restructuring and privatization seem to have stalled.

A number of observers say the hardening of the government’s politics reflects a shift in the policies and style of the man at the top of the system. Hosni Mubarak, they say, is beginning to believe his own press and isolate himself from contrary opinions. These analysts fear that the current head of state is showing signs of the megalomania which beset the late Anwar Sadat in his final years as president.

Another problem is the lack of a clearly defined successor should something befall Mubarak. The position of vice president has remained vacant under Mubarak: an important point since upon the deaths of former Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Sadat it was the vice president who succeeded as head of state and ensured an orderly, peaceful transition. Given the current void, would the passing of the reins of power be so smooth?

Internationally, Egypt is in a period of flux. It is no longer unique as an Arab country which has concluded a peace treaty with Israel, and so is no longer so important in the eyes of the rest of the world. Jordan is at peace with Israel, and, at least prior to Israel’s 1996 election, the Palestinians were slowly and painfully working out a modus vivendi with Tel Aviv, and four Arab countries, Morocco and Tunisia in the west and Qatar and Oman in the east, were opening tentative channels with the Israelis. Relations between Israel and Turkey and other Muslim nations in Central Asia are also proceeding apace.

If ties with these and other Muslim countries increase, Israel no longer will need to rely on Egypt as its window to the Arab and Muslim worlds. As one of many, Egypt no longer commands the same degree of attention from policymakers in Tel Aviv and thus in Washington as well.

The Peace Deficit?

This fact has economic implications as well, since it has the potential to impact heavily on American foreign aid levels. Jordan was coaxed to its desert signing ceremony with U.S. dollars, the Palestinians are appealing for increased aid, and Syria will no doubt strike a respectable economic understanding with Washington if Damascus ever inks a peace treaty with Israel. With a shrinking foreign aid pie and more Middle Eastern plates on the table, can Egypt continue to maintain the size of its slice? As with many other recipients of foreign assistance, Egypt is hooked, and any substantial decrease in American or other foreign aid monies will hit hard.

While the number of zeroes in its foreign aid checks may be beyond the control of the government in Cairo, its performance in economic areas where it sets the agenda has been lackluster. Economic restructuring and privatization seem to have stalled, and the wide disparity between rich and poor in the country gives no indication of narrowing. Economic growth is negligible, and the per capita gross domestic product actually has fallen over the last decade. Official corruption and mismanagement remain endemic, creating resentment among the common people. As Algeria demonstrates, economic hardship and frustration often lap over into turbulent political unrest.

Yet some of the most daunting problems Cairo faces are largely beyond its ability to solve. Aging infrastructure combined with a mushrooming population has set Egypt on the path to a Malthusian meltdown. Housing capacity is strained in urban areas, as are utilities, sanitation and transportation. With the growing number of young people, the government faces ever-increasing demands for educational opportunities and, most importantly, decent job prospects upon graduation. The Egyptian civil service already is notoriously bloated, agriculture and life on the farm hold little allure for youth entranced by the big-city lights of Cairo, and the private sector is still too feeble to absorb the hundreds of thousands of new job-seekers coming into the work force every year. Unemployed, poorly housed and frustrated young people with little hope for the future are an ingredient for disaster, and their numbers in Egypt are set to increase inexorably.

The Other Side of the Coin

While one should not underestimate the problems facing Egypt’s rulers, it also would be a mistake to be overly pessimistic about the system’s prospects. The Egyptian government enjoys many strengths; ironically, many of them are also some of the regime’s most glaring weaknesses.

While not a charismatic or inspirational leader, Hosni Mubarak nevertheless has provided relative stability for a decade and a half, despite low expectations following Sadat’s assassination in 1981. This is a common feature among Egyptian presidents: they seem to grow in the job. Nasser came into his own only a year or two after the 1952 Free Officers’ coup, while Sadat was supposedly just a temporary placeholder after Nasser’s death in 1970. While there is no appointed successor to Mubarak, there is a group of extremely capable officials high in the government who eventually might be tapped for the leadership role. Foreign Minister Amr Moussa and presidential adviser Osama Bin Baz are well respected in international circles for their savvy, as is Arab League Secretary-General Esmat Abdel Meguid.

Egypt’s government also can boast of other weapons in its arsenal, including a crack diplomatic corps, an able military and perhaps theArab world’s best intelligence services. Cairo remains a hub for music, book, film and television production, and as a result of Egyptian films and soap operas, Egyptian Arabic is a “second dialect” to most non-Egyptian Arabs. While lightning population growth has created problems, it also ensures Egypt an important place in regional political and economic affairs simply because of its demographic weight. The government’s carefully nurtured ties with Washington are another important asset: despite occasional friction over issues like non-proliferation and unblinking U.S. support for Israel, Cairo and Washington remain close. The United States, Europe and Israel all see Egypt as a force for regional stability and a trustworthy intermediary, and none want to see that status compromised.

Like population growth, the sprawling Egyptian bureaucracy is a two-edged sword. The country’s official structure has shown itself to be slow to act, unimaginative and often inept. It is hopelessly overstaffed. But because it is so large and commands so many resources, it has been able to sustain and reproduce itself, safeguarding its interests and ensuring its ownand the regime’ssurvival.

“Pharaonic bureaucracy” is an old cliché, and as practiced in Egypt, it is certainly long-lived (mummified, the uncharitable might say). Even should there be radical changes in the country, the bureaucracy and the system in which it thrives could not be dismantled in a day.

When tallying up the strengths and weaknesses of the government, simple bureaucratic inertia may tip the scales in favor of continued regime longevity. It is not responsive and it is not efficient, but official Egypt is, in the end, simply overwhelming.

This is in perfect synch with Egyptian political culture. The government is basically non-ideological. Almost alone among Arab states, Egypt’s regime has no particular “ism” to peddle. It is essentially a pragmatic animal, dedicated to self-preservation rather than to any loftier ideals. It may not electrify the masses, but it does endure.

In fact, that is what Egyptian governments since the revolution have done best: endure. They have withstood a series of crushing military defeats at the hands of Israel, weathered the trauma associated with the breaking of Arab ranks during Camp David, endured the death of one beloved president and the assassination of a successor at the hands of his countrymen, overcome outbreaks of domestic Islamist violence and the economic and political reverberations of the Gulf war, and ridden out the vicissitudes of the ongoing peace process. Given the system’s past ability to mitigate, if not master, such crises, it may be a little early to count out the government of Hosni Mubarak just yet.