July 1996, pg. 11

Did Israel’s 1996 Election Kill the Peace Process?—Six Views

An Israeli-American Writer

Netanyahu Has No Choice Except To Pursue Peace

By Alon Ben-Meir

Contrary to the views of many Israeli and foreign political observers, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Binyamin Netanyahu will neither reverse nor freeze the peace process. Netanyahu will be under insurmountable pressure exerted by the Arabs and especially the U.S. to move the peace process forward. If he does not, Netanyahu will risk a major crisis in the American-Israeli relationship, something no Israeli prime minister can afford.

While reaffirming the United States’ unshakable commitment to Israel’s security, President Clinton has made it clear that “if Israel is prepared to take risks for peace, we are determined to do our best to reduce the risks and increase the security of those who do that.” And in a clear reference to the importance the U.S. attaches to the peace process, Secretary of State Christopher has amplified the president’s position. After three years of deep involvement in the peace process, Christopher stated, the administration has some specific ideas to discuss with Netanyahu when he comes to Washington. The implication is obvious: the U.S. will be relentless in pursuing the negotiating process charted by Peres.

The American-Israeli special relationship is not a one-way street. With the U.S. fully committed morally, politically, and militarily to Israel’s security, the new leadership can hardly ignore America’s strategic interests in the region. Successive American administrations have invested heavily in the welfare and well-being of Israel. Never in the history of relations between two states has one nation transferred to another as much wealth as the U.S. has provided Israel. And no American administration has invested so much time and energy, and political as well as financial capital in Israel and in the peace process, as has the Clinton administration. Israel’s economic prosperity, military prowess and its standing in the international community have been made possible because of the scope and continuing nature of American support.

For the first six months—during the U.S. presidential campaign—President Clinton will avoid straining U.S.-Israeli relations, but he will make clear where the U.S. stands on various issues regarding the peace process. While Netanyahu will be tested by Israeli and Arab extremists, he, too, will most likely refrain from taking any action that might upset relations with the U.S. during the same period. Basically, Netanyahu will enjoy a six-month honeymoon, but once the U.S. elections are over, a Clinton or a Dole administration will expect Netanyahu to make the necessary concessions for peace.

This is not to suggest that Israel must be entirely compliant to American whims at the cost of jeopardizing its security. It does mean, however, that Netanyahu cannot seek questionable security measures or resort to ideological fanaticism to justify any intransigence on his part. From the American perspective the Arab-Israeli peace is critical to Middle Eastern stability, and stability is the prerequisite to the United States’ strategic interest in the area. If Netanyahu were to keep his campaign promises and retain Israeli control over the entire West Bank and the Golan Heights, he would shatter the prospects for peace. Similarly, expansion of existing settlements or the building of new ones would destabilize the peace and therefore dangerously strain U.S.-Israeli relations. The pressure that was exerted by the Bush administration on the previous Likud government to end settlement activities in the West Bank contributed directly to the defeat of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, a fact that will not be lost on the Netanyahu government.

Since the capture of the territories in 1967, the U.S. has consistently supported U.N. Resolution 242, calling for the exchange of land for peace. Both the Israeli-Egyptian treaty made possible by the direct involvement of the U.S. and the Israeli-Jordanian peace, vigorously promoted by President Clinton, are based on the concept of land for peace. Netanyahu may preach “peace for Peace,” but all he will be able to negotiate is “land for peace with security.”

There is no reason to believe that a Syrian government will settle for anything less than recovering the entire Golan or that the Palestinians will accept indefinite Israeli control. But with Netanyahu at the helm, the Syrians and the Palestinians may be compelled to take Israel’s security requirements more seriously. Fortunately, even before he was declared the winner, Netanyahu and his lieutenants abandoned their campaign’s hard-line rhetoric for more moderate positions on settlements and the Golan.

The overwhelming majority of Israelis want peace, but they do not want to surrender more territories and receive less and less peace. Netanyahu’s victory should send a clear message to Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians: give Israel peace with security and Netanyahu will have no choice but to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, Begin, Rabin and Peres, who came to the conclusion that Israel’s ultimate security lies in peace, not in territory.

As a full-fledged partner in this process, America can persuade Israel to give up territory in exchange for peace with real security, but it will not prevail on the Israelis to jeopardize their security for less.