A Palestinian-American Activist

Fanatics Cannot Make Peace

By Muhammad Hallaj

What has long been considered the most dreadful threat to the future of peace in the Middle East has become a reality. The Israeli electorate put in office a man and a party who had opposed, condemned and deplored every bit of progress made in the Arab-Israeli peace talks during the past three years. Unless Binyamin Netanyahu betrays his ideology, his party and constituency—an unlikely prospect—peace in the Middle East is virtually dead.

The new Israeli prime minister has been outspoken and unambiguous about his attitude toward the peace process. He rejects “the exchange of land for peace,” the magic formula which succeeded in bringing Arabs and Israelis into direct negotiations. Likud, its leaders and constituents, still see Israeli security in terms of territorial control, unlike Labor which has come to see Israel’s future—its security and prosperity—in terms of peaceful and normal relations with its regional environment.

Netanyahu has made it clear, through policy pronouncements before and during the recent election campaign, that he opposes the two most essential requirements for further progress in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

1. He has no intention of implementing agreements that have already been reached, such as Israeli redeployment out of Hebron and additional territories in the West Bank and Gaza (designated as zone B in the Taba—or second Oslo—agreement).

2. He opposes negotiating final status issues, placed on the agenda by the first Oslo agreement, which include Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, and refugee rights, as well as withdrawal from Syria’s Golan Heights. In fact, Netanyahu has said that he wishes to renegotiate the Oslo agreements that already have been signed at the White House because they are unacceptable to him.

If the new Israeli government refuses to implement agreements already reached and refuses to negotiate remaining issues in good faith, the collapse of the peace process becomes unavoidable. Without further agreement on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks, it would be impossible for other Arab parties to proceed with the normalization of relations with Israel and confrontation will replace conciliation as the order of the day in the region.

There are those who believe that Netanyahu the prime minister will surprise everyone and turn out to be more rational and moderate than Netanyahu the candidate or opposition party leader. Such a view is not justified by anything that Netanyahu has said or has done, but by the doubtful notion that it takes a hard-liner to make compromises. The examples of De Gaulle making peace with the Algerian nationalists and Nixon’s rapprochement with China are usually cited as precedents.

I personally do not subscribe to the notion that it takes fanatics to be reasonable. It is advanced by apologists for fanatics and the naive who insist on seeing a silver lining even where it does not exist. Exceptional cases do not establish historical patterns. Instead, the pattern of history is that fanatics are more likely to make war than peace. The expectation that Netanyahu’s government will deliver a mortal blow to the peace process is more likely than the hope, commendable as it may be, that Netanyahu and the Israeli right that he represents will soar above themselves and transform into peacemakers.

Arafat’s Dilemma

Palestinian National Authority President Yasser Arafat’s credibility among the Palestinians hinged on the premise that the small gains made toward Palestinian self-determination were only the beginning, and that such gains would be augmented as the process continues. If it becomes clear that Gaza and Jericho are “first and last,” as the Palestinian critics of the peace process have argued, his credibility will erode beyond tolerable limits.

The only way to salvage Arafat’s leadership, and the necessary minimum of Palestinian support for the peace process during the lean years of the Likud government, would be a massive international effort to revitalize the Palestinian economy. Only a quick, visible, and substantial improvement in the quality of life for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would stave off the collapse of the peace camp among the Palestinians, until political conditions in Israel change again and the peace process can resume. Even this will be a temporary measure. Nothing can replace further progress in the peace process to help the Middle East escape the fate of being doomed to repeat its own history.

Washington’s Obligations

Peace in the Middle East is a vital interest of hundreds of millions of people in the region and beyond. Whether or not there is peace in the Middle East also impinges on the U.S. national interest. Half of the Israeli electorate, therefore, should not be allowed to wield a veto power over the fate of the entire Middle East peace process. The U.S. government is not only the principal sponsor of the peace process, it also is a signatory to the agreements that have been reached. In that sense the U.S. carries a political and moral obligation to see to it that the process is not placed in serious jeopardy. As a signatory to the Oslo agreements, the U.S. government should exercise everything within its power to ensure compliance with agreements already reached. This means, among other things, Israeli redeployment out of Hebron, the release of remaining Palestinian prisoners, the establishment of free access between Gaza and the West Bank, and the lifting of travel restrictions between Palestinian cities in the self-rule zone.

As the principal sponsor of the peace process, the U.S. government also should ensure Israeli willingness to negotiate in good faith final status issues, including Jerusalem, settlements and refugees, as Israel agreed to do in the first Oslo agreement.

The peace process, the future of the Middle East, and the legitimate interests of Europe and the United States should not be held hostage to the politics of paranoia exploited by the rightist clique that has come to power in Israel. If the present opportunity to bring peace and normal relations to the Middle East fails, the very feasibility of making peace with Israel should be and will be questioned throughout the Arab world. It took a unique convergence of many regional and international circumstances, not likely to be repeated, to overcome the difficulties of bringing Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table. It would be cowardly and criminal to permit a handful of Israeli fanatics to frustrate the hopes and aspirations of all of the peoples of the Middle East.

Muhammad Hallaj is the former director of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine.