July/August 1995, pgs. 42-44
Prospects for Change in SudanTwo Views
Don't Neglect the "Modern Forces"
By Imatong Ali
Sudan is a painful reminder of the horrors which afflict many countries
in Africa. This one country encompasses the killing fields of war,
the tragedy of famine, the senseless violence of religious zealots
and the percolating social crisis of a collapsed economy. Since
the Islamic fundamentalist military coup of 1989 there has been
a continual flow of reports of genocide, widespread violations of
human rights and the harboring of international terrorists on the
part of the regime. Sudan has become synonymous with ominous news.
Therefore, the cease-fire arranged by former President Jimmy Carter
last March was greeted with enormous relief.
Yet those who are familiar with Sudan remain skeptical. The government
has used similar cease-fires in the past to rearm and redeploy its
troops, leading to a further escalation of the conflict and greater
suffering. Recent reports say the government has contracted a Middle
East arms dealer to provide $100 million of ammunition, while Al-Hayat
reports the U.S. State Department is concerned over a new agreement
on military cooperation between Sudan and Iran. Such bulletins do
not allow for much optimism.
Peace prospects appear even gloomier when one considers the fate
of the IGADD initiative, which has been stalemated as a result of
the regime's intransigence. Khartoum already is looking for new
allies and has announced that regime strongman Hassan al-Turabi
is seeking Scandinavian and Dutch mediation of the conflict.
Talks vs. Negotiations
The Khartoum government has finely honed its tactics of talking
without actually negotiating. It manipulated the IGADD just as it
took advantage of previous talks in the Nigerian capital of Abuja,
using the "negotiations" as a cover for its military operations.
Sudanese commentator Bona Malwal was right to warn against the "Abujanization"
of the IGADD talks.
The regime will continue to capitalize on the international yearning
for peace talks, so long as they remain just "talks."
Once the discussions touch on substantive issues, however, and real
negotiations begin, the process will come to a halt. After all,
the government loses nothing by exploiting international goodwill
and interest in peace. On the contrary, the exercise brings good
press and buys more time.
Imagining a political settlement under the current government is
difficult. The regime is as bizarre as it is extremist. One presidential
proclamation ordered a committee study of the use of djinn
("genies") in the national development plan, while other
official statements have detailed how divine intervention guided
monkeys to clear land mines in front of advancing government militia
troops! The National Islamic Front regime has transformed the conflict
into a religious struggle to establish a theocratic state, which
rules out compromise. From the regime's perspective, the conflict
is more than a conventional war; it is a religious duty, a jihad,
which cannot be negotiated with human beings—least of all
with "infidels."
To assume the government is totally uninterested in peace would
be cynical. Successive Sudanese regimes, including the current one,
have desired an end to the conflict. Their dilemma has been that
each wanted a settlement on its own terms. Rather than making the
political compromises that peace entails, Sudanese regimes have
preferred to incur the high costs of war. While every new government
since 1964, whether civilian or military, has claimed to advance
the cause of peace, no faction of the ruling elite has dared disturb
the status quo, in spite of the obvious need to end the conflict.
War is not, and never has been, the cause of the conflict in the
Sudan. Rather, it is the manifestation of ideological, social, racial,
cultural and economic relations which produce injustice and inequality.
No lasting settlement can be reached without addressing the injustices
underlying the war. Such efforts have been made in the past, but
were quickly blocked by those elements which benefit from maintaining
the status quo. In this sense, peace is a threat to the dominant
political actors in the country.
The Role of the "Modern Forces"
While the south has used arms to effect change, forces in the north
have used different means to put pressure on the ruling elites.
Popular opposition in northern Sudan galvanized around trade unions
and their experience using civil disobedience tactics like strikes,
demonstrations and public rallies. By the 1960s the unions had established
links with professional associations, women's groups and students
to bolster resistance to the dominant traditional elite and their
sectarian political parties. This broad alliance came to be known
as the "modern forces."
The military regimes of 1958-64 and 1969-85 survived all the armed
coup attempts directed against them, yet neither could withstand
national strikes fomented by the modern forces. Both of these uprisings
were triggered by the failure of the military regimes to end the
bloodshed in the south.
After both the 1964 and the 1985 uprisings, the modern forces
initiated searches for an end to the civil war. In 1965 they succeeded
in convening the multi-factional Khartoum Round Table Conference,
and since 1985 they have maintained dialogue with the SPLA/SPLM.
These efforts produced the most comprehensive blueprint for peace
in Sudan, the 1986 Koka Dam Declaration, which outlined the conditions
necessary to open substantive negotiations and end the war.
The traditional sectarian elite continued to stonewall various
peace initiatives, however, and in 1988 the modern forces took steps
to create a new governmental coalition clearly committed to peace.
Threatened by such moves, Islamist elements in the military seized
power in June 1989. One of the junta's first actions was to purge
thousands of trade unionists, professionals and army and police
officers.
It is unfortunate that the modern forces are ignored by observers
outside Sudan, despite their political record and experience. The
sectarian elite now in opposition will not provide resources to
those challenging their traditional hegemony, of course, yet the
modern alliance remains a potent force for change in Sudan. The
December 1994 creation of the Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF), made
up of seasoned activists from the army, police, trade unions and
professional, women's and students' groups, is significant. The
SAF, led by Brigadier Abdelaziz Khalid, maintains contact with the
SPLA and the two largest traditional northern parties (now in opposition),
the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).
The U.S. Role
The United States provides generous humanitarian relief and is
leading international efforts for peace, democracy and human rights
in the Sudan. The U.S. Congress has maintained an active interest
by holding hearings and passing several strong resolutions. American
NGOs have contributed effectively in a wide range of activities,
at times taking great risks. Sudanese gratitude and appreciation
of this support is truly immense.
There is a need for greater coordination of efforts to maximize
the returns from the existing resources, however. It is essential
that the present level of international pressure be maintained,
possibly even intensified, and certainly not reduced. Any easing
of pressure will have disastrous effects for the forces of peace
and stability not only in Sudan, but throughout the Horn and into
Central, East and North Africa, possibly even extending across the
Red Sea. The government and its fellow travelers outside Sudan will
misconstrue such a relaxation in efforts as a victory for their
cause, and they will become even more dismissive of human rights
and basic democratic principles.
One step which would greatly empower the peace movement inside
the Sudan would be the breaking of the government's embargo on outside
information and news of developments in the peace process. This
could easily be accomplished by broadcasting relevant newspaper
articles, congressional and U.N. resolutions and other material
via short-wave radio.
Friends of Sudan must ask themselves one simple question: Is the
objective of their efforts to arrive at a political settlement,
or is it to realize lasting peace? The answer will affect not only
the peoples of the Sudan, but of the wider region as well.
Imatong Ali is the pseudonym of a trade unionist from Sudan. |