Tie Humanitarian Assistance to Substantive Reform

By John Prendergast

Over the past year, the conflict in Sudan has shifted from an internal civil war to a regional security crisis. The government of Sudan now is engaged in low-intensity conflicts with neighboring Uganda and Eritrea, with larger war clouds ominously forming on the horizon. The rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is battling the Lord's Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group based in southern Sudan. Cross-border conflict also is occurring between Sudan and Zaire, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Egypt. Given its extensive mobilization of militia in the context of a jihad recruitment drive, the government of Sudan might have the largest army in Africa by year's end. There is a clear possibility of a major regional war developing over both ideology and resources, particularly the Nile waters.

The U.S. historically has been the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to war-torn Sudan. It is now time to step up the response to another level, commensurate with the extraordinary requirements created by the world's deadliest war. I propose three steps be taken: condition all aid on good governance and human rights criteria; build local capacities and support grassroots civil structures; and encourage multi-level peacemaking.

Placing Conditions on Humanitarian Aid

It is commonly alleged that the U.S. and Israel cooperate in making arms available to the SPLA, despite protestations to the contrary. In addition to whatever covert assistance the U.S. may or may not be providing, Washington provides millions of dollars annually in humanitarian assistance to Sudan, representing a huge infusion of resources in a resource-scarce environment.

Thus far, the U.S. has failed to exercise the vast potential leverage which its aid programs offer to further good governance and human rights, or to encourage factional reconciliation in the south. This failure could be interpreted as reflecting Washington's comfort with a policy of low-intensity destabilization of a pariah regime.

Egypt's ambivalence further muddles U.S. policy. Cairo abhors the National Islamic Front (NIF), the driving force behind the Khartoum regime, but is frightened at the prospect of an independent Southern Sudan which could control the flow of the Nile to Egypt.

Finally, the neutrality necessary to maintain the United Nations-negotiated humanitarian access agreement, Operation Lifeline Sudan, creates a continuing need to be even-handed. There are a growing number of allegations by independent critics that humanitarian policy is being substituted for political engagement. This inaction on the political front clearly encourages the Sudanese government on the battlefield; Khartoum is confident it faces little international sanction beyond rhetorical protests.

Donor governments and aid agencies understandably have shied away from placing conditions on humanitarian assistance, yet increasingly in an age of complex conflicts and wars seemingly without end, humanitarian aid is often the only tie connecting the combatants and the international community. Economic and military aid is drying up, and diplomacy is often sporadic. It must be recognized that humanitarian aid is not neutral, but rather has tremendous ramifications on the course of conflicts.

Conditions should be placed on humanitarian assistance to encourage humanitarian objectives, including basic public welfare, basic human rights standards and basic accountability. Donors and agencies must be allowed to engage in independent monitoring and assessment of these criteria. When the controlling authorities fall short of the mark, they should be circumvented to the maximum extent possible. If this proves unworkable, and humanitarian principles are unabashedly abused, aid should be cut off and the agencies should withdraw.

In the context of Sudan, questions about the use of aid to underwrite Khartoum's war efforts remain unanswered. To what extent is the international community assuming the public welfare responsibilities of the Sudanese government, thereby freeing resources for the war? Are aid flights from Khartoum to the south supplying soldiers in government garrisons rather than civilians in need? Is money spent in the pursuit of aid projects providing the government with a source of hard currency used to prosecute the war, and are donated food stocks in the north freeing Sudanese grain production for export (reports say up to a million tons of northern Sudanese sorghum may be exported this year alone)?

If donors cannot independently investigate and resolve these issues satisfactorily, their entire aid program to the north should be reconsidered. Yet any cut-off should be conditioned scrupulously on consistent abuse of access, accountability and reciprocity, and the same principles should be applied to aid to the south.

Supporting Civil Structures

A new approach to humanitarian assistance is needed. Major progress has been made over the past year in moving away from food aid "dumping" to a more rehabilitative approach. Further shifts need to be made to reinforce civil structures and build up local capacity. This paradigm should be the foundation of the Clinton administration's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, as well as all U.S. efforts to respond to complex emergencies around the globe.

Agencies and donors would better serve the long-term goals of crisis management and capacity building by focusing directly on the chiefs, churches, women's organizations, local community groups and other non-military elements. "Civil society" is healthiest at the grassroots level, and any efforts to build externally driven systems above this level are ultimately diversions from crucial grassroots rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The donors should emphasize the need for creative space at the local and community levels in their contacts with the controlling authorities.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

A renewed, coordinated, multi-track effort is needed to encourage peacemakers within and outside Sudan to work formally and informally to foster peace at all levels of society. Participants in peace efforts should be drawn from governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith groups and indigenous communities, and should operate at the national, inter-factional and community levels.

At the national and international level, the Horn of Africa's Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) has moved from its initial focus on conflict resolution to the discussion of broader issues and more comprehensive measures. The IGADD's role in negotiations may have stalled, but its new emphasis on larger issues of regional stability is also important. IGADD's "success" should not be measured solely in terms of the progress of talks between the government of Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM).

Perhaps the key to breaking the current deadlock of negotiations is reconciliation between the rival rebel groups, the SPLM and the SSIM. The moment for such rapprochement is ripe.

At the same time, we should not ignore the importance of local, indigenous peace efforts among Sudanese peoples, which augur well for communal peace and the creation of an atmosphere and momentum which could assist peacemaking at the inter-factional and national levels. When indigenous peoples initiate peace efforts, governments and NGOs must be ready with materiel and personnel to strengthen and facilitate this process.

War has raged in Sudan for three of the last four decades. The situation will not be reversed overnight. It is increasingly apparent that all aid, trade and diplomacy must be directed toward helping the Sudanese themselves rebuild a culture of peace in their divided and multi-faceted country: a goal far beyond the political or military outcome of the current civil conflict.

John Prendergast is the director of the Horn of Africa Project at the Center of Concern in Washington, DC. He is currently completing a book on conflict prevention and resolution in the region under a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace.