July/August 1995, pgs. 9, 116-117

Words to Remember

Bosnia and the Failure of American Leadership

Because the multicultural, multi-sectarian Bosnian people refuse to lie down and die, the problem of saving their government, whose borders are recognized by the United Nations and the United States, from the raw fascism that nearly destroyed Europe in the first half of the 20th century and threatens it again at the end of the same century, won't go away.

His unwillingness to face up to the problem cast a shadow over the end of George Bush's presidency and will deny him a place in the history books as one of America's successful presidents. As the shadow darkens, it relegates Bill Clinton to the role of failed president even before the end of his term.

However, there will be far more serious consequences of America's failure of leadership in Bosnia. It will undermine the confidence of people everywhere that they can halt, once and for all, the cycles of war and disorder that are the enemies of human progress.

It also has opened a chasm of hatred between the Muslims who occupy the southern latitudes of Eurasia, and the Orthodox Christians who occupy its northern latitudes. The "clash of civilizations" in Bosnia also is manifested in Azerbaijan and Chechnya and, if it remains unchecked, will break out in many other places across the center of the world's largest and most heavily populated continent.

Certainly the failure is undermining American support for the United Nations, perhaps permanently. It may also hasten an American withdrawal from Europe and into isolationism. That will destroy NATO, which will delight the French, horrify the British, and tempt both Germans and Russians to the excesses that convulsed Europe throughout all but the final decade of the 20th century. A short-term triumph for the Serbs, and the spread of their virulently contagious and lethal brand of tribalism to neighboring areas, may begin the transformation of Europe from a gradually strengthening community of nation states to a confused quagmire of quarrelsome tribes within the lifetimes of many who read these words.

All this is beyond the understanding of the insecure and unimaginative occupant of the White House, surrounded as he is by yes-people, whose energies are fully engaged in turf fights and self-serving leaks to the press. Instead of harnessing the strength and ingenuity of the world's only remaining superpower to the search for solutions to problems like Bosnia, Clinton's aides seem dedicated only to shielding him from advice and counsel he does not want to hear.

Because there seems no possibility of a Bosnia policy developing from within the administration, below are some ideas gleaned from national leaders and the media, abridged and expressed in Words to Remember:

Former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III:

Does the United States have an interest in stopping the humanitarian nightmare in Bosnia? Without a doubt. Does the United States have an interest in supporting the territorial integrity of Bosnia? Of course. But are our interests in either sufficiently vital to warrant the introduction of U.S. ground forces into a potential military quagmire? The answer is clearly no—as it has been from the beginning...

The United States does, however, have one true vital interest in the Bosnian conflict: containing it. Should the war spread to neighboring countries, it risks a conflagration that could draw in Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and even Turkey. A broader war in the Balkans would create general instability in Europe. The United States has a compelling interest in averting such an outcome, because history teaches us that the United States cannot avoid involvement in broader European conflicts....

As a first step, U.N. peacekeepers should be withdrawn from Bosnia....Today, U.N. peacekeepers have become unwilling tools of Serb aggression. The Bosnian Serbs, in total disregard of international law, have seized peacekeepers before. And they will do so again, unless peacekeepers are removed...

The international arms embargo must also be lifted. Like the U.N. peacekeeping force, the embargo has outlived what usefulness it might once have had. Conceived as a measure to lower the overall level of violence, the embargo has instead strengthened the hands of the Bosnian Serbs and their masters in Belgrade. By diminishing the Bosnian government's ability to defend itself, the embargo encourages Serb aggression. Like the peacekeepers, the embargo should go...Would our Western allies and Russia be prepared to work with us in the United Nations to lift the embargo? I believe they would, but only in the context of a full withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers and a broader strategy of containment.

Of course, any policy of containing the conflict in Bosnia, if it is to be credible, must be backed up by force. And only NATO has the military capacity to provide that force. That means the United States must take the lead. And we should. European leadership has failed. But that also means no more empty U.S. threats. Our resolve must match our rhetoric or containment and deterrence will not work. But if we are serious and committed, containment can work...

Clearly, a containment policy would require a redefinition of NATO's mission to permit military action anywhere under circumstances that threaten peace and stability in Europe. That redefinition is long overdue. But if NATO's mission is not to act to prevent general war in southeastern Europe, one is justified in asking, four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, what is its mission?...

In 1914, a single act in an unimportant country—the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo—spread to become a continent-wide conflict. An admittedly lesser, though similar, risk exists today. Hand-wringing and finger-pointing will do nothing to avert it. Nor will a continuation of the current Western policy in the Balkans. Only a substantial containment strategy, resolutely led by the United States and an overwhelming NATO force, can do so.

—Excerpted from the Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1995

Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman:

We must realize that negotiations will not end this war. So far, the talks with the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, have not encouraged him to recognize Bosnian independence. Even if he did agree, he would only agree on paper—and he eats those agreements as if they were shredded wheat...

The West will have to use force if it wants to influence the outcome. There are only two ways to do so. First, we can unilaterally lift the arms embargo to enable the Bosnians to acquire heavy weapons, as Bob Dole, the Senate majority leader, wants. This would even up the sides somewhat—except that the Serbs would have every reason to launch a major offensive to try to win the war before the Bosnians could be trained in the new weapons.

The better approach is a campaign of decisive NATO air strikes against Serbian military targets in Bosnia. This might require the U.N. to leave Bosnia altogether, as a growing number in Congress urgently favor...The odds are that the Clinton administration will embrace neither of these approaches. What then?...

The more predictable scenario is that the Bosnian Serbs will take Sarajevo. The city still has 250,000 inhabitants, 50,000 of them Serbs who have defied orders from the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, to join his side. Many are likely to be executed.

As for the others—Muslims and some Croats—most will flee in panic. When they are added to the more than half a million Bosnian refugees outside the country, temporarily accepted by host countries on the assumption that they would soon return home, the West will face its largest refugee crisis since World War II. Moreover, Mr. Milosevic will be emboldened to use force on behalf of Serbs in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia, thus widening the crisis...

There are no flawless alternatives to avert disaster. But paradoxically, the least risky course in the long run would be for NATO, led by the United States, to use its air power to force a compromise with which all the combatants can live.

—Excerpted from the New York Times, June 24, 1995

Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick:

It is significant that in the days after the F-16 was shot down, the U.S. government neither retaliated nor expressed much outrage over this deliberate targeting of an unprotected U.S. plane on a routine, nonviolent mission. The administration has still given no one—least of all the offending Serbs—any reason to fear American displeasure.

Such behavior was probably to be expected from an administration that permitted the installation of the SAM missiles within an area patrolled by American planes. It should probably have been expected, as well, from an administration that sends American planes to patrol an area defended by SAM missiles—and sends those planes unprotected by the readily available, highly effective electronic companions in our Air Force.

It was not to be expected—I suppose—that such an administration would strike back against an attack. The Clinton administration—like the Carter administration before it—often sees American strength as a provocation and tries not to be assertive. Often it is ready to give scoundrels the benefit of the doubt.

It is easy enough to guess how Ronald Reagan would have reacted in such a situation. He would not have accepted rules of engagement that exposed American airmen to unnecessary dangers. He would have used all available protection for all military personnel on any mission. When an American plane was attacked, he retaliated swiftly, fiercely, and certainly, never doubting his right or duty to do so...

Bill Clinton has already promised NATO pilots the full available protection on future forays. The next appropriate step would be to remove Serb missile sites—that is, retaliate. It would be good for his own political future and good for world peace if Bill Clinton would watch a few John Wayne movies.

—Excerpted from the Washington Post, June 9, 1995

Editorial: The Washington Jewish Week

An oft-proclaimed principle of post-World War II international relations has been the inadmissability of territorial acquisition by force. One result of the 1991 Persian Gulf war against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussain was to reassert that principle. One result of Serb victory over the Muslim-led Bosnian government will be to make the Gulf war and then-President Bush's "new world order" look like the exception, not the rule, perhaps emboldening aggressors to come.

Abandoning the (previously) Westernized Muslims of Bosnia already is providing a propaganda windfall to Islamic extremists in the Middle East and beyond. "See," they can say, "Westerners do not really care about human rights or the slaughter of believers, even those most like them. Therefore, attacks against the West are justified."

Small wars, left to themselves, sometimes fade away. But sometimes they expand. Costly as small wars are to stop, big ones are costlier.

Yes, the United States has important national interests in Bosnia. Important enough to send an American army into the hostile mountains of the Balkans? Maybe not. Important enough to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and even to provide the air power and other support to back up NATO, or the Bosnia Muslims in a serious way? Probably, unless we don't care if the U.N. goes the way of the League of Nations.

—Excerpted from the Washington Jewish Week, June 8, 1995

Syndicated Columnist Paul Greenberg:

Just what American policy is at press time remains uncertain, not that it matters, because it's bound to change. Just as Bill Clinton is bound to repeat that his policy has been firm all along, whatever it may be this morning...

For three years now, U.S. policy has been weaving all over this destinationless road, reinforcing the failure of the European powers to show any real power. That tends to happen with some regularity when America fails to exercise leadership. In 1914. In 1939. Now in 1995.

—Excerpted from the Washington Times, June 8, 1995

Syndicated Columnist Thomas L. Friedman:

It is no wonder that The Times of London thundered in its Monday editorial that while Mr. Clinton's initial offer showed that he was "now genuinely worried about appearing to leave America's close allies in the lurch in Bosnia, as so often with this most changeable of presidents, his latest wisp of resolve evaporated halfway down Pennsylvania Avenue, blown away by congressional muttering."

Raymond Seitz, who recently retired as U.S. ambassador to Britain, remarked to me that this behavior "conveys to the Europeans that this administration is utterly unreliable and adolescent. Sure, it has to take domestic politics into account. But the real test is taking those domestic pressures into account and still finding some room for your allies—because you will be asking them to do the same for you one day..."

You don't tell your friends that if they get stuck in the Balkan quagmire we will hold a congressional debate about rescuing them. You tell them only one thing: "We'll help get you out. You can count on us."

Anyone who thinks that the American people wouldn't respond favorably to that kind of leadership doesn't know the American people.

—Excerpted from the New York Times, June 7, 1995

Syndicated Columnist Anthony Lewis:

If the Europeans and the United States are not themselves willing to oppose the most murderous aggression in Europe since the Nazis, it is clear now that they—and the United Nations—should get out of Bosnia. To continue hiding behind a hopeless U.N. mission is no longer possible.

Instead, the West should move rapidly and massively to arm and train the Bosnian government forces—and support them from the air. When there is no worry about possible Serbian retaliation against peacekeepers, air attacks would be devastating. And Dr. Karadzic knows it: That is why he says he will not release his hostages until NATO promises that there will be no more airstrikes.

The time has come for all of us, hawks and doves on Bosnia, to face the fact that UNPROFOR cannot stop the slaughter. Those with an abiding interest in the peace of Europe and its freedom from religious murder—NATO members above all—then have an obligation either to intervene more effectively or to get out of the way and help Bosnia fight the aggressors.

—Excerpted from the New York Times, June 5, 1995

Former National Security Agency Director General William E. Odom:

It has long been clear that the only way to deal effectively with the war in Bosnia is through a major change in the balance of military forces on the ground. That means a large deployment of NATO troops committed to an indefinite stay. Against this backdrop, effective diplomacy can begin...

A fundamental problem has been the difference in American and European approaches to the war in Bosnia in the past, and the current course of marginal military deployment does not remove it...The European approach has been to try to sell out the Bosnian Muslims, but the Bosnian government, whose military is now stronger than it was a year ago, will not lie down and die...

The Bosnian Serbs see no reason to accept compromises. For the Bosnian government, compromise is suicidal—and it has enough military power to stay alive. If Bosnia did capitulate, Serbia and Croatia would still have unresolved differences, and additional conflict almost certainly awaits us in Macedonia and Kosovo...The crisis today presents NATO with a challenge that is likely to define its future, either as a vital, effective security structure for Europe or an empty shell...

Although public opinion polls suggest that a military operation large enough to make diplomacy effective is out of the question, it must be considered. If the alliance cannot deal effectively with Bosnia, questions will arise about its effectiveness in the face of the challenges of potential instability in Central and Eastern Europe. As Sen. Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, recently warned, NATO must go "out of area" or "out of business..."

In 1993, I suggested that a NATO force of 300,000 to 400,000 was necessary for such a mission. As a result of discussions with former Yugoslav Army officers, I have reduced the number to 150,000 to 200,000, although my interlocutors insist that 100,000 would be adequate. A ratio of two European soldiers to every American soldier would rightly let the Europeans carry the larger burden...What really is at stake? Increasingly the answer is becoming the future of the Atlantic alliance. Eventually ways may be found to extract NATO and the U.N. from Bosnia and to "wall off" that corner of Europe, reducing its damaging effect on the NATO region. In the current course, the basic strategic issues will not be resolved, only postponed. We are not dealing with Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti in this case.

Large parts of the world must remain beyond our military commitments. We cannot be the world's policeman. Nonetheless, we can secure important strategic regions—Europe, northeastern Asia—and we can maintain a balance of power in the Middle East. Bosnia lies within the most important of these regions.

—Excerpted from the New York Times, May 31, 1995

Syndicated Columnist William Safire:

The Serbs know that the U.N. is a sponge designed to absorb humiliation. Now they are testing the Western powers to see who has the will to fight and win in Bosnia.

No outsiders have that will. When Americans dare to suggest that Europeans collectively enforce Europe's peace, the response is, Without you? You lead, America—send U.S. troops to fight—and we may follow, criticizing all the way...

The U.S. should help in a withdrawal guaranteed to lead to lift-and-strike, but not in any "reconfiguration" intended to prolong the embargo and the dithering.

Outsiders do not have the will to win. Serbs do. So do embattled Bosnian Muslims. Humanitarians must become air-support allies; in that way, the world can win the war.

—Excerpted from the New York Times, June 1, 1995

Syndicated Columnist Jim Hoagland:

Bosnia policy is the number one oxymoron in world politics today. The West has no policy for Bosnia, only wishful thinking and good intentions. The United Nations and NATO must now face up to the failure and incoherence of their misconceived joint mission in the Balkans: They must radically transform that mission or abandon it. They must make war, or make way...

The Bosnian government, a U.N. member recognized by the United States and its major allies, fights to regain its own territory. The Bosnians are victims, the Serbs are aggressors. While there are no angels in this war, there is a right side and a wrong side. There is a side with legitimate war aims. It is the Bosnian side.

The choice comes down to this: If the NATO command is to stay involved, it should take charge of member-country troops and commit them to not being neutral. Those troops should protect themselves, and protect the territorial integrity of Bosnia, with all war-fighting means available. Other U.N. troops should leave...

Without U.S. leadership and combat involvement—a political impossibility under this president—the Europeans will not take up this burden.

That means the time has come for them to get out of the way and join the United States in forcing a lifting of the U.N. embargo against the Bosnian government. The newest Serb outrage produces a new dynamic in the constantly changing Bosnian war. The Serbs threaten not only the lives of U.N. soldiers but also international order. They have knocked away any comfortable, fence-sitting option in this conflict.

—Excerpted from the Washington Post, May 31, 1995