An Indian Concern is China

By Sumit Ganguly

Indian nuclear policy is a curious amalgam of idealism and realpolitik. The idealistic dimension is inherited from Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first prime minister. A firm believer in the importance of harnessing the benefits of science and technology for India's economic development, Nehru was an early advocate for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the international level, he was a passionate and tireless campaigner for the abolition of nuclear weapons. As early as 1954 Nehru promoted the introduction of the first U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for a comprehensive test ban. He also commissioned the world's first non-classified study of the radiological, blast and thermal effects of nuclear weapons, published in 1956.

Even prior to Nehru's death and the first Chinese nuclear explosion at LOP NOR in 1964, the idealism of India's foreign and security policies was severely tested. India's inability to befriend the people's Republic of China culminated in a brutal border war in 1962.

After Nehru's successor, Lai Bahader Shastri, failed to obtain a nuclear guarantee against China from either the western alliance or the Soviet Union, India's nuclear Policy began to shift. The leadership of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, discarded Nehruvian idealism although the government still paid lip service to its rhetoric India's successful attempts to persuade the nuclear weapons states to limit their nuclear arsenals in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) hastened the development of the Indian nuclear weapons program. Indira Gandhi became convinced that nuclear weapons were the key to great power status. Desiring to consolidate India's pre-eminent power in South Asia, the government pursued its nuclear program with renewed ardor.

In May 1974 India set off a nuclear device at Pokharan in the Rajasthan desert. Although official spokesmen offered the explanation that the nuclear device was solely for peaceful purposes and did not represent any change in India's security or nuclear policies, the external world knew otherwise. In reaction to the Indian explosion the major industrial powers formed the London Suppliers' Group, which set out explicit guidelines designed to curb the supply of nuclear technology and materials to states that were non-members. India's bilateral relations with two major suppliers, the United States and Canada, also suffered, particularly when Canada cut off all cooperation in the nuclear field. The widespread international disapprobation no doubt shaped India's decision not to test another nuclear device.

The idealistic language of the Nehruvian legacy continues to inform both Indian official discourse and multilateral diplomacy on the nuclear issue despite the fundamental belief by Indian policy-makers in the strategic and perceived utility of nuclear weapons. The dichotomy between Indian official pronouncements and behavior is readily apparent. India remains formally opposed to the NPT, insistingon its fundamentally discriminatory character and proposing instead a global nondiscriminatory regime. Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi provided the most specific Indian proposal at the General Assembly in June 1988. Among other matters, this four-stage plan called for a 50 percent cut in U.S. and (then) Soviet nuclear arsenals, a global cutoff of all weapons-grade fissionable material, a comprehensive test ban and an undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals by the year 2010.

Despite these idealistic pronouncements Indian policy-makers have not curtailed their own program. Overcoming cost overruns and problems of systems integration, India has successfully developed short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The short-range Prithvi missile, with a range of 150 miles, is believed to be on the verge of deployment.

Under considerable pressure, India has started a series of bilateral talks with the United States on the nuclear issue designed to culminate in multilateral discussions. After three meetings since January 1992, the two sides have made some progress in their dialogue. Significant differences remain, however. Among other matters, the two states cannot agree on the participants for a multilateral nuclear conference.

The United States is willing to include the five permanent members of the security Council, Japan, Germany and, of course, India and Pakistan in a multilateral forum. But Indian negotiators insist that other nuclear-capable actors like Israel be brought into the discussion.

India's real concern, however, is China. Indian diplomats privately argue that the U.S. has little or no leverage on Chinese behavior. Consequently, they remain dubious about any Chinese undertakings to assuage India's security concerns. Nevertheless, as a matter of practical necessity, they are prepared to continue a dialogue with the United States. To this end, the Indians point out that they have co-sponsored both a comprehensive test ban and a nuclear-grade fissile-material cutoff resolution with the United States.

The Clinton administration, however, perceives the situation differently, arguing that the Indians are not moving with sufficient dispatch on the nuclear issue. Perhaps to prompt India to fuller cooperation, the administration recently has proposed a one-time repeal of the Pressler Amendment to provide Pakistan with 38 F-16 military aircraft in return for a verifiable cap on Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan's initial response to this offer has been negative, and India has been no more forthcoming.

Any American non-proliferation policy toward South Asia must address both India and Pakistan's valid security concerns. Merely addressing Pakistani misgivings about India without simultaneously dealing with India's concerns about China will not further the cause of nuclear non-proliferation in the region. Assuaging that concern may well enable the United States and the international community to enlist India to the cause of regional non-proliferation. After all, as its own history demonstrates, India is sensitive to shifting global norms. Combining global idealism with regional security imperatives may eventually unravel the nuclear conundrum on the subcontinent.

Sumit Ganguly is a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.