July/August 1994, Page 16
Nuclear Proliferation: Darkest Cloud Over South Asia?Three
Views
South Asia Could Be The Next Korea
By Sen. Larry Pressler
The catalyst for much of what currently is happening on the Korean
Peninsula was a Clinton administration policy that sent disastrously
mixed signals to the North Korean government. North Korea postured.
The administration waffled. North Korea was emboldened as officials
in Pyongyang came to believe the U.S. was not serious about preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that part of the world.
As a result, today we have an extremely unstable situation that
even the world community may not be able to contain.
What does this have to do with security in South Asia? Plenty.
A similar—indeed a much more serious—scenario could
develop in that part of the world if the Clinton administration
is allowed the "onetime" exemption to the Pressler Amendment
it has requested. To properly comprehend this point, one needs to
understand the history of the law limiting foreign assistance to
Pakistan.
In 1985, the so-called Pressler Amendment became law. Under the
terms of this law, Pakistan is not eligible to purchase American
arms or receive most other foreign assistance unless the president
can make a yearly certification that nation does not possess a nuclear
explosive device.
At the time, Pakistani officials embraced the concept saying, "We
are not developing a nuclear device; we support this
amendment." This was due in large measure to the fact that
during this same time frame other members of the Senate were proposing
legislation to cut off aid immediately under the presumption that
Pakistan already had a nuclear weapon. The Pressler Amendment provided
a compromise.
From 1985 to 1990, the president was able to certify that Pakistan
did not possess a nuclear explosive device. However, in 1990 President
Bush was unable to make the certification. As a result, some $600
million per year in American aid to Pakistan has been cut off. Among
other things, this has meant a number of F-16 fighter-bombers-bought
and paid for by the Pakistanis became undeliverable.
Last fall, the Clinton administration announced it would seek a
repeal of the Pressler Amendment. After several senators from both
political parties-protested, the administration withdrew the proposal.
Recently, the administration presented a new plan. It now proposes
to deliver (at least) the F-16s to Pakistan in exchange for an agreement
from that country to cap its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Probably never before in history has a country sought to promise
the delivery of 20 to 40 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear
weapons to a country that has nuclear weapons and say it is doing
so in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation. The administration
cannot explain its reasoning. The best it can do is to argue the
planes would not have the mounts necessary to carry a nuclear weapon.
The truth is, such mounts are not difficult to make. Where is the
logic?
Unfortunately, there are many problems with the administration's
proposal far more serious than a lack of logic. For instance, there
is the effect such a move would have on diplomatic efforts between
India and Pakistan. A visitor to South Asia cannot come away without
the clear impression that tensions between the two are higher than
they have been in a number of years.
India blames Pakistan for a series of terrorist attacks in India,
including the bombing of the Bombay Stock Exchange. Pakistan accuses
India of a campaign of systemized repression against the Muslim
population of Kashmir. Any chance for diplomatic progress would
be set back by the delivery of technology such as the F16s. Such
a move would provide the catalyst for destabilization in South Asia.
The warning signs already are there. Recently, Pakistan closed its
consulate in Bombay. India responded by shuttering its consulate
in Karachi.
If we deliver the F-16s or other military technology, India certainly
will react by escalating its procurement of arms. Tensions will
mount. Two countries that have been at war three times since independence
in the 1940s once again will find themselves on the brink. Only
this time, each side will have the ultimate weapon at its disposal.
While the world focuses its attention on the Korean Peninsula, South
Asia could find itself in a nuclear war.
What about other nations? A number of countries contemplating nuclear
weapons also are U.S. aid recipients. The existence of the Pressler
Amendment and its possible extension to other countries undoubtedly
has been a key consideration in the decision-making of these countries'
political leadership when the question of pursuing a nuclear weapons
program is discussed. These countries are looking closely to see
if the U.S. means what it says.
If we allow a so-called onetime exception to the Pressler Amendment,
we will be certifying and accepting Pakistan as a full nuclear power
without that country ever agreeing to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) or accepting any formal inspection regime. Through
such a move we would tell not only Pakistan, but also other countries
considering a nuclear weapons program, that there is no long-term
penalty for going nuclear.
After extensive talks with leaders of South Korea, India, Pakistan
and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I am convinced
we should keep the Pressler Amendment unchanged. President Clinton
has stated eloquently that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is the most critical national security issue facing
the United States today. To repeal the only sanctions legislation
that has real teeth regarding possession of nuclear weapons would
be a tragic mistake.
In the end, the issue really is in the hands of the government
of Pakistan. It has the ability to make a dramatic contribution
to peace and stability in South Asia by voluntarily dismantling
its nuclear weapons program. President Bush once told me this could
be done in "fifteen minutes." An exaggeration, perhaps,
but not by much.
There is, in fact, precedent for such a move. South Africa had
a nuclear weapons program which included a number of completed systems.
It dismantled its program under international scrutiny. Other countries
with the technical capacity for a nuclear weapons program (such
as Japan, Germany, Taiwan and South Korea) have voluntarily foregone
such programs. The IAEA continues to urge countries to reduce nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, it has no real sanction power of its own.
We should give the IAEA sanctions with real teeth. In the meantime,
we should not repeal the toughest sanctions we have in our law.
Sen. Larry Pressler, Republican senior senator from South Dakota,
is the author of the Pressler Amendment which ties U.S. military
assistance to Pakistan to Pakistani weapons policy. |