Bosnian Cease-fire: Beginning of Peace Or Brief Interlude Between Wars?

By Richard H. Curtiss

"In the case of Bosnia, no fundamental change has occurred in the West's bask policy, which is to slowly normalize the territorial aggression of the Serbs, who have taken 72 percent of Bosnia by a policy of genocide ... All sides may sign a piece of paper But will the Serbs roll back their spoils by one third? No one believes so. If not, will the West enforce the treaty by putting troops on the ground? No one believes so. The Western mode is now withdrawal. " —Christian Science Monitor editorial, June 15, 1994

Most of those fortunate enough to survive protracted exposure to war will agree that its most difficult moments occur with the duty-driven return to danger after a period in safe and peaceful surroundings. Soon, however, fear, anger and the surge of satisfaction with each escape from death become routine, replacing the temporary irresolution and desperate longing for normalcy.

At this writing, the cease-fire in Bosnia provides one of those abnormal interludes of normality. The fighting is largely confined to isolated areas and brief outbreaks. For most of the country's 4.5 million people, of whom 2 million have been displaced by the warfare and Serb ethnic cleansing," the ever-present fear of snipers, shelling, or a sudden lunge by tanks and troops at their towns or neighborhoods is replaced not by rage at how much has been lost, but rather by longing to save whatever is left.

If the diplomats are to bring peace with their plan to give the new federation of the 44 percent of the population that is Muslim and 17 percent of the population that is Croat 51 percent of the land, and the 31 percent of the population that is Serb 49 percent of the land for their own breakaway republic or annexation by Serbia, it must be now.

Thanks to a triumph of American diplomacy, ably assisted behind the scenes by the Catholic hierarchy and Germany, the war between the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia was stopped last March. It now seems agreed that if the Republic of Bosnia cannot be restored to its original borders, a new federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, agreed upon in a May 11 meeting of the two sides in the American Embassy in Vienna, will in turn federate with the Republic of Croatia after the fighting ends both in Bosnia and Croatia.

This makes sense in that the Croats and Muslims are closer to each other and share more history, not all of it commendable, than do either with the Serbs. Their combined population of more than 3 million in the remnant of Bosnia and 4.5 million in Croatia can be an effective counterweight to the 10 million population of Serbia and Montenegro combined, and some 1 million Bosnian Serbs who will be free to remain with Bosnia, or amalgamate with Serbia.

Bosnia and Croatia combined are assured of extensive outside support. A billion of the world's Muslims, including those in the petroleum-producing states, who may have been only vaguely aware of their European co-religionists in Bosnia,' Albania and the small countries around them, are highly conscious and supportive of them now. The long Serb and brief Croat war against Bosnia's Muslim-led government has seen to that.

Bosnia can be assured of generous initial assistance from the Middle East, and preferential markets there for its own products Croatia, whose picturesque mountain re sorts and spectacular Adriatic coastline have long been popular with free-spending German tourists, can count on preferential economic treatment from German speaking Europe, based both on historic ties and the Roman Catholic connection Economic prospects for Bosnia and Croatia, in fact, are far more promising than for the Serbs, whose cultural and religious ties link it to the Christian Orthodox world from Russia to Greece, but whose seamless transition from communist authoritarianism to a particularly nasty version of fascist authoritarianism has left even its own educated classes deeply alienated and divided.

But the temptations of "normalcy," security, and preserving what's left rather than recovering or avenging what's been lost would pass with the return to warfare. Originally the Serbs sought a four-month U.N.-brokered cease-fire. The Bosnians agreed to one month, beginning June 10, seeing an advantage to a halt in the fighting during summer, when dry weather and passable roads favor the tank-led assaults by which the Serbs have seized 72 percent of the country. In the fog, snow and freezing cold of winter, which comes early to the Bosnian mountains, the advantage will shift to the far more numerous but lightly armed Bosnian government militiamen, fighting close to the homes they are defending or hope to recover. Therefore, whether the cease fire is extended or fighting resumes depends upon two factors, in both of which the American role is crucial.

One is the matter of maps. The Muslims and Croats of Bosnia, together comprising at least 61 percent of the population, not unreasonably say they will settle for no less than 58 percent of the land. Initially the U.S. supported them on this point. Now, in a Clintonesque switch, it has thrown its weight behind the European 51-percent plan. Instead of rejecting the European plan outright, the mixed Muslim, Croat and Serb leaders of the new Bosnian federation concede that the percentage of land they will accept is "negotiable," depending upon the "quality" of the areas to be restored to them.

The Serbs say that even the European 51 -percent plan asks them to give up too much, and that they will not withdraw from the once predominantly Muslim, now "ethnically cleansed," major population centers they have seized. To emphasize their intention to hold virtually everything they occupy, they are continuing their "ethnic cleansing" right through the truce.

According to Peter Kessler, Sarajevo spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 462 Muslims and Croats fled the Banja Luka area on June 14 alone.

"This is a clear-cut, systematic pattern of ethnic cleansing, and it is done very quietly, very thoroughly," a U.N. officer told The New York Times. He said terrorized Muslims are being offered safe passage out of Muslim-majority but Serb-occupied areas for fees ranging from a few hundred dollars to a thousand dollars a head, paid to Serb "travel agents" and a Serb organization that calls itself the Red Cross. The refugees are allowed to take nothing with them but the clothes they are wearing, and they are subjected to highly intrusive body searches for hidden funds or jewels at Serb roadblocks before they reach Bosnian government-held territory. As they leave, their houses are destroyed or are occupied by Serbs displaced from other areas in Bosnia or Croatia.

This leads to the second key factor in the present prelude to more war or to peace. If the Muslim-led Bosnian government negotiators are tempted by the "quality" of the territory being offered to compromise on the percentage for which they would settle, who will secure that "quality" land for them? The Serbs already have made clear their unwillingness to withdraw from anything they decide to keep. The pattern of their "ethnic cleansing" indicates that this will be all of the major Bosnian population centers in an arc sweeping north near the border with Serbia and then west along the Bosnian border with Croatia to link Krajina, a largely Serb area of Croatia, to Serbia.

It therefore seems extremely unlikely that, whatever they sign, the Serbs will withdraw voluntarily from any of this territory. In fact, the Serbs have kept none of the U.N.-brokered agreements they have reached in recent months, not even those with their Russian mentors, except those enforced by the credible threat of NATO air strikes.

Therefore there will be no peace until the United States convinces the parties it is prepared to use air strikes to enforce what ever agreement is brokered. It did this successfully last February when it threatened to bomb the Serb tanks and artillery shelling Sarajevo, and actually shot down two Serb aircraft bombing and strafing Bosnian towns and villages inside and outside U.N.-protected "safe zones.”

In doing so, the U.S. will not be opposed by Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in a June 14 meeting in Moscow: "If you choose peace, you can count on the most decisive support from Russia. We will support you then even at the price of confrontation ... [But] if you choose war, then forget about Russia's support. You cannot control 70 percent of the territory by force as you do now."

The Serbs have kept only those agreements enforced by the credible threat of NATO air strikes.

The Clinton administration very briefly regained international credibility with its February actions until it became clear that French and British support for the U.S.-led NATO air strikes were only half of a devil's deal. The other half was that the U.S. would support French-led efforts to get the Bosnian government negotiators to settle for 51 percent of their territory. France threatened to withdraw 2,500 soldiers from its 6,800-troop U.N. peacekeeping contingent, and Britain threatened to withdraw all 3,300 of its soldiers if the Bosnians didn't accept the plan, leaving them to the mercy of the Serbs.

The threat no longer terrifies. Other nations now are supplying peacekeeping troops. The recent addition of 1,450 Turkish troops also allays Bosnian Muslim fears that withdrawals of U.N. blue helmets from Western European countries could leave them at the mercy of Russian, Ukrainian and other U.N. peacekeepers whose natural sympathies lie with the Serbs.

The balance of power on the ground also is shifting rapidly. Although the U.N. arms embargo on all countries of the former Yugoslavia remains in effect, it no longer prevents the legitimate Bosnian government from getting arms to defend its U.N.- and U.S.-recognized borders.

The end of Muslim-Croat fighting has opened up the Croatian seacoast, with dozens of ports and coves, and aircraft landing strips, all connected by Croat-held roads with the embattled Bosnian enclaves. Large quantities of arms finally are reaching the Bosnian forces, which already comprise 200,000 Muslims and loyal Croats and Serbs, but until now have had only one weapon for every four soldiers. The Bosnians have little doubt that, properly armed with some artillery and with sufficient antitank missiles to neutralize the weapons with which the Serbs have seized their cities, they can take back much of their land by themselves.

"It will take you five years to recover by force of arms the territories you have lost," British Lt. Gen. Michael Rose, commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia, warned Bosnian government leaders in June. Americans in the NATO and U.N. forces, who have proved somewhat more sympathetic and helpful to the Muslim-led authorities than their French and British counterparts, might have reminded General Rose of one lesson of mutual U.S.-British history. The two years that have elapsed since fighting broke out in Bosnia, plus five more, would exactly equal the time that elapsed between the 1776 declaration of independence and the 1783 promulgation of the constitution that bound together the 13 colonies successfully freed by lightly armed and poorly clothed Americans, despite their suffering from cold, disease, hunger and the superior weaponry of the army they finally defeated.

In fact, the U.S. can strongly influence the outcome in Bosnia by making sure that the map being shown to the Bosnians by U.S. peace envoy Charles Redman assigns them the "quality" areas that could make them settle for 51 percent. It is equally important, however, to convince the Bosnians that if they accept the settlement being proffered, the Serbs can be made to withdraw. If Bosnian military action is required to secure their cities, it should be supported by whatever NATO air strikes are required to assure that forces from neighboring Serbia do not again rush to support the Bosnian Serb aggressors. Only when they come to believe the Serbs will be forced to withdraw from lands awarded to the Bosnian government will the Muslims and Croats give up the dream of restoring Bosnia's 1992 borders, and accept a reasonable settlement now.

Re-establishing U.S. Credibility

After two years of American flip flops, however, re-establishing credibility won't be easy. "The Serbs are not going to give the disputed territory back," said the Los Angeles Times in a June 10 editorial. "The French and Americans are not going to take it back. So much for the agreement."

Equally skeptical was the same June 15 Christian Science Monitor editorial quoted at the beginning of this article: "President Clinton now supports what he said he never would: a partition plan that will reward Serb aggression. He is part of a terrible precedent that can only buy a temporary peace. Moreover, Mr. Clinton himself now raises the issue of lifting the U.N. sanctions on Belgrade—an action we totally reject, since sanctions represent the only punitive measure the West has ever exacted on the Serbs for three years of mayhem in Europe."

These media expressions of outrage are echoed in Congress, where the Senate by 50 to 49 votes, and the House by 244 to 178, called upon Clinton not only to disregard the U.N. arms embargo, unilaterally if necessary, but also to supply the Muslim-led Bosnian government with arms.

"Little did I think that such evils as concentration camps and ethnic cleansing would resurface and such brutal aggression would go unchallenged in the heart of Europe," said Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R-KS), who was gravely wounded as a U.S. infantry lieutenant in World War II. "I believe the American people would support U.S. policies that would allow the people of Bosnia to defend themselves."

Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, long a supporter of U.S. leadership for an effort to halt the genocidal aggression in Bosnia, was even more specific, criticizing U.N. special envoy Yasushi Akashi for using "idiotic rules of engagement 'to halt NATO air strikes. "I believe we should be using air strikes much more aggressively," Biden said on a June 5 visit he made with Dole to Sarajevo.

Describing the House action, Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-IN), chief congressional supporter of Bosnia, noted that "the House said: Lift the embargo, let's not screw around anymore." Said Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, "We've got to act like a moral leader, not just talk like a moral leader. It's time to stop being neutral about atrocities." Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) said nearly all of the 45 Jewish members of the House supported lifting the embargo "because of the sensitivity to people being assaulted unprovoked" during the Jewish Holocaust in Europe.

Contrasting Clinton-administration indecision in Bosnia with Bush administration decisiveness only four years earlier, president Albert Wohlstetter of the Europe-America Workshop wrote in the June 10 Wall Street Journal: "In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. led a coalition of willing NATO members and other interested powers—in spite of the fact that the Russians opposed it, the Greeks opposed it, the Belgians wouldn't sell ammunition to the British; and the French, who had opposed the use of force against Iraq, went along only when they saw that the U.S. was going to go ahead anyway with those who were willing."

The softness on Serbia by France and Russia, both of whom initially opposed the Gulf action, may indicate their desire to add Serbia to an unacknowledged alliance to help "contain" or limit Germany's role within the European Union, and make a U.S. presence in Europe seem superfluous. By contrast, Britain seems to have no policy at all in the Balkans. If Margaret Thatcher were prime minister, she would have strengthened Clinton's resolution to act in Bosnia, just as she strengthened Bush's resolution to act in the Gulf. Unfortunately for the Bosnians and peace in Eastern Europe, British Prime Minister John Major and Clinton share the qualities of irresolution and a hopeless desire to appease France.

The Bosnians may feel confident enough to take a chance on peace.

At this point it still may be possible to convince the Bosnian government that, if it accepts the "map" offered by U.S. negotiator Redman, U.S. arms and U.S.-led airpower will be available to back up the peace accord by supporting Bosnian government forces moves to take back the lands awarded to them if the Serbs refuse to withdraw. A good way to begin, therefore, is to make sure that the strongly pro-Bosnian resolutions passed by both houses of Congress are not watered down in committee.

The Bosnians, who are being rearmed by Muslim friends of the U.S. like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, and also by the Islamic radicals of Iran, and who are receiving fuel from anti-Western Libya, may feel confident enough to take a chance on peace. They know that if the Serbs refuse to withdraw, and Bosnians must resume the war to take back their lands, Croatian forces will join the fight near the Serb-held Bosnian town of Brcko in an effort to cut the Serb supply line that extends across northern Bosnia to the breakaway Serb "Republic of Krajina" within Croatian territory.

If the Serbs are stopped by Western support for Bosnia and Croatia, they are far less likely to begin "ethnic cleansing" next in Kosovo, where a million Albanian Muslims constitute nearly 90 percent of the population. That fighting could spread to Macedonia, which has a mixed population including both Albanian Muslims, and Slavic Macedonians and Bulgarians. Inevitably other countries would be drawn in, formally or through the presence of "volunteers" from Russia and NATO member Greece on one side and Turkey, Albania and perhaps some Catholic countries, on the other.

An ounce of prevention now to keep brushfire wars in Bosnia and Croatia from becoming conflagrations racing not only through the Balkans but also along the Christian-Muslim religious/cultural faultline that runs from west to east through lands of the former Soviet Union certainly is in the U.S. national interest. It would forestall a chain reaction of ethnic wars that would put the U.S. and Russia on opposite sides, and pit NATO members in Southern Europe against each other.

Columnist Anthony Lewis wrote in the June 10 New York Times: "The way to deal with demagogic nationalists is by strength: force and the threat of force. The misuse of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep has only given peacekeeping a bad name. Weakness in the face of evil Serbian leaders has encouraged nationalist demagoguery elsewhere."

Speaking at 50th anniversary ceremonies of the June 6, 1944 D-Day landing, Richard Hathaway, one of the U.S. Army Rangers who scaled the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc to silence German guns raining death down upon allied forces landing on the beaches of Normandy, said to an audience that included President Clinton: "Nations can and should unite to form the strongest possible bonds, devoted to all mankind so that they may enjoy freedom from oppression, freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. We leave this to you, for only by this can you and your descendants enjoy a free society of all mankind, devoid of such destructive forces as were exhibited here."

President Clinton, responding as a spokesman for the successor generation, vowed to preserve the gift of freedom purchased at such cost by the preceding generation that included his own father, who served in World War II. Bosnia, whose free and multicultural society practicing the universal values described by Hathaway makes it unique in the Balkans, would be a most excellent place to start.

Richard H. Curtiss is the executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.