Kuwait Rebuilds Its Defenses Despite Challenges by Parliament

By Michael Collins Dunn

Kuwait, the only Gulf Arab state with an elected parliament—and one controlled by the opposition at that—is wrestling with the effort to rebuild its defenses in the wake of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of 1990. It also is facing charges from parliamentarians concerning the poor performance of Kuwait's armed forces in August 1990, and rumors of corruption and kickbacks in the defense procurement process.

Kuwait has budgeted billions to rebuild its defenses in the wake of the occupation. Much of Kuwait's equipment was destroyed during the occupation, although some of its aircraft escaped to Saudi Arabia. Now that the fires are out and Kuwait's oil production is recovering, the government is committed to major defense purchases to replace lost equipment.

Parliament, dissolved in the 1980s and reconvened last year in accordance with wartime promises by Kuwait's rulers, is highly critical of the government's past defense policies. The Kuwaiti armed forces were not even on alert on the night of the Iraqi invasion. Parliament has demanded an investigation of the Defense Ministry, and as a result some reshuffling is now taking place.

Member of Parliament Mubarak Al-Dawila, a deputy with Islamist affiliations, has led the charge against corruption and graft in defense procurement. He has charged extensive impropriety in the awarding of defense contracts, and a five-member committee has been set up to investigate all defense purchases since the Gulf war. Some already-contracted-for purchases might be in jeopardy as a result.

Kuwait is moving ahead in a number of other areas, ordering modern tanks—the American M-1—and additional heavy equipment. The McDonnell Douglas F-18s ordered before the war are entering service, and the Kuwaitis are thinking of selling off some of their older French Mirages. Spain recently sent a delegation to look them over.

Realistically, of course, Kuwait's tiny armed forces could not repel another Iraqi invasion in the future, nor could they defend the emirate against its other aggressive neighbor, Iran, should that become necessary. The Kuwaiti air force and armor are little more than "speed bumps" to slow down an invader until outside support arrives on the scene.

As a result, Kuwait has forged defense agreements with the U.S., Britain and France in the wake of the war, and has announced its intention of signing a defense agreement with Russia later this year. Defense Minister Sheikh Ali Sabah Al Salim Al Sabah has indicated the Russian agreement will probably be signed in August. Kuwait was the first of the conservative Arab Gulf states to have ties with the former Soviet Union and has maintained good relations with Russia in the wake of the Soviet breakup.

There still is no indigenous Arab Gulf deterrent force.

The U.S.-U.K.-France-Russia agreements may put potential aggressors on notice that Kuwait has powerful friends who came to its rescue once and are pledged to do so again. There are, of course, some questions about whether another Desert Storm would be possible in some hypothetical future invasion of Kuwait, since the U.S. was the only country capable of mounting the intervention in 1990-91, and under President Bill Clinton the U. S. appears to have entered a period of major defense reductions and retreat from international engagements.

Despite pledges at the time of the war that the Gulf Cooperation Council would become a genuine defense alliance and would build up its joint forces, as well as the abortive "Damascus Declaration" which envisioned Egyptian and Syrian troops deployed on a long-term basis to the Gulf, there still is no indigenous Arab Gulf deterrent force. The GCC has agreed to increase its existing Peninsula Shield force slightly, but has shelved Omani proposals to build up a force of 100,000 men for Gulf defense. And, because the GCC states never were comfortable with the idea of large numbers of Egyptian and Syrian troops on their soil, the Damascus Declaration is essentially a dead letter.

At present, there is no immediate threat.

Saddam Hussain's military has been crushed and Iraq is struggling with sanctions and with Western-imposed "no-fly zones" over its northern and southern regions. Iran has shown considerable assertiveness in pressing its territorial claims and other interests in the Gulf, but any actual military threat is likely to be years away. So far the Iranians have not been foolhardy enough to provoke Western intervention.

A New Maginot Line?

Kuwait has, however, faced frequent border incursions from Iraq. Nor has Iraq accepted the U.N.-drawn border demarcation which, although based on earlier agreements, has revealed that territory long assumed to belong to Iraq in fact lies on the Kuwait side of the newly demarcated line. Instead, Iraq periodically has tested Western resolve by crossing the border. One incursion was to remove missiles, another to remove stored equipment, and several have been to arrest oil exploration teams or others who have strayed into the formerly disputed zone the U.N. has declared Kuwaiti. The alleged dispatch of an Iraqi intelligence officer and his team on an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former U.S. President Bush also was carried out overland through the desert.

Partly to put a stop to these persistent border violations and partly to deter any future Iraqi invasion, Kuwait has announced plans to build a huge defense ditch all along its border with Iraq. The ditch would be three meters deep and five meters wide and run along the entire 207-kilometer border. The Kuwaitis are also said to be considering using up to 1.3 million mines to reinforce this new fortification.

Of course, such fortifications always call to mind the Maginot Line, and raise the question of whether Kuwait is closing the barn door after the horse is already out. Iraq is probably not going to try to invade Kuwait again in the near future, and there are less elaborate types of sensors available to stop overland infiltration, once the border itself is demarcated. A potential aggressor might just as easily try to attack Kuwait from the sea, or through Saudi territory, as come the way the Iraqis did in 1990.

The plans for the big ditch, along with some of the other decisions made in the current defense buildup, raise the question of whether the Kuwaitis are yielding to the temptation of indulging in high-visibility prestige projects rather than really planning the best means of deterring foreign aggression. While F-18s and M-1 tanks are certainly highly capable fighting machines, Kuwait's small forces are going to be stretched very thin if anyone tries to attack them again. With the joint GCC defense schemes still nothing more than rhetoric, the only likely deterrents are the defense agreements with the U.S., Britain, France and Russia. The irony is that for years Kuwait was the Gulf state most opposed to dependence on Western or foreign forces for Gulf defense. Now, after its bitter seven months under Iraqi military occupation, and two more years spent in the unfinished work of repairing the resulting physical and psychological devastation, Kuwait is the Gulf state with the broadest range of defense agreements in place or under negotiation.