Israel's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Not For Discussion in English

By Israel Shahak

Although the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu have convinced the world that Israel already has considerable nuclear weapons capability, there are three resulting questions upon which the American media are reluctant to speculate.Does its possession of nuclear weapons underlie Israel's unwillingness to discuss compromise that would make possible peace with the Arab countries? Could Israel's nuclear weapons plant at Dimona become another Chernobyl? How far would Israel go militarily to prevent any Arab state from developing nuclear weapons? Whether Israel's U.S. media apologists like the answers or not, Israeli authorities and commentators in the Hebrew press have responded clearly to all three questions.

On April 17, 1992, Passover Eve, Israel's Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Amnon Shahak-Lipkin, was asked by Ma'ariv's Ya'akov Erez and Immanuel Rozen: "Assuming that nuclear weapons are introduced into the Middle East, isn't it time to change our attitudes toward nuclear realities and begin thinking about negotiations and secret diplomacy? Will we be always able to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?"

The general's answer was remarkably negative: "It is never possible to talk to Iraq about anything; it is never possible to talk to Iran about anything, and certainly not about nuclear weapons. With Syria we cannot talk either. I don't agree that preventing or postponing [their acquisition of nuclear weapons]is not in our power. A postponement by one week may be crucial, while a postponement for 10 years would be magnificent. Today, not a single Arab state has a proven nuclear capability. I believe that the State of Israel should from now on use all its power and direct all its efforts to preventing nuclear development in any Arab state whatsoever."

Asked if his statement implied that Israel would use "violent means" to carry it out, the general replied: "In my opinion, all or most available means serving that purpose are legitimate."

The risks for the Middle East and beyond of the policies advocated by Shahak-Lipkin are obvious. Equally irresponsible is his reiteration, in the same interview, that keeping Saddam Hussain in power in Iraq is in Israel's best interest, a statement he had made on the last day of the Gulf war more than a year earlier. Asked if he considered "this opinion still correct," the general answered:

"As far as I am concerned, it would be preferable if Saddam Hussain had not been born. We tried to prevent his birth but we failed. Now we need to decide what to do. It would have been ideal for everybody if it were possible to change the character of the Iraqi regime, and its insane attitude of hostility toward the entire world. But in Iraq no change will ever be possible. Iraq will always remain the same, bent on defying the whole world.

The development of Israeli nuclear weapons is being paid for by the American public.

"True, it was helped by the entire world to become what it became. But since the Iraqi thinking can never change, a possible removal of Saddam Hussain alone can only lead to the emergence of another dictator who will smile nicely to the entire world. And the entire world, anxious to somehow compensate Iraq for hardships inflicted upon it, will help in its recovery and in restoration of its capabilities. Therefore, if I have to choose between a boycotted Iraq with Saddam and an Iraq without Saddam again supported by the entire world, then I opt for Saddam, because Saddam will never be helped by anyone."

Israeli custom commands the generals in active service to stop short of saying too much in such interviews, but it lets semi-official experts or retired generals reveal Israeli strategic intentions to the nation's elite in a more informative manner. On the same day that General Shahak-Lipkin was interviewed, nuclear-weapons expert Oded Brosh published an article in Ha'aretz which, for the first time in the Hebrew press, openly discussed options for the actual use of Israeli nuclear weapons during a war. Brosh begins by attacking unnamed advocates of "appeasement" in the form of only "a limited use of Israeli weapons referred to as 'the last-minute option.'"

This, he says, is "a scenario which in fact presumes that Israel will refrain from making any nuclear threats, unless it is defeated by conventional weapons, or can realistically expect such a defeat as imminent, or is threatened by the use of non-conventional weapons." By use of such a "last-minute option" Arab leaders "can be denied victory" with the threat of "the destruction of the Arab civilization."

The "Last-Minute Option"

This description is interpreted by the Israeli public as meaning that Israel has contingency plans for cases of extreme emergency which involve the devastation by nuclear weapons of a considerable number of Arab urban centers and of such crucial installations as the Aswan Dam (whose destruction was envisaged in Israel before 1973). This awful possibility needs to be faced, however horrifying may be the though about its direct effects upon the entire world in terms of massive casualties.

Brosh himself does not favor "the last-minute option," because he clearly realizes that it implies not just "the destruction of the Arab civilization," but also "our own national suicide." He therefore believes that to deter "a potential massive missile or armored attack against us...it would be preferable to leave the enemy uncertain about our intentions," and not let Israeli decisions "be dictated by outside factors," a transparent allusion to the United States.

On the same day that General Shahak-Lipkin's interview and Brosh's article appeared, General Uri Saguy, commander of Israeli Military Intelligence, said in an interview with Yediot Ahronot that "Syria has always been and still is a threat to the security and very survival of the State of Israel."

In addition to the possible use of Israeli nuclear weapons against Syria, two further dangers to the entire Middle East, and by extension to the entire world, need to be taken into account. First, there exists a danger that, as Brosh puts it, "Dimona might yet become another Chernobyl." He concedes that "the responsible authorities indeed need to test again and again" all their precautionary measures.

Brosh also mentions the possibility "that somebody authorized or unauthorized might activate one or several Israeli nuclear warheads through error or accident." Such speculation has never before appeared either in the censored Hebrew press or, to the best of my knowledge, in the mainstream international press.

Indeed, the prospect of Gush Emunim, other right-wing fanatics, or some crazed Israeli general seizing control of Israeli nuclear weapons, and using them in accordance with their "knowledge" of politics or with "a Divine command," cannot be precluded. In my opinion, the likelihood of some such occurrence grows with time. This is because as the Jewish society of Israel undergoes a steady political polarization, the Israeli Security System increasingly is relying on recruitment from the ranks of the extreme right.

Notwithstanding all such dangers, Brosh, presumably representing the viewpoint of Israeli authorities, remains convinced that Israel should use, and threaten to use, its nuclear weapons, both in the case of war and in what he defines as political contingencies.

"Generally, in long-term security planning one cannot ignore the political factors." Brosh writes, "Israel must take into account, for example, that the Saudi royal family is not going to reign forever, or that the Egyptian regime may also change...We need not be ashamed that the nuclear option is a major instrumentality of our defense as a deterrent from attacking us. The three big democracies have relied on the same deterrent for decades."

The very comparison of Israel's strategic aims with those of the U.S., Britain and France is irrefutable proof of Israel's ambition to achieve the status of a superpower. But Israel can become a superpower only if it establishes hegemony over the entire Middle East.

There is, however, one crucial difference between Israel and the other existing nuclear powers. The French, for example, finance their own nuclear weapons development. The development of Israeli nuclear weapons is being paid for by the American public. Israel can obtain the money for this purpose only as long as Congress toes the American Israel Public Affairs Committee line. To make Congress do this, Israel must ensure that the American public remains uninformed about Israel's strategic aims, and its discussions of how and when to use nuclear weapons.

Dr. Israel Shahak, a Holocaust survivor and retired professor of chemistry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is chairman of the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights. His monthly translations From the Hebrew Press are available to Washington Report readers for $25 a year.