Washington Report, July 26, 1982, Page 2

The Middle East Muddle

The man who visits our office once in a while to ask questions came in again the other day. We've never seen him so gaunt and worried -looking.

Q This time, everything in the Middle East confuses me

A Don't worry. You've got plenty of company.

Q Yeah, I guess so. But the thing is, you know, I thought I was finally beginning to understand a lot of this stuff—only now so much is happening, and it's all so complicated, that I'm having a big problem keeping up. Could I ask you a few questions?

A Certainly. Shoot.

Q Well, first tell me about the PLO. It looks as though it's completely finished now, isn't it?

A Tsk, tsk. You should study your notes from previous chats before coming in again. Remember my telling you a while ago (see "The ABCs of PLO," in The Washington Report, May 31, 1982) that the PLO is a nationalist movement that practically all Palestinians, whether under occupation or in the outside world, give their support to? That doesn't mean that all of them agree with everything that the PLO does or has ever done. But the Palestinians do want a land of their own, and the PLO has been the vehicle through which they have been trying to get it—a vehicle similar to the Jewish Agency, which the Jews worked through to get their state.

Q Okay, now I remember. But what good is a vehicle if it's destroyed?

A The point is, my friend, that there's no way you can destroy a legitimate national movement simply by dispersing its leaders and its military cadres—or even by killing them. There are four million Palestinians, after all, and as long as they are thwarted in getting a homeland they will keep on throwing up new national leaders and—if necessary—fighting men. Of course, the new leaders of the future might decide to call themselves by another name than the PLO, but what's the difference? The organization's goal would still be the same, and Israel would have to cope with it.

Q You said something about fighting men. I thought the idea now, after the clobbering in Lebanon, was that the PLO would be converted into a strictly political organization, with no military arm-

A That's wishful thinking by people who seem to believe that all Arafat has to do is disarm himself, recognize Israel and promise to ask for his land politely, as Sadat did, and Begin will graciously give him the West Bank and Gaza for his people to live in. But the Israeli leaders have put it clearly on the record that Sinai is the last of the territories captured in 1967 that they intend to give back, and that the West Bank and Gaza are part of the biblical land of Israel and should never be relinquished.

Q But if the U.S. thinks Israel should withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza to bring permanent peace to the area, won't it pressure the Israelis into doing it?

A In my book, that's also wishful thinking. During the past 15 years, the only times the U.S. has ever pressured the Israelis even mildly has been in reaction to fears that war might break out, thereby threatening our oil, bringing on a Soviet-U.S. confrontation, and so forth. So why would the U.S. do anything to hassle the Israelis if the Palestinians have become toothless and the frontiers are quiet? The record indicates that the U.S. would probably just accept the Israeli fait accompli.

Q But won't things be different with Mr. Shultz as Secretary of State?

A It would be nice to think so. But to effect any major breakthrough in traditional attitudes and approaches, he would have to pull both the President and the Congress along with him. I wouldn't place any large bets on that happening.

Q So you think the PLO will always keep a military option?

A Yes, indeed. Palestinian leaders know that a purely political debating society will never get them a homeland. Eventually, they'll begin rebuilding their military capability, and there's a good chance they will begin using it in a more radical way than ever before.

Q Why's that?

A Because in their view they have been moderate in recent years, and it didn't really get them anywhere. So the pressures from the radical elements to be more aggressive will be strong.

Q Well, at least when the PLO, Syria and Israel get out of Lebanon that'll be one problem solved

A Yikes. First, you should be saying if they all get out. Next, let me advise you not to accept as gospel all that talk about the presence of the foreign troops being responsible for all of Lebanon's troubles. Remember that the Lebanese civil war had been raging for several months before the first Syrian troops came in. Remember also that the Lebanese had a civil war of sorts going on back in 1958—the time the U.S. Marines landed. This was seven years before the PLO was even established, and long, long before it began running a state within a state" in Lebanon.

It's true that the Lebanese have always suffered from various kinds of interference by foreign governments in their problems. But the root of these is that a formula has never been found that properly balances the interests of all the different sects which make up the country. With the Israelis now pushing their own candidates to run Lebanon this core problem is likely to get worse.

Q How does the Ayatollah fit into all this?

A Unless you believe that everything that happens in the world is caused by someone who sits in an underground operations room in Washington and pushes buttons—some people actually believe this—I would suggest that you forget trying to "fit" it into anything, and certainly not the Lebanon crisis.

Q But is the Ayatollah for real?

A If you mean is the Ayatollah Khomeini serious about his intention to export his Shia fundamentalism, he most certainly is. Iraq is obviously his current objective, and was a target of subversion even before the present war broke out two years ago.

Q What do you think the U.S. should do?

A There is a good case in favor of tilting towards Iraq, by providing political and logistic support to fend off the Iranians.

Q Hasn't Iraq been our enemy for years?

A There have been no diplomatic relations between Iraq and the U.S. since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but "enemy" would be much too strong a word. For one thing, Iraq's relations with the Soviets are almost as chilly today as its relations with the U.S. Since long before the war with Iran, strong signals have come from Iraqi leaders suggesting they would like better relations with the U.S., and trade between the two countries has been quite robust.

Q But I've heard that the Administration considers Iran a much more important country, because of its size and location, and doesn't want to do anything that would allow it to fall into the hands of the Soviets

A First, keep in mind that Iran regards Russia as a country only slightly less satanic than the U.S. Also, considering our relations with Iran, it's hard to imagine anything we could do that would get them madder at us than they are already, except, perhaps sending troops to help the Iraqis-and I am not, of course, suggesting that. But we have another important point to keep in mind: it is Iran, not Iraq, that has been threatening Saudi Arabia and other countries along the Gulf countries that are friendly with, and vitally important to, the United States.

Q Gosh, it's time for me to go, and I haven't even had a chance to ask you if the Ayatollah really is expecting to send his troops all the way to Jerusalem

A Come back and tell me if you hear anything.