AWACS and Jerusalem

By Dennis J. Wamsted

AWACS Confrontation Fails to Materialize

On June 30 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia officially took possession of the first of the five AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) radar planes it had purchased from the U.S. in 1981. At the ceremony marking the transfer, Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, said: "These planes are the building blocks to security in a troubled area of the world." He noted that the conclusion of this sale demonstrates the long-standing military relationship between the two countries. Beyond that low-key ceremony at the Boeing plant in the State of Washington, however, there was virtually no fanfare and, surprisingly, little controversy over the transfer.

By contrast, earlier this year, Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) claimed that he had the votes needed to delay—if not cancel outright—the scheduled delivery of the five AWACS radar planes, as well as the eight tanker aircraft, At that time, Cranston asserted that since the initial sale "critics of the Saudi regime have gained substantial strength in Congress." The California Senator added: "My only doubt is whether we can rally enough support to override a presidential veto." Until the Senate's early June decision—by a one-vote margin—to sustain the President's veto of a congressional resolution that would have prohibited a separate missile sale to Saudi Arabia worth an estimated $265 million, it was widely expected that there would be a major conflict between the congressional opponents of the AWACS sale and its Administration supporters. Private comments by several Senators at the time of the missile vote indicated, however, that there were as many as seven or eight who would have switched, if they had to, to sustain the President's veto. None who were up for reelection were anxious to antagonize the pro-Israel lobby, but several said they would if necessary to see that the sale went through. [See box on this page for the record of the roll-call vote on June 5 to sustain President Reagan's veto of a congressional resolution that would have prohibited the Administration's missile sale to Saudi Arabia.]

Almost immediately after the Senate approved the first sale to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom's congressional critics conceded defeat on the AWACS issue as well, admitting that it was unlikely they would be able to block the scheduled transfer. Specifically, one of the leading congressional opponents to all arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Representative Mel Levine (D-CA), noted that even though "there remains a sentiment to find a way to express our unhappiness with the Saudis ... there's a great deal of doubt whether the way to do that is to block the AWACS." Similarly, Cranston, who led the unsuccessful fight against the Saudi missile sale, said that although he remained opposed to the AWACS sale, he would not organize an attempt to block the planes' delivery.

Without any formal opposition, President Reagan's June 18 letter to Congress certifying the Saudis' compliance with the terms of the sale attracted little attention. In it, President Reagan noted that "significant progress toward peaceful resolution of disputes in the region has been accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi Arabia." In particular, Reagan's letter cited the Saudis' promulgation of the Fez Communique in 1982 which "moved the formal Arab position from rejection of peace to consideration of how to achieve peace with Israel." White House spokesman Larry Speakes noted that the presence of the five AWACS in Saudi Arabia would help safeguard "vital American interests in a strategically important area." Speakes also announced that the transfer of all five AWACS as well as the eight tanker planes would be completed by spring 1987.

As with the earlier, much smaller missile sale, one of the most intriguing aspects of the AWACS, "battle" was the decision by AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) to remain officially neutral. Although AIPAC had coordinated the unsuccessful 1981 fight to prohibit the sale, the organization did not contest the President's certification. In fact, after the President's letter urged Congress "to seek firm assurances from the administration that the AWACS technology remains secure and that these aircraft will only be used in the best interest of the United States..."

The reason(s) behind the AIPAC decision remains unclear. Some analysts have suggested that AIPAC, realizing it could not prevent the AWACS transfer, bowed out of the fray in order to maintain its aura of invincibility. Others have speculated that the organization muted its opposition on this issue in order to maintain its close, cordial relations with the Administration—exemplified by the regular meetings between AIPAC Executive Director Tom Dine and Secretary of State George Shultz. It is the Department of State that is frantically seeking to limit the damage to Israel resulting from the Pollard affair. AIPAC may have decided to cooperate with State on AWACS, in exchange for this assist by Shultz. Whatever the reason, the plain fact is that for the second time in less than a month, AIPAC lost on an issue to which it was clearly opposed.

The Jerusalem Embassy Bill—Again

On June 25, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) surprised his colleagues by proposing an amendment to the diplomatic security bill (H.R. 4151), which was then under consideration on the Senate floor, mandating that the U.S. move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Specifically, Helms' amendment, which was adopted by the Senate by an unrecorded voice vote, "prohibit[s] the use of funds for site acquisition, development, or construction of any facilities in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank, except for facilities to serve as a chancery or residence within five miles of the Israeli Knesset building and within the boundaries of Israel as they existed before June 1, 1967."

The reason the issue is so controversial is that at the time the U.N. (with strong U.S. support) voted in 1947 to partition Palestine into one state for its Jewish inhabitants and another for its Muslim and Christian Arab inhabitants Jerusalem, as a city sacred to Christians, Jews and Muslims alike, was awarded to neither state. It was to remain under international jurisdiction. Recognizing it now as the capital of Israel would violate the basic premise of international law barring the acquisition of territory by war.

Feelings are strong on the issue not only throughout the Arab and Islamic countries but also in some Christian countries of Europe. Diplomats in Muslim countries even as far away as Indonesia predict both hostile popular demonstrations and official diplomatic and economic measures against the U.S. and Americans if the U.S. Government enacts such a measure.

The last time this issue was proposed, during the second session of the 98th Congress in 1984, the Administration came out forcefully against such a move. An example of this opposition came from then Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who, in testimony before Congress, said: "A change in the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem would seriously undermine our ability to play an effective role in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, moving our embassy to Jerusalem would widely be perceived as an effort by the U.S. to preempt negotiations altogether by prejudging a crucial issue." Similarly, when asked about the bill and whether he would veto it, President Reagan declared: "I am hoping I won't have to. But like the several previous presidents before me, I think that that is a most unwise thing. It should never have been introduced in our Congress."

Unlike the 1984 effort, which was debated over a period of months in Congress and which elicited strong opposition from a number of Mideast experts as well as former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, Helms' current initiative could become law without any public debate. When Congress returns from its Independence Day recess on July 14, the House—which has already passed its own version of the diplomatic security bill—will consider the Senate's version, including the Helms amendment. If the House accepts the Senate bill intact, it will be sent to President Reagan for his approval or veto. On the other hand, if the House disagrees with any portion of the Senate version, which is likely, a conference committee of House and Senate members will be established to reconcile the differences in the two bills. By all accounts, it is at this stage that the Administration, which despite its low-keyed response is still strongly opposed to the proposed relocation, hopes to kill the proposal.

How strongly Helms will fight for his proposal, and whether AIPAC will throw its weight behind the initiative, remain unanswered questions. However, if both Helms and AIPAC do decide to push this proposal, the Administration could be in for a long, hot summer.

Dennis J. Wamsted is News Editor of the Washington Report