Lebanon's Legacy

We were sitting around thinking that maybe we've been much too hard on Humphrey—too impatient, too arbitrary—when in he walked once again, eager to pick our brains on the Middle East.

Q Tell me about Lebanon. I'm confused.

A What else

Q And please don't say, "what else is new," or make one of your usual sarcastic remarks

A —could give me more pleasure than to help you out, Humphrey.

Q Yeah. Hmmm. Well, what's causing the roadblock on the withdrawal of foreign forces?

A It really depends on who you listen to, Humph. Israel and the U.S. say it's the fault of Syria, Syria says it's because of Israel and Lebanon, and

Q For goshsakes, what's your opinion? I've never heard you worry that much before about what other people think

A Sorry. Okay, let's see—I really think we have to go back to the beginning. In 1976, Syrian troops were invited in by the Lebanese government, under the auspices of the Arab League, to stop Lebanon's civil war. The Syrians have been there ever since, and although their presence is resented by great numbers of Lebanese, they have never been officially asked to leave, and are still a legal presence.

Q Sounds to me like you're trying to sell me some nutty idea that the Syrians have nothing to do with blocking anything. But go on.

A May I? Thank you. Now let's move up to June, 1982, when the Israelis launched an invasion of Lebanon with 100,000 troops, and occupied one third of the country, in an area which contains half of Lebanon's population. They definitely were not invited to come in, and more than a year later they're still there. Are you with me?

Q Of course. What do you think I am, some kind of a dunce? Boy, you sure sound weird today.

A I'm sorry, Humph. It's just that those points are very basic to an understanding of all the rest of the problem. Okay. So when practically everyone—the Lebanese, the Israelis, the Americans—began talking about the need to get all foreign forces out of Lebanon, what did the Syrians say?

Q They told everybody to go fly a kite.

A I'm disappointed that you have picked up such inaccurate notions, Humphrey. No, what the Syrians said was that they would agree to get out of Lebanon if the Lebanese wanted them out, just as long as the Israelis withdrew—completely, and without conditions. But as you know, the agreement that emerged from the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, with the United States sitting in, did not meet these criteria. It contains clauses which in effect will allow Israel to run things in south Lebanon even after it withdraws, and it makes concessions on "normalization" of relations which come pretty close to making it a peace treaty. Syria says it will not withdraw as long as this agreement remains in effect

Q But what business is it of the Syrians, for crying out loud! Lebanon is a sovereign nation, and can sign anything it wants

A I'm afraid there's the rub, my friend. Lebanon ought to be a sovereign nation, and used to be a sovereign nation, but right now it happens to be under occupation. This means it can't act like a sovereign nation. It could not negotiate as an equal. It had to choose between giving the Israelis the minimum they were insisting on, or letting the Israelis decide if and when they would ever leave at all. I don't blame the Lebanese for accepting the best deal they could get under the circumstances—but that doesn't mean the Syrians have to like it.

Q But what harm would it do the Syrians to go along?

A Plenty, the way they look at it. To condone a quasi-peace treaty achieved by Israel through force of arms would be very embarrassing to a country which has always thought of itself as the principal defender of Arab nationalism. It could even be dangerous to the stability of the government. In addition, it sees in the agreement some very practical threats to its own security and welfare. With the Israelis in effective control of a large part of south Lebanon, they will be too close for comfort to the Bekaa Valley, which is essential to the defense of Damascus. The Bekaa also contains the headwaters of Syria's Orontes River. If anybody cut off these headwaters, much of Syria's agriculture and industry would shrivel up and die.

Q But won't the Syrians have to give in anyway, under pressure?

A Pressure from whom?

Q Holy cow, that's a pretty dumb question. How about the Americans, the Saudis, and

A Don't call me dumb, you er—er, yes, Humphrey, I suppose it does sound that way. Just a manner of speaking. The thing is, the U.S. has no real leverage on Syria. We don't do anything for them. We give them only a small amount of economic aid, and they get their military assistance from the Soviets. We could promise to try to get the Golan Heights back from Israel for them, but they wouldn't believe us—quite rightly, of course.

Q Okay, but how about the Saudis?

A The Saudis do give Syria quite a bit of money, but it's apparently not enough to provide effective leverage. They've been trying for nearly three years to get Syria to open up the Iraqi pipeline that goes through Syria to the Mediterranean, and haven't managed to do it. And even if they had the leverage to get Syria to back off from its position on Lebanon, their heart isn't in it. The Saudis agree with Syria that the Lebanon-Israel agreement is harmful.

Q So what's going to happen?

A It's hard to see anything good coming down the road. As of now, it looks as though the next big development will be a redeployment of Israel's forces into south Lebanon. By doing this, the Israelis hope to cut down on the casualties they have been suffering from ambushes in central Lebanon—and also be in a position to tighten security in the south itself, where the ambushes have been greater in number than anywhere else.

Q That makes sense from the Israeli point of view

A Perhaps. But it really worries the Lebanese. What they're afraid of is that both the PLO and the Syrians will believe that their tough line against Israel has paid off, and as a result they will be less ready than ever to contemplate leaving while Israel still occupies any part of the country. At the same time, the Israelis, if their casualties are substantially reduced, will correspondingly be less ready than ever to leave unilaterally—that is, before the Syrians and PLO do. And this means

Q A stalemate?

A You could call it that. But what that translates into is an effective and possible permanent partition of Lebanon. And there could also be other problems. What happens when the Israelis withdraw from the central area? The present idea is that they will turn over security to the Lebanese army. But leftist militia leaders in the area have already warned that if this happens they will fight the army, which they regard as a tool of their enemies, the Phalangists. The last thing the country needs is to have the civil war break out again. And the last thing the U.S. needs is to have its marines caught up in it.

Q Well, that's enough gloom for one day. I still can't figure out why you sound so weird, but I gotta go. Bye-bye.

A Humph?

Q Yeah?

A What you call weird, I call polite. But since you don't notice the difference, I just have to tell you one more thing.

Q What's that?

A From now on, it's "no more Mr. Nice Guy." So have a nice day, bonehead.