Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June
1999, pages 27-28
Special Report
As Bombs Fall on Serbia and Refugees Flee Kosovo,
Bosnia Feels Repercussions
By Peter Lippman
As bombs fall on Yugoslavia and hundreds of thousands of Kosovars
become refugees, the ongoing struggle between pro- and anti-Dayton
forces in Bosnia is almost at a boil. Politicians from the Serb-controlled
entity of Republika Srpska have stopped participating in the joint
governmental institutions of the Bosnian state.
Meanwhile protest demonstrations, as well as scattered violent
incidents, are taking place in many parts of that entity. In the
Federation, Bosnias other entity, relations are frigid between
Croat and Muslim politicians.
Since the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995, resistance to
Bosnias reintegration has been strong on all fronts. In the
Republika Srpska it has manifested itself as an ongoing political
crisis between two blocs. One consists of those who accept at least
some elements of Dayton and wish to cooperate with the West. The
other bloc, led by politicians who were deeply involved in prosecution
of the war, consists of those who would prefer to weaken ties with
the Federation and see the RS annexed to Yugoslavia.
With the election of Milorad Dodik as RS prime minister in early
1998, the latter bloc seemed to be significantly weakened. Freedom
of movement was significantly increased, at least in the western
half of the entity. Displaced persons from the Federation began
making assessment visits to their homes in the RS, and there was
a tentative beginning of return.
However, Nikola Poplasen, member of the extreme nationalist Serb
Radical Party, was elected president of the Republika Srpska in
September 1998, and thus the separatists were given another chance
to block progress toward implementation of Dayton. It was Poplasens
duty to nominate a new prime minister. He proceeded to nominate
a series of candidates who had no chance of being accepted by Sloga
(Accord), the dominant coalition in the RS parliament. This stalling
process became a primary means of obstruction and an increasing
source of tension.
At the same time there was another source of tension stemming from
the ongoing arbitration process over the fate of the strategic town
of Brcko. Brcko is located in the narrow corridor that connects
the two halves of the Republika Srpska. The decision as to which
entity should control it was delayed under the Dayton agreement,
and the city has since then been supervised by an international
official.
Serb politicians consider it essential that the Republika Srpska
retain exclusive control of Brcko. Their claim is that anything
less would split the entity in two. The implication is that the
RS must remain a territorially contiguous unit, in order to preserve
the option of eventual secession from Bosnia and annexation to Serbia.
When on March 5 of this year the international arbitrator decided
that Brcko should become a special district, to be controlled
by both entities with free movement for all, this was met by shocked
reactions from the politicians of the Republika Srpska. Prime Minister
Dodik immediately submitted his resignation, and Zivko Radisic,
chairman of the three-man multi-ethnic presidency of Bosnia, froze
his participation in that body.
To make matters more complicated, on the same day High Representative
of the international community Carlos Westendorp removed Poplasen
from his position as president of the Republika Srpska. This was
in reaction to Poplasens long-term obstruction, and specifically
to a recent attempt to unseat Dodik as prime minister. The international
community had attached itself to Dodik as the only politician acceptable
for that post, so that when he was threatened by Poplasen, Westendorp
put an end to Poplasens work.
Reaction around the Republika Srpska to these two moves of the
international community was angry. Protest demonstrations took place
in many cities. Scattered incidents of violence also occurred as
people attacked offices and vehicles belonging to U.N. and other
international organizations. As a result, most international organizations
withdrew from the RS.
The NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia served to heighten the disorder
in the Republika Srpska. Serb politicians engaged in Bosnias
joint institutions maintained their boycott. More international
targets were attacked in various towns. Cooperation between the
RS and the international community, as well as the Federation, was
at a standstill.
This does not mean that the political blocs of the Republika Srpska
were finally unified. It worked in Dodiks favor, naturally,
for Poplasen to be fired. Dodik and his Sloga coalition, in any
case, are motivated by the rational idea that they are obliged to
cooperate with the international community to ensure the survival
of their entity. This rationality is contrasted with the feverish
nationalism of the radicals and their allies, the Serb Democratic
Party (SDS), who are willing to make enemies of the entire world
in the pursuit of their goals.
Poplasen, who still occupies the presidents office in Banja
Luka, has continuously made inflammatory statements hinting at rebellion.
On the other hand, Dodik returned to his office, and he and his
ministers have called for a resumption of Serb participation in
the joint Bosnian institutions. Thus the two blocs are still at
loggerheads.
It would serve the Republika Srpska well to return to cooperation.
The ongoing destruction and chaos taking place in Yugoslavia can
sink the already poor economy of the RS. Four-fifths of the entitys
exports had been going to Yugoslavia, and this trade is now disrupted
for the long term. Firms that were closely involved in trade with
Yugoslavia are now closing down. Substitute markets will have to
be sought with the Federation and abroad. An international donors
conference is to be held in May, but donors will be hard put to
offer assistance to an entity in chaos, whose leaders so obviously
oppose Dayton.
Another reason to cooperate is that the Republika Srpska is, as
of mid-April, host to around 10,000 refugees or returnees from Yugoslavia,
and this number will increase. With all international organizations
except SFOR having left the entity, the Serb Red Cross is sorely
pressed to supply even the most minimum assistance to these people.
Clearly, only cooperation will be the salvation of the Republika
Srpska.
As the political crisis in the Republika Srpska continues, Prime
Minister Dodik has called on Radisic to cease boycotting the Bosnian
presidency, or else resign from his job. U.S. envoy to the Balkans
Robert Gelbard warned ominously that the Serb politicians who are
boycotting the joint institutions are playing a stupid game.
At the same time, the SRS and its confederates show no sign of backing
off from their incitement of disorder throughout the entity.
International officials are saying that in spite of ongoing incidents
of violence in the Republika Srpska, most citizens of the entity
want to go about their business. Still, the extreme separatist elements
have been given a new life by the events of March. It would be dangerous
to predict their eclipse at this point. Much depends on the ability
of some relatively moderate Serb politicians to calm the situation
and return to the realm of dialog. To do this, they will have to
accept the removal of Poplasen and the creation of a Brcko district,
and relinquish ambitions for unification with Serbia. This is a
tall order, but the alternative is more chaos, possibly even renewed
war in Bosnia.
The influx of refugees to Bosnia stemming from the Yugoslavia intervention
affects implementation of Dayton. In addition to the above-mentioned
arrivals to the Republika Srpska, refugees arriving in the Bosnian
Federation number at least 15,000 Kosovar Albanians and 10,000 Muslims
from the Sandzak, a region straddling Montenegro and Serbia.
The new influx of refugees into a country already trying to support
over 800,000 displaced persons is a horrible irony. Bosnias
attempt to care for these arrivals is placing a new burden both
upon domestic and international agencies, and there will be negative
consequences for the return of Bosnian DPs. Already, some NGOs concerned
with return are suffering for lack of support.
The Year of Return, as the international community
proclaimed 1998, was a failure. Both the international community
and domestic activists are determined that 1999 will be different.
What are the possibilities for continued, increased refugee return
in the midst of all this political chaos and manipulation?
To a large extent the answer to this question remains unknowable,
as variables described above have yet to unfold. If violence spreads
in the Republika Srpska, obviously refugee return will come to a
standstill. Otherwise, return will be slowed, but not stopped. In
any case, the basic problem remains: all the politicians in question
in the RS, regardless of bloc affiliation, wish to maintain a relatively
ethnically homogenized entity. Meanwhile, the displaced Bosnians
await a resolution of their seemingly interminable sufferings.
Peter Lippman is a human rights activist from Seattle currently
working in Bosnia as a translator and free-lance journalist. |