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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June 1999, pages 27-28

Special Report

As Bombs Fall on Serbia and Refugees Flee Kosovo, Bosnia Feels Repercussions

By Peter Lippman

As bombs fall on Yugoslavia and hundreds of thousands of Kosovars become refugees, the ongoing struggle between pro- and anti-Dayton forces in Bosnia is almost at a boil. Politicians from the Serb-controlled entity of Republika Srpska have stopped participating in the joint governmental institutions of the Bosnian state.

Meanwhile protest demonstrations, as well as scattered violent incidents, are taking place in many parts of that entity. In the Federation, Bosnia’s other entity, relations are frigid between Croat and Muslim politicians.

Since the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995, resistance to Bosnia’s reintegration has been strong on all fronts. In the Republika Srpska it has manifested itself as an ongoing political crisis between two blocs. One consists of those who accept at least some elements of Dayton and wish to cooperate with the West. The other bloc, led by politicians who were deeply involved in prosecution of the war, consists of those who would prefer to weaken ties with the Federation and see the RS annexed to Yugoslavia.

With the election of Milorad Dodik as RS prime minister in early 1998, the latter bloc seemed to be significantly weakened. Freedom of movement was significantly increased, at least in the western half of the entity. Displaced persons from the Federation began making assessment visits to their homes in the RS, and there was a tentative beginning of return.

However, Nikola Poplasen, member of the extreme nationalist Serb Radical Party, was elected president of the Republika Srpska in September 1998, and thus the separatists were given another chance to block progress toward implementation of Dayton. It was Poplasen’s duty to nominate a new prime minister. He proceeded to nominate a series of candidates who had no chance of being accepted by “Sloga” (Accord), the dominant coalition in the RS parliament. This stalling process became a primary means of obstruction and an increasing source of tension.

At the same time there was another source of tension stemming from the ongoing arbitration process over the fate of the strategic town of Brcko. Brcko is located in the narrow corridor that connects the two halves of the Republika Srpska. The decision as to which entity should control it was delayed under the Dayton agreement, and the city has since then been supervised by an international official.

Serb politicians consider it essential that the Republika Srpska retain exclusive control of Brcko. Their claim is that anything less would split the entity in two. The implication is that the RS must remain a territorially contiguous unit, in order to preserve the option of eventual secession from Bosnia and annexation to Serbia.

When on March 5 of this year the international arbitrator decided that Brcko should become a special “district,” to be controlled by both entities with free movement for all, this was met by shocked reactions from the politicians of the Republika Srpska. Prime Minister Dodik immediately submitted his resignation, and Zivko Radisic, chairman of the three-man multi-ethnic presidency of Bosnia, “froze” his participation in that body.

To make matters more complicated, on the same day High Representative of the international community Carlos Westendorp removed Poplasen from his position as president of the Republika Srpska. This was in reaction to Poplasen’s long-term obstruction, and specifically to a recent attempt to unseat Dodik as prime minister. The international community had attached itself to Dodik as the only politician acceptable for that post, so that when he was threatened by Poplasen, Westendorp put an end to Poplasen’s work.

Reaction around the Republika Srpska to these two moves of the international community was angry. Protest demonstrations took place in many cities. Scattered incidents of violence also occurred as people attacked offices and vehicles belonging to U.N. and other international organizations. As a result, most international organizations withdrew from the RS.

The NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia served to heighten the disorder in the Republika Srpska. Serb politicians engaged in Bosnia’s joint institutions maintained their boycott. More international targets were attacked in various towns. Cooperation between the RS and the international community, as well as the Federation, was at a standstill.

This does not mean that the political blocs of the Republika Srpska were finally unified. It worked in Dodik’s favor, naturally, for Poplasen to be fired. Dodik and his Sloga coalition, in any case, are motivated by the rational idea that they are obliged to cooperate with the international community to ensure the survival of their entity. This rationality is contrasted with the feverish nationalism of the radicals and their allies, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), who are willing to make enemies of the entire world in the pursuit of their goals.

Poplasen, who still occupies the president’s office in Banja Luka, has continuously made inflammatory statements hinting at rebellion. On the other hand, Dodik returned to his office, and he and his ministers have called for a resumption of Serb participation in the joint Bosnian institutions. Thus the two blocs are still at loggerheads.

It would serve the Republika Srpska well to return to cooperation. The ongoing destruction and chaos taking place in Yugoslavia can sink the already poor economy of the RS. Four-fifths of the entity’s exports had been going to Yugoslavia, and this trade is now disrupted for the long term. Firms that were closely involved in trade with Yugoslavia are now closing down. Substitute markets will have to be sought with the Federation and abroad. An international donors’ conference is to be held in May, but donors will be hard put to offer assistance to an entity in chaos, whose leaders so obviously oppose Dayton.

Another reason to cooperate is that the Republika Srpska is, as of mid-April, host to around 10,000 refugees or returnees from Yugoslavia, and this number will increase. With all international organizations except SFOR having left the entity, the Serb Red Cross is sorely pressed to supply even the most minimum assistance to these people. Clearly, only cooperation will be the salvation of the Republika Srpska.

As the political crisis in the Republika Srpska continues, Prime Minister Dodik has called on Radisic to cease boycotting the Bosnian presidency, or else resign from his job. U.S. envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard warned ominously that the Serb politicians who are boycotting the joint institutions are “playing a stupid game.” At the same time, the SRS and its confederates show no sign of backing off from their incitement of disorder throughout the entity.

International officials are saying that in spite of ongoing incidents of violence in the Republika Srpska, most citizens of the entity want to go about their business. Still, the extreme separatist elements have been given a new life by the events of March. It would be dangerous to predict their eclipse at this point. Much depends on the ability of some relatively moderate Serb politicians to calm the situation and return to the realm of dialog. To do this, they will have to accept the removal of Poplasen and the creation of a Brcko district, and relinquish ambitions for unification with Serbia. This is a tall order, but the alternative is more chaos, possibly even renewed war in Bosnia.

The influx of refugees to Bosnia stemming from the Yugoslavia intervention affects implementation of Dayton. In addition to the above-mentioned arrivals to the Republika Srpska, refugees arriving in the Bosnian Federation number at least 15,000 Kosovar Albanians and 10,000 Muslims from the Sandzak, a region straddling Montenegro and Serbia.

The new influx of refugees into a country already trying to support over 800,000 displaced persons is a horrible irony. Bosnia’s attempt to care for these arrivals is placing a new burden both upon domestic and international agencies, and there will be negative consequences for the return of Bosnian DPs. Already, some NGOs concerned with return are suffering for lack of support.

The “Year of Return,” as the international community proclaimed 1998, was a failure. Both the international community and domestic activists are determined that 1999 will be different. What are the possibilities for continued, increased refugee return in the midst of all this political chaos and manipulation?

To a large extent the answer to this question remains unknowable, as variables described above have yet to unfold. If violence spreads in the Republika Srpska, obviously refugee return will come to a standstill. Otherwise, return will be slowed, but not stopped. In any case, the basic problem remains: all the politicians in question in the RS, regardless of bloc affiliation, wish to maintain a relatively ethnically homogenized entity. Meanwhile, the displaced Bosnians await a resolution of their seemingly interminable sufferings.

Peter Lippman is a human rights activist from Seattle currently working in Bosnia as a translator and free-lance journalist.