What the U.S. Can Do to Help End the Suffering

By Abbas S. Mehdi

As with other world events, what’s happening in Iraq usually only features in U.S. news reports when something occurs that makes make good TV—for example, the bombing raids of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox. The real news about Iraq, however, is the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people, and the fact that much of this is the direct result of U.S. foreign policy.

It’s easy to blame everything on a colorful baddie: Saddam Hussain is, undeniably, a tyrant, and 20 years of his military dictatorship has brought a once-prosperous country to its knees. But, tragically for the people of Iraq, current U.S. policy has exacerbated their suffering under Saddam Hussain to new and appalling levels; has made them more, not less dependent on his rule; and has diminished rather than increased the likelihood of his removal and a peaceful transition to democracy, stability and prosperity.

Let me start by summarizing what is happening in Iraq now. Thousands of small children are dying each month from hunger and disease, as a direct result of the economic embargo that is supported and perpetuated (it is tempting to say perpetrated) by U.S. foreign policy.

As long ago as December 1995, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that the sanctions had caused the deaths of more than 1 million Iraqis, including 567,000 children. More recent figures estimate that at least 4,000 children are dying every month as a result of sanctions. Quite simply, they are not getting what they need to thrive, particularly if they are sick.

Another U.N. report notes that “public health services are nearing a total breakdown as basic medicines, life-saving drugs and essential medical supplies are lacking throughout the country.

What are the political effects of this? A population that is battered from the outside and prey to a military dictatorship within becomes more, not less dependent on that regime. For example, systems for rationing food increase people’s dependency on the government, while crisis management provides a pretext for Saddam Hussain to tighten his grip still further. Meanwhile, long-term plans for post-war rebuilding and hopes for a peaceful future for Iraq become ever more remote.

And the political effects of the sanctions go far beyond the borders of Iraq. Few if any Arab nations have much sympathy with Saddam Hussain. But they are greatly concerned about the ongoing tragedy of the country’s collapse, and the United States’ hand in this collapse. The United States’ excuse for continuing sanctions and bombing raids has been the threat that Iraq poses to its neighbors. The truth is that Iraq does not currently pose a significant threat in the region. The Arab nations know this, and find it odd, not to say condescending, for the United States to insist otherwise.

It has been all too easy for anti-American commentators to claim that the bombing raids were calculated in order to humiliate Iraq and soothe the United States’ (or perhaps Bill Clinton’s) damaged amour propre.

Both sanctions and bombing raids have made a very difficult situation even more dangerous. What is left? The United States’ record of political intervention is hardly encouraging.

The United States failed to intervene in 1991 when Saddam Hussain crushed an uprising in Erbil in the north of the country, resulting in the deaths of members of the Iraqi opposition who had been supported by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the CIA. (The main group that the U.S. government has supported has been the INC, despite the fact that it is denigrated by most other opposition groups.)

Last fall, however, there were signs that U.S. policy might be moving in some new directions. First came the announcement that $97 million would be directed toward a program to aid the Iraqi opposition. The Iraq Liberation Act, as it was called, proposed supporting a wide range of opposition groups to get rid of Saddam Hussain. Then, early last December, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that “we are now at containment plus regime change.”

But close on the heels of this came the mid-December air-strikes, and since then, bombardment has continued—albeit with far less publicity than the Desert Fox raids—on a more-or-less daily basis. And despite promises of impartiality, the U.S. government has continued to favor the INC, to the disappointment of most of those working to rebuild a new democratic Iraq.

Obviously the primary motivation for U.S. concern with the entire Gulf region is the concentration there of petroleum and natural gas, totaling more than 60 percent of the world’s proven reserves of both. Saudi Arabia has the largest and Iraq the second largest petroleum reserves in the world. But acknowledging the realities of U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region does not require ignoring the realities of the suffering of the people of Iraq or the country’s desperate need for economic, social and cultural renewal.

There are many ways in which the United States could help. First, however, it must arrange for an immediate end to sanctions and bombings.

Then, it should use legitimate national and international means to disempower Saddam Hussain. This could include ensuring that he is put on trial for crimes against humanity (for example, for the Kurdish genocide of 1987–88) and working in cooperation with the United Nations. This also would include implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, which condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, demands that Iraq immediately end this repression, and expresses the hope that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.

The U.S. should also support a wide range of Iraqi opposition organizations. It should not assume, however, that any of them is willing to be in the pay of the CIA, and it should not attempt to dictate to them or intervene in their internal affairs.

Finally, the United States should demonstrate that it cares about the long-term future of Iraq, beyond Saddam Hussain’s regime. This must include promises of help to rebuild Iraq and forgive Iraqi debts, following the model of the Marshall Plan. It must also involve cooperation with Iraqi expatriates, opposition groups, and concerned nations in the region to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy in Iraq.

These policies would separate Saddam Hussain and his murderous regime from the Iraqi people, who desperately need help, not further punishment. They would also help to defuse the dangerous build-up of militaristic hostility between Arab peoples and the United States. Lastly, they would create the necessary political environment for the formation of a credible and accountable opposition, one that prioritizes human rights, democracy, and the rebuilding of Iraq.

Abbas S. Mehdi is chairman of the Union of Independent Iraqis and professor of organization and sociology at Saint Cloud State University in Minnesota.