High-Level Private Task Force Attacks "Dual Containment" Policy

by Richard H. Curtiss

America's Arabian Gulf policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran is under heavy attack in Washington this spring, with former National Security Advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski of the administration of President Jimmy Carter and Brent Scowcroft of the administration of President Gerald Ford deriding it as "more of a slogan than a strategy" and one that "may not be sustainable for much longer."

The two senior statesmen, both prominent private consultants in the foreign affairs field, released at the National Press Club on April 21 a report on dual containment by an independent Council on Foreign Relations task force stating that "in trying to isolate both of the Gulf's regional powers, the policy lacks strategic viability and carries a high financial and diplomatic cost."

The report also is being published in the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine under the bylines of Scowcroft, Brzezinski and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy, who served as project director for the task force and for an earlier Council on Foreign Relations study group on the same topic.

"At the start of President Clinton's second term," the report says, "U.S. Persian Gulf policy is at an impasse. Saddam Hussain remains in power in Iraq and has even regained some control over the Kurdish areas of the north, while the Gulf war coalition that defeated him is eroding. Toughened U.S. sanctions against Iran, although doing some damage to the Iranian economy, have produced no major achievements and increasingly isolate America rather than their target." The report adds, too, that "the continued willingness and ability of some members of the GCC and others to help implement these policies is open to question."

In the case of Saddam Hussain's Iraq, the report sees no alternative "in the military sphere other than continued containment" and "continued economic embargo so long as Saddam remains in power." However, the report recommends "five corollaries to the basic containment policy, not all of which the Clinton administration has adequately stressed."

The first of these corollaries is for the international community to "credibly demonstrate its concern for the Iraqi people." The report suggests that "if it becomes necessary or appropriate to ease Iraq's economic containment, the sanctions should be suspended rather than lifted completely, so that the international community can easily reimpose them should unacceptable Iraqi behavior resume."

The second corollary is for the U.S. to "reassure Iraqis and their neighbors that while America continues to seek political relief for the Iraqi people, it is committed to the integrity of the Iraqi state."

"Toughened U.S. sanctions against Iran increasingly isolate America."

Third, the U.S. "should consult more closely with Turkey" to determine whether or not the Turks are "comfortable with the status quo" in order to keep from losing Turkish support in northern Iraq.

Fourth, the U.S. "should send a clear signal that it is prepared to work with" any post-Saddam Iraqi regime including one that might emerge from the military or the Ba'ath Party so long as it is "ready to fulfill Iraq's basic international obligations."

Fifth, the U.S. should make it clear that if "Saddam's regime crosses clearly drawn lines of appropriate behavior, particularly with regard to its weapons of mass destruction programs and its threats to other countries, the United States should punish it severely." The report calls at the same time for "a serious diplomatic effort to nurse the Gulf war coalition of European and Arab countries and Japan back to robust health."

The report shows considerably more flexibility in the case of Iran, saying its "geopolitical importance is greater than Iraq's and the challenge it represents is more complex." The report states that "given the American military presence, Iran does not currently pose a threat of military aggression, but its long-term policies could destabilize the region.

Iran's "conventional military buildup, its opposition to the [Arab-Israeli] peace process, its promotion of Islamic militancy, its support of terrorism and subversion and its quest for nuclear weapons...can be addressed by specific policy instruments, rather than the current crude and counter-productive attempt to cordon off the entire country," the report maintains.

"A More Nuanced Approach"

Recommending what it calls "a more nuanced approach" to Iran that "could yield greater benefits at lower cost," the report says "the United States must be careful not to demonize Iran," but that on the other hand "direct attacks on American citizens would constitute a special provocation and call for clear retaliatory measures."

The report recommends the U.S. push nuclear weapons controls and inspections "to their limits" and "make counter-proliferation efforts a top priority." Further, the U.S. "should explore the notion of using carrots in addition to sticks in getting Iran to shift course."

"The policy of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran has been ineffectual, and the attempt to coerce others into following America's lead has been a mistake," the report concludes. "Extraterritorial bullying has generated needless friction between the United States and its chief allies and threatened the international free trade order that America has promoted for so many decades."

A specific recommendation in this regard is "the resuscitation of U.S.-Iranian commercial relations. To this end," the report states, "Washington should be open-minded regarding the resumption of activity by American oil companies in Iran." The report condemned U.S. government cancellation of a $1 billion deal between Iran and the U.S. Conoco company, saying "this served no one's interests except those of the French firm Total."

Despite its high-level sponsorship, the report has no official standing. It is, however, a strong attempt by the U.S. foreign affairs and foreign trade establishments to revoke an unpopular policy which, from the beginning, has been identified with the Clinton administration's first White House Middle East adviser, Australian-born former lobbyist for Israel Martin Indyk. Indyk presently is U.S. ambassador to Israel, but he hopes to return soon to Washington as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs. In addition to its author, Indyk, the dual containment policy has strong support in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and the House International Affairs Committee, both of which are dominated by Indyk's former lobby base, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

To buttress their case for turning over a new policy leaf, Brzezinski, Scowcroft and Murphy pointed out in their Washington, DC press conference that "the strident U.S. campaign to isolate Iran...has found few supporters, and drives Iran and Russia together and the United States and its G-7 allies apart."

They noted also that "the imposing U.S. military presence which helps protect its regional allies from external threats may also be exacerbating their internal social, political and economic problems."

The report also reviewed previous failed U.S. policies in the Gulf, which included relying on the Shah's Iran as America's chief regional proxy "in the hope that it would be a source of stability. This policy collapsed in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution, when Iran switched from staunch ally to implacable foe," the report noted.

"During the 1980s the United States strove to maintain a de facto balance of power between Iraq and Iran so that neither would be able to achieve a regional hegemony that might threaten American interests." the report continued. In this period "the United States provided some help to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and provided, with Israeli encouragement, some help to Iran, chiefly in the context of seeking the release of American hostages. This era ended with Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990 and the United States leading an international coalition to war to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and defeat Iraq's bid for dominance."

"The Clinton administration came into office in 1993 facing the challenge of ensuring Gulf stability in a new international and regional environment," the report recalled. "The Clinton team's initial Middle East policy had two aspects: continued support for the peace process and dual containment of Iraq and Iran."

In conclusion the report avoids commenting on the current stalemate in the peace process, but it states frankly that with U.S. Arabian Gulf policy at an "impasse," in the absence of "statesmanship" by the Clinton administration, "U.S. policy in the Gulf will continue to be driven by domestic political imperatives rather than national interests, with the hard line of recent years making long-term goals increasingly difficult to achieve."