Israel-PLO Agreement May Revive Frayed U.S.-Lebanese Ties

By Carol H. Dagher

Only a visit to Washington, DC fully reveals to a Lebanese observer how profoundly events over the past 20 years have diminished the once-broad interface between Lebanon and the United States. The plain fact is that except for a largely sentimental and nostalgic interest in events at home among Lebanese-Americans, there are no meaningful ties at all.

Just as Lebanon has lost its role as "marketplace of ideas" in the Middle East, it has dropped off America's political radar entirely. If there is to be any serious revival of U.S. interest, it will begin in the economic-commercial sphere. And this is not going to happen without further changes in Lebanon's security situation, and U.S. perceptions of it.

Lebanon's once-huge American colony departed en masse in 1975 and 1976. Tentative returns were discouraged by successful bomb attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the ignominious departure of U.S. military forces after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut airport in which 241 U.S. servicemen were killed. It was after that that the wave of hostage taking by Iran-funded militias escalated, and most U.S. journalists left Beirut for good.

In 1985, after a TWA aircraft was diverted to Beirut and the passengers openly held in hotels there by Iran-directed hijackers, President Ronald Reagan suspended access of U.S. airlines to Lebanon and Lebanese air carriers to the United States. A ban on travel to Lebanon by U.S. citizens was imposed and remains in effect, despite a remarkable improvement of security conditions in Lebanon since 1990 and the demonstrated strength of the reemerging Lebanese army.

The result of 13 years of vivid media images of a country torn by war and sectarian and political hatreds from 1975 through 1988, followed by a virtual blackout of media coverage in the U.S. following the travel ban, is that Lebanon has dropped out of U.S. consciousness. Only those Americans who personally experienced the "good old days" of the 1950s and the 1960s still recall Beirut as "a gorgeous, cosmopolitan, lively city—one of those you don't forget."

Unfortunately for Lebanon, Americans who recall this era long since have yielded the levers of power to a successor generation. For current U.S. government officials, the Lebanon of the 1970s and 1980s was a "dangerous snare," best dealt with by total political (and military) disengagement.

In the intervening years, U.S. attention has focused on the continuing bad relations with Iran, the Gulf war and destruction of Iraq's army, close and growing ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the perennial Israeli-Palestinian problem. The latter casts its shadow over all U.S. -Middle East relations, just as it does over all Lebanese domestic and foreign affairs. With its acquiescence in the Taif accords, the U.S. closed the door on further political initiatives in Lebanon until after stabilization of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Re-energized Diplomacy

For this reason, the PLO-Israeli breakthrough, facilitated by the "Oslo channel," was like a thunderstorm that reenergized U.S. diplomacy. In Washington, DC, emphasis was put overnight on the economic aspects of the peace process. Political support for the "Gaza-Jericho first" agreement was linked to launching a new market economy.

"Gaza-West Bank" became a buzzword for business opportunities, investment and development projects, all rationalized (and to be financed) as support for the peace process. Initiatives included formation of a special "Builders for Peace" committee under the sponsorship of U.S. Vice President Al Gore and involving the international community of aid donors, ArabAmerican groups, USAID and international financial institutions such as the World Bank.

In the wake of that economic-oriented fever, Lebanon's strongly free-market oriented government of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has found its "window of opportunity." Hariri is a Lebanese who made a private fortune as a contractor in Saudi Arabia and has invested much of that fortune in restoring the Lebanese human and material infrastructure after the civil war.

The Hariri government already was engaged in a $10.5 billion reconstruction plan including renovating Lebanon's water and sewage systems, electricity generation plants, highways and telecommunications network. The plan also encompassed extending the Beirut airport and harbor and a $2 billion total reconstruction of downtown Beirut, which was virtually destroyed during the civil war. Beirut, therefore, already had become a tempting market for U.S. firms, except for the access and security problems for American personnel.

With the sudden surge in prospects for peace provided by the Sept. 13 Israeli-Palestinian accord, representatives of a large number of American corporations attended with renewed interest a conference on Lebanon's reconstruction, held last October in Washington, DC by the American Task Force for Lebanon. U.S. officials representing Congress and the concerned executive branch departments participated in the conference panels. In doing so, they involuntarily highlighted the contradictions in present U.S. policy toward Lebanon, which teeters between continuing political disengagement and rapidly growing economic interest.

So far, because of U.S. travel restrictions, the absence of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees and of Export-Import Bank facilities, and the lack of Beirut-based consular services, contracts for rebuilding Lebanon are going primarily to European and Japanese companies and their local partners.

To date, more than $1 billion has been pledged for Lebanon's reconstruction. Notable among the pledges are the European Community/European Investment Bank, $308 million; Italy, $460 million; World Bank, $175 million; Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, $70 million; Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, $75 million; and Saudi Arabia, $60 million. Other donors include the OPEC Fund, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Islamic Development Fund and United Nations Development, Program.

A year ago, then-U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Ryan Crocker reported, "There is abundant opportunity for profit by American firms ... if U.S. companies are prepared to deal creatively with the ban on American citizens' travel to Lebanon and the absence of OPIC coverage." Before and since then, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut has identified nearly 20 product categories as especially promising for U.S. exporters. These include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, telecommunications, computer hardware and software, agricultural equipment, household electrical equipment, automobiles and trucks, aviation and ground support services, grains, cereals and oilseeds.

Last October, in a first-of-its-kind visit in many years, a delegation of key Lebanese business leaders met in Washington, DC with a wide range of U.S. government and industry policymakers. The Lebanese discussed the removal of U.S.-generated roadblocks to doing business in Lebanon, pointing out the inconsistency of a U.S. government travel ban for Lebanon when Americans can visit Iran, and even Iraq, with permission. The Lebanese delegates offered to assist the Department of Commerce by identifying business opportunities in Lebanon as well as Lebanese companies interested in working with American counterparts. They thus began to raise policymakers' awareness of Lebanon and to put Lebanon "back on the map" for U.S. commercial interests.

Political Hurdles

At the same time, however, they heard from U.S. officials that, although current U.S. policy may impede American competitiveness in Lebanon, legitimate security concerns remain. Americans, they were told, remain wary of involvement in Lebanon because of their experiences there in the 1980s. The Clinton administration, like the Bush administration before it, does not want to "go out on a limb" and risk another hostage situation or loss of American lives so long as groups like the Hezbollah are not disarmed. In fact, the U.S. officials said, in the aftermath of the Israeli-PLO agreement, security in Lebanon may need to be increased to thwart those who wish to derail the peace process. In the meantime, however, U.S. companies will be encouraged to "do as much by proxy as possible."

Officially, the U.S. policy is based upon "Lebanon's meaningful role in the region, as a model for democracy, coexistence and free market economy." This particular role of Lebanon was emphasized by President Bill Clinton during his cordial meeting with Prime Minister Rafik Hariri at the United Nations General Assembly session last September.

President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher also told Prime Minister Hariri and Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz that they understand Lebanon's concern not to move ahead on the peace track without Syria. The U.S. officials agreed with their Lebanese counterparts that there could be no significant progress in Lebanese-Israeli negotiations concerning security and an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon before major progress is achieved on the Syrian-Israeli track.

However, the Lebanese officials were able to point out during their meeting a basic contradiction that afflicts U.S. policy in the area. While the U.S. Congress generally expresses concern about Lebanon's close ties to Syria, and insists on greater Lebanese independence from Syria (ignoring at the same time Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon), successive U.S. administrations highlight Syria's "stabilizing" role in the region and its vitally needed participation in the peace process.

U.S. officials point especially to Syria's influence on Hezbollah, the major U.S. security concern in Lebanon. American diplomats believe that Hezbollah or its offshoots still constitute a serious threat to foreigners in Beirut in addition to carrying out their armed campaign against Israeli occupiers in southern Lebanon.

Since Israel's primary public demand in negotiating peace with Lebanon and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory is security on its northern borders, and since Syria controls the area in which Hezbollah is based and from which it conducts its armed activities, that particular issue was on the agenda of Clinton's January meeting with Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad in Geneva. Only the ensuing months will reveal any new orientation in Syrian policy regarding Hezbollah in Lebanon, and regarding Palestinian rejectionist groups headquartered in Damascus, which have strong influence in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

"If there is going to be a breakthrough in the peace talks with Syria," said one U.S. official after the Clinton-Assad meeting in Geneva, "one can expect things to move quickly toward normalizing relations with Lebanon." Meanwhile, Lebanese will be working—and watching and waiting—with hope.

Carol H. Dagher, a Lebanese free-lance journalist, is the author of Les Paris du General, describing the challenges facing Gen. Michel Aoun during his bid for the presidency. In February she completed a U.S. Information Agency-sponsored program working with U.S. media and local governmental institutions. While in the U. S. she became a co-founder of International Exchange, Inc., 1735 20th St. NW, Washington, DC 20009.