Rafsanjani Faces Crucial Struggle

By Bahram Alavi

The May 5 call by Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani for the killing of five Britons, Frenchmen, or Americans in retaliation for every Palestinian killed by Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza is the latest manifestation of deadly rivalry within the unstable regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat immediately replied that he "rejects this call in its totality."

For the past several months, Rafsanjani and his supporters, who once were described by Reagan's National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and Israel intelligence operatives as "the moderate faction" in Iran, have been criticized by their opponents for adopting pro-US policies. In April, Rafsanjani struck back by arresting an undisclosed number of supporters of opposing factions in the Iranian military. The arrested officers reportedly include the commanders of naval communications and joint operations with the air force, the commander of the airborne units, and the navy representative at the armed forces chief of staff's office. They were charged with spying for the US.

As in the past, there is little doubt that the US is being used as a scapegoat to conceal the internal political conflict between factions struggling for power. Indeed, there now exists a general consensus among analysts in Tehran that, as a result of factional fighting, in the very near future a massive wave of imprisonments and executions will sweep over Iran, this time affecting the top officials of the government and the Commanders of the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards.

"The situation in Iran reminds one of the last six months of the shah's regime," a close observer of the Iranian political scene stated. "The people in the government and the armed forces are divided among themselves. Their statements and proposed solutions seem increasingly irrelevant. The majority of Iranians I speak to believe that the situation cannot possibly last much longer and the regime is bound to disintegrate. It does not necessarily mean the end of the Islamic regime, but rather a lot of bloodshed, anarchy, and chaos."

In the weeks following the forced removal of Ayatollah Montazeri, the designated successor to Khomeini, it has become increasingly clear that the future of the country will be determined by the outcome of the struggle between two principal factions. The first faction is led by Rafsanjani, who is also acting commander in chief of Iran's armed forces. The second faction, usually labeled ultra-religious, is led by Khomeini's son, Ahmad; the interior minister, Ali Akbar Mohtashami; and the minister for state information and security, Hojatoleslam Reyshahri.

The struggle between the two factions is centered around four principle questions:

Who will be the successor to Khomeini?
How much executive power can the next president of the country exercise?
How can the Iranian economy be rebuilt and how much should Iran rely on investment from West Europe, Japan, and the United States?
What is the position of the Revolutionary Guards with regard to the ongoing power struggle and who should assume the role of commander in chief of the Iranian military forces?

The ultra-religious faction has proposed to Khomeini that he designate his son, Ahmad, an opponent of Rafsanjani, as his successor. Rafsanjani and his supporters have suggested the formation of a four-man council, arguing that no one present has the necessary religious and theological credentials to assume the role of the country's spiritual leader. It is interesting to note that there are at least six high-ranking ayatollahs who are considered superior to Khomeini, both in terms of religious training and in their knowledge of Islamic law. None of the six, however, is being asked to replace Khomeini or even act as a member of the council proposed by Rafsanjani. The reason is that they all oppose Khomeini's fundamentalist interpretation of Shi'ite Islam, and the policies adopted by both principal factions within the Islamic regime.

The presidency became a major point of contention between the warring factions only after Rafsanjani declared his intention to become the next president of the country. Rafsanjani, who already holds several key governmental posts, has called for major alterations in the constitution of the Islamic Republic which will substantially increase the executive power of the president. In a letter addressed to Khomeini, 166 members of the parliament who support Rafsanjani have asked that "the power of the next president be increased through the abolition of the post of prime minister." Since the present prime minister, Mir Hossein Mussavi, is an ally of the ultra-religious faction, Rafsanjani's candidacy is generally viewed both as an attempt to increase his own personal power and to undermine his opponents.

Since the end of the war with Iraq and the beginning of UN sponsored cease-fire talks, there has been much discussion about reconstruction of the Iranian economic infrastructure. The question of reconstruction,however,is complex. Since reconstruction involves foreign investment, the question is how far the country's door should be opened to Western and Japanese investment.

Rafsanjani and his backers support an open-door economic policy. In several of his speeches on economic reconstruction, Rafsanjani has called for free trade with all "friendly countries" interested in selling their advanced technological know-how to Iran.

Opponents of the free trade policies, led by the ultra-religious factions, insist that an open-door trade policy will result in the "subjugation of Iran by the West." They argue that Iran's borders must remain dosed to Western investment and companies until the government has trained new specialists and administrators to function as managers of the newly built industries, plants, and projects. They oppose the idea of asking the hundreds of thousands of professionals and intellectuals who left Iran after the revolution to return.

The most important question for all factions struggling for power is: who will control the armed forces of the country? AD factional leaders are painfully aware that the day after Khomeini's death their political survival will depend on the amount of military support they can muster. Each faction has already organized its own military force by recruiting officers and commanders from the Iranian armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards.

In his attempt to consolidate his position in the armed forces, however, Rafsanjani committed a major mistake which has proved to be a liability for him. Last November, Rafsanjani appointed his brother-in-law and the former minister of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rafiqdoost, as his military advisor.

Raflqdoost, who is a highly experienced military man, is considered to be one of the most corrupt members of the ruling elite. Indeed, in the past several months charges of corruption and embezzlement have forced him to resign from his post in the government. According to statements made in the Iranian parliament, a large sum of money, approximately half a billion dollars, is missing from accounts of the Revolutionary Guards. Rafiqdoost and Mohsen Rezai, Revolutionary Guards commander in chief, have been accused of pocketing the money, which was to be spent on purchasing arms for the Iranian armed forces fighting Iraq.

Members of the Iranian Parliament allied with the ultra-religious faction claim that Rafiqdoost and his friends are responsible for the defeat of the Iranian forces in the war against Iraq. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani's continuing reliance on Rafiqdoost as his closest advisor has provided his opponents with sufficient ammunition. With efforts underway to replace the billions of dollars worth of military hardware lost during the war, the leaders of the ultra-religious faction have stated repeatedly that, as a result of the Rafiqdoost scandal, Rafsanjani should no longer be acting commander of the armed forces.

"We already have the basic elements of a show trial during which Rafsanjani and his supporters will be accused by their opponents of corruption and embezzlement," an Iranian observer noted. "The nation already knows that Iran was militarily defeated by Iraq last year. Rafsanjani's opponents will undoubtedly hold him responsible for the defeat."

Before the show trial begins, however, Rafsanjani is bound to act, because for him and his supporters, time is running out. The recent execution of Iranian officers opposed to Rafsanjani is perhaps the beginning of Rafsanjani's life or death struggle.

Bahram Alavi is the pseudonym of an Iranian-born political scientist teaching at a US university. It is against Washington Report on Middle East Affairs policy to publish articles or letters without the correct name of the author. However, the editors have made an exception to the policy in order to protect the author's relatives in Iran. His articles will be available as an American Educational Trust White Paper later this year.