US Must Work with USSR and Arab League

By James Zogby

With the settling of the smoke and dust in Lebanon comes the tragic realization that the savage warfare of the past two months was for nought. General Aoun's fit of fancy and Syria's fit of fury have only served to produce more dead, more wounded, and more damage to Lebanon and the spirit of its people. Apologists on all sides are wrong. This was no war of liberation. It was just another bloody chapter in Lebanon's long war with itself.

The simple fact is that there can be no military solution to Lebanon's political problems. There is no short cut to ending the 15-year war in Lebanon. Those on all sides who have chosen killing as a way of saving Lebanon are, in fact, killing Lebanon.

Peel away the many layers that have accumulated since the conflict began and it remains, at its core, one arising from the political and economic inequities of an outmoded system of governance that gave preference to elites of both Christian and Muslim sects. As the injustices of this system intensified, the disenfranchised rebelled. Those with power fought to maintain their hegemony, and this led ultimately to a breakdown in national cohesion. While the initial rounds of fighting had an ideological and political overlay, increasingly sectarian loyalties came to dominate.

As each group sought to buttress its position by appealing to outside forces, the conflict became increasingly internationalized, as evidenced by the involvement of Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, Iraq, Iran, and at times and to differing degrees, the US and France—each picking a side. As a result, Lebanon's unity is fractured and, in some areas, there is de facto cantonization by sect.

At bottom, the military and political conflict requires a resolution of the fundamental issues of class and sect arising from the anden regime: internal political reform aimed at creating national integration through a more democratic, more representative government that can restore to the Lebanese a sense of national unity and purpose. Any effort to short circuit this fundamental restructuring of Lebanon is doomed to failure. Those who have tried to resolve the war in Lebanon short of such a restructuring have found themselves mired in the conflict: Syria since 1976, Israel since 1978, and the US in 1982.

Currently there is great pressure for the US to be involved again in Lebanon. This has been tried before, but because US involvement was unilateral and one sided, the results were tragedy and failure. Appearing to support Israel's goals in Lebanon and becoming a combatant on behalf of a narrowly based and unrepresentative government resulted in the tragic death of our Marines and the failed diplomacy of Secretary of State George Shultz's initiative.

Based on this past involvement, some advise continued US disengagement. History counsels otherwise. With the exception of the brief period noted, this has been the approach of both the US and the Soviet Union for most of the past 15 years. This approach has reduced Lebanon to little more than the Cambodia of the Middle East.

In the political vacuum thus created in Lebanon, terror has run rampant. Nine Americans and thousands of Lebanese are held in degrading captivity. Lebanon has become a vacant lot in which regional conflicts of all kinds are battled out by surrogate groups. Drug smuggling has increased and Lebanon's people have been dismembered, disfigured, and dispersed. Each new round of sectarian fighting creates new wounds, deepens divisions, and makes restoring Lebanon's unity more difficult to achieve.

No, the US must become engaged—but engaged in a comprehensive process to find a long-term solution to Lebanon's conflict. Such a US engagement policy in Lebanon should include four elements:

1) US-USSR cooperation. Any long-term solution requires cooperation among the US, the Soviet Union, and the Arab League. As major actors, they can work together to exert leverage on Lebanon's competing forces. The US and USSR must first help to support the recently negotiated Arab League cease fire, and then to bring about a pullback of all foreign forces and a drastic reduction in the arming of competing groups in Lebanon's civil war. When the US and the USSR put their weight behind a local effort (in this instance, the Arab 'League initiative) as they did in southern Africa and the Iran-Iraq war, they can ensure progress toward peace.

Any long-term solution requires cooperation amongst the US, the Soviet Union, and the Arab League. As major actors, they can work together to exert leverage on Lebanon's competing forces.

2) Arms embargo. Simply put, warfare in Lebanon cannot continue at its current level of intensity without the complicity of the great powers and/or their allies in providing arms to Lebanon's increasingly murderous militias and armies. Only by strangling the flow of weapons into Lebanon can the militias be cut down to size. This must entail a firm US-USSR commitment to embargo and, if necessary, interdict arms transfers with the cooperation of their respective allies. Asserting firm control over the direct arms flows through Israel, Syria, and by sea, from (for one example) Iraq, into Lebanon is the best way to use the US-Soviet relationship to hasten an end to the conflict.

3) UN peacekeeping role/UN peace conference. The United Nations has a vital role to play in bringing peace to Lebanon. First, there is the need for a reaffirmation of the Security Council's support for Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity The UN must reaffirm its support for implementation of UN resolution 425 (passed after the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon). UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon must be enabled to complete their mission and take positions in the so-called Israeli security zone-a euphemism for Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon. The role of these UN forces should be further expanded to replace the discredited Syrian peacekeeping forces in the north and east of Lebanon.

Also on the UN agenda should be an all-party conference with political reform as its goal. Lebanon's dismemberment is not the result of external interference. Rather, it is the result of the breakdown of the Lebanese system itself.

For a resolution to be possible the militias and partisan armies—through their patrons and supporters—must be reined in so that the people of Lebanon and their political and religious leadership can be freed from the tyranny of the gun to find their way to peaceful reform. And it is the framework of such a solution that will guarantee the integrity, unity, and independence of Lebanon.

4) Humanitarian and reconstruction aid. As an incentive to Lebanon's leadership, an international commitment to massive aid must be forthcoming. While such reconstruction aid is out of the question at this time, there is an immediate need for increased humanitarian aid to the private voluntary relief organizations providing food, shelter, and medical treatment to Lebanese on all sides of the confrontation lines. Lebanon's political problems cannot be resolved overnight, but meanwhile Lebanon's people have needs that must be met.

Such a long-term approach may not appeal to those who seek either a quick fix or punishment of one side or another. Only through such an approach, however, can the fundamental political problems of Lebanon be addressed and resolved. Only through political reform can the Lebanese regain their sense of confidence and their sense of national unity.

What must be restored for Lebanon to be restored is the will of its people to live together as one. It is toward this end that US engagement should be directed. No other end is either America's or Lebanon's advantage.

Dr. James Zogby is president of the Arab American Institute in Washington, DC