Still Seeing Red?

When the present Administration came into office, it brought with it a peculiar theory about the Middle East. The theory was that the countries out there were more concerned about a threat from the Soviet Union than about anything else, and that with a little encouragement from the United States they would be ready to abandon such petty local disputes as the one between the Arabs and Israel, and would gladly work with each other and with the U.S. to confront this greater common danger.

As any college freshman could have discovered for the new officials at the White House and State—if they had thought of sending the freshman on a brief tour of Middle East capitals—their pet theory was resting on a false premise. The fact was that even the moderate Arab governments, rightly or wrongly, believed that the proven danger from a powerful Israel that had already absorbed thousands of square miles of Arab territory was of much more concern to them than was the theoretical and so far unproven threat of an imminent Soviet attack upon their countries. After some exposure to the realities of Arab thinking, the Administration soon dropped its misconceived theory.

Old Theory in New Clothes

Or did it? There is certainly reason to wonder, because during the past few months the theory seems to be popping up again in a somewhat different form. This time, instead of assuming as it did before that the Arabs believe the greatest threat to the region comes from the Soviet Union, the Administration appears to be trying to convince them that this is so. For starters, it is pointing to Israel's withdrawal agreement with Lebanon as evidence that Israel, for its part, is acting like a model peacemaker (see following story). In contrast, Administration spokesmen seem to lose few opportunities to argue that the Soviet Union is carrying out the role of a dangerous troublemaker and is a potential threat to Middle East peace. For example, Secretary of State Shultz, among others, has called the Soviet rearmament of Syria a "destabilizing" move. Defense Secretary Weinberger went much further in hyping up the Soviet connection when he accused the Soviets of "provocative actions" and "obstruction of the Lebanese peace process," and added: "I want to make it very clear to the Soviets and any proxies they may have in Syria that any aggression by them would be met by a retaliatory force that would make the aggression totally unworthwhile...."

At the risk of being accused of being naive about the Soviet system—a system which we do not like, any more than most Israelis or Arabs do—we want to say that we cannot buy either Mr. Shultz's argument or Mr. Weinberger's oratory.

In connection with Mr. Shultz's accusation of Soviet “destabilization," it seems to us perfectly reasonable that the Soviets would want to replenish the losses of Soviet equipment Syria suffered last summer when the Israelis moved into Lebanon uninvited and used their superior U.S.-equipped air force to clobber the Syrians. It also seems reasonable that the Soviets would want to upgrade the quality of the new weapons, so that if the Israelis attack again the chances are reduced that either the Soviet Union or Syria would suffer as great a humiliation as they did the last time. As for the sending of Soviet military technicians this time to make sure the equipment works and is operated properly: the Syrians will have no more advantage than the Israelis have already by being able to use large numbers of highly-skilled, dual-nationality Americans to man and operate the U.S. equipment on which the Israeli armed forces principally depend. But the main flaw in Mr. Shultz's argument, it seems to us, is his apparent assumption that the area would be "stable" if Syria remained perpetually weak while Israel continued to be very strong. A situation like this could only tempt Israel, as has been the case so many times in the past, to keep trying to remake the map of the Middle East on its own terms. If the greater capability that the Soviet equipment gives to Syria can act as a deterrent to a new Israeli adventure, this looks to us like a factor for stability, rather than the reverse.

Making a Settlement Stick

On the other hand, we don't think, as Mr. Weinberger seems to, that Syria's new strength will tempt the Soviets to push Syria into a war with Israel—much less get into one themselves. We have no proof that they do not want to—but does Mr. Weinberger really have evidence that they do? The Soviets would seem to have nothing to gain, any more than the U.S. would, by sparking a war which could lead to a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in that area. Furthermore, for many years the principal thrust of Soviet policy in the region has been to try to have a say in the negotiations for a comprehensive Middle East settlement. For just as many years, the U.S. has been trying to keep them out. Why? The Soviets, like the U.S., support a settlement which would be along the lines called for by United Nations Resolution 242. With both superpowers guaranteeing this kind of settlement, there is a very good chance that it would stick. But with the Soviet Union left on the outside indefinitely while the U.S. tries to establish its pax americana, the Soviets may at some point feel it has no recourse but to sabotage it. Mr. Weinberger's prophecy would then become self-fulfilling.