Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis

By J.M. Abdulghani. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 270 pp. $28.50.

Reviewed by G. Neal Lendenmann

For almost four years Iran and Iraq have been locked in a futile war of attrition that has taken an unbearable toll in human life. With the world's concern focused narrowly on the devastation, however, little attention has been paid to the historical factors that led to the war itself. Most press reports provide little insight into the origins of the war; they merely observe that Iraq invaded its neighbor in September, 1980.

But the Iran-Iraq war is not an isolated event that arose spontaneously. Rather, as Dr. Jasim M. Abdulghani notes, it should be seen as "yet another phase in the continuing historical antagonism" between Iran and Iraq.

Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis provides a timely and well-constructed analysis of the cultural differences and historical events that have divided the two neighbors for centuries. Abdulghani briefly traces the establishment of Shi'ism in the 16th century as Persia's state religion and its role as the nucleus of Persian nationalism. The existence of the holy Shi'a shrines in Iraq, he notes, has served as an inducement to a succession of Persian rulers to try to extend their rule to Iraq. This brought them into constant conflict, first with the Sunni Ottoman Empire and later—after it achieved independence in 1932—with Iraq.

The emphasis of the book lies in the period following the resumption of power in Iraq in 1968 by the Ba'th Party, Which had also governed briefly in 1963. Abdulghani outlines the historical context in which the Ba Party came to power and identifies three major issues dividing Iraq and Iran in the early years of Ba'th rule: The Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute, rivalry over the Gulf, and the Kurdish question and Iran's role in supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.

Inherited Disputes

Iraq inherited a number of boundary disputes with Iran that had previously divided the Persian and Ottoman Empires. The question of sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab river in southern Iraq has proven to be the most intractable. Although boundary agreements have been concluded on several occasions that provided for Ottoman and Iraqi control over the Shatt, each of the treaties in turn has later been renounced by Iran, which demanded that the demarcation be made in mid-channel. The most recent example was Iran's abrogation in 1969 of the 1937 Boundary Treaty. Abdulghani points out that with limited access to the waters of the Gulf, Iraq views her "unrestricted and exclusive sovereignty over the entire waterway as vital for her national security..."

Abdulghani sees the coming to power of the Ba'th party as sharpening the polarization between Persian and Arab nationalism in the Gulf. Rivalry between conservative, monarchical Iran and revolutionary Iraq was fueled in part by what Abdulghani calls a "two-track foreign policy" in Iraq in which normal state-to-state dealings existed simultaneously with policies on the party level that aided revolutionary movements, such as that in Oman.

Iran has long manipulated Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups as a way to weaken the Iraqi government. Abdulghani examines attempts by Iran, the United States, and Israel prior to 1975 to destabilize the Ba'thist government by supporting Kurdish insurgents, and notes the speed with which the Kurdish resistance in Iraq collapsed after that aid was withdrawn. He concludes that by supporting the Kurdish insurgency, these countries helped to "radicalize Iraq's foreign policy orientation and consolidated her links with the Soviet Union." At the same time, however, Iraq manipulated the issue of "Arabistan" in western Iran, where significant Arabic-speaking minorities reside, as a pressure tactic of its own.

War Averted ... For Awhile

Many of these issues were temporarily resolved in 1975, when Iran and Iraq concluded the Algiers Agreement, in which Iraq agreed to make a major concession on the Shatt al-Arab boundary in return for Iran's halting aid to Kurdish rebels. Abdulghani emphasizes that the Algiers Agreement enabled Iran and Iraq to avert full scale war and usher in an era of markedly improved relations until the overthrow of the Shah.

Unfortunately, the ideological orientation of the new Islamic Republic caused Iran to try to export its revolution and to reassert claims to certain Arab territories in the Gulf, and relations between Iraq and Iran deteriorated rapidly. Serious border clashes were taking place regularly between the two countries long before full scale war broke out in 1980.

Abdulghani's very capable examination of contemporary relations between Iraq and Iran is an adaptation of his doctoral thesis at the George Washington University and it retains the highly structured and fully annotated style associated with a scholarly work. High marks must be given for balance and objectivity. It should be noted that the book does not, and was not meant to, trace in detail the evolution of the Iran-Iraq conflict itself. Nor was it designed to examine the Iranian governments of the period in as much depth as that of Iraq. These limitations in scope do not, however, detract from the merits of the work.

G. Neal Lendenmann, who has done research in Baghdad, Iraq, is the managing editor of Middle East Focus.