Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land

By John F. Devlin. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983. 140 pp. $16.50

Reviewed by Talcott W. Seelye

Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land is one in a series of profiles on Middle East countries edited by Bernard Reich and David Long. The book is exceedingly well written and very readable. The author, John Devlin, has done a masterful job of covering succinctly the history, environment, people, culture, and political and economic dynamics of Syria in only 132 pages. He fills a void in Middle East publications by concentrating on the Assad period since 1970, about which little has been written. In so doing, he does not go into great detail but nevertheless touches on all important developments and brings us up to June, 1982.

It is a tribute to the author that although he has not lived in Syria for a long time, he has deftly caught the nuances and paradoxes of Syrian policy today. For example, he has observed correctly (what many people don't know) that despite the authoritarian nature of the regime it has allowed press criticism of the way in which the government's internal policies are carried out, though not criticism of the policies themselves.

The author reminds us that the Baath party was the first political party in the Arab world created for the specific goal of achieving Arab unity and that an important impetus in its development was the discontentment of Alawis dispossessed from the district of Alexandretta when it was taken over by the Turks in 1939.

Advocating Arab Nationalism

The early Baathist commitment to Arab unity flowed from Syria's longstanding advocacy of Arab nationalism. As Mr. Devlin observes, Syrians had been in the vanguard of those in the area who saw themselves as Arabs and the Arab world as an entity. The first Syrians to join the Baathist movement were secondary school students attracted by pan-Arab doctrines. But, he contends, pan-Arabism as a political force in Syria was destroyed by the failure of the UAR experiment.

The Syrian Baathists who took over in 1963 turned inward, focussing on land reform and economic changes in favor of the disadvantaged. As a result, they attracted large numbers from the rural provinces including in particular Alawi tenant farmers. Mr. Devlin takes note of the irony that while the Alawis flocked to the Baath party banner in order to introduce a measure of equality into Syrian society, once they took over they perpetuated inequality by taking for themselves the per quisites of power. It is noteworthy that they achieved this paramount influence despite the small size of their sect.

Mr. Devlin points out correctly that at first President Assad was a popular ruler. He downplayed ideology; he encouraged the return of Syrian emigres; and he involved a growing number of citizens in the political administrative process. His pragmatic approach to Syria's problems was well-received. Also, the secularism of Alawi Baathism appealed to non-fundamentalist Moslems and to many non-Moslems as well. By the late 1970's, however, Assad's popularity had declined. A contributing factor was the monopoly of power achieved by the Alawi military. Despite growing dissatisfaction, the author believes that Assad will remain in power as long as the Alawi military remains loyal to him. There is little current evidence of a shift in this loyalty.

Sunnis and Soviets

No book review appears to be complete without reference to errors. Here goes: The Sunnis are not 90 percent of the population, but rather somewhere between 70-80 percent. Qadhafi did not contribute anywhere near $600 million to Syria after the short-lived Syrian-Libyan unity declaration in September of 1980 (maybe $50 million). Syria's and Libya's policies in the past have been less congruent than the author suggests (e.g., Assad firmly resisted Qadhafi's efforts to get Syria to join South Yemen and Ethiopia in a union). However, Assad's sudden meeting with Qadhafi at the end of May suggests that their mutual unhappiness with the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement may now draw them closer together. The 1981 Soviet-Syrian Friendship Treaty was essentially a paper transaction and did not reflect a "striking" tightening of the Soviet-Syrian relationship. Nevertheless, with the recent introduction to Syria of Sovietmanned SA-5 missiles the relationship has "tightened."

Finally, with regard to omissions, there is no mention of Ali Haidar's Special Forces which, like Rifat Al-Assad's Defense Companies, serve both as palace guard and as security shock troops. On the economic front, mention should be made of the fact that Syria's most ambitious engineering project, the Euphrates Dam, has had its problems. While the dam has generated needed electrical power, it has not succeeded as yet in opening up new areas for irrigation.

This book, nevertheless, is absolutely first-rate and is indispensable to those who wish to be well informed about and to understand contemporary Syria. It is to be hoped that in the future John Devlin will follow up with a more detailed and definitive treatment of the Assad era alone.

Talcott Seelye is a former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Tunisia and is currently a private consultant.