Lebanon’s Political Clouds Were Lifting Prior to Israeli Onslaught

by Carole Dagher

Prior to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ bloody April land, sea and air assault on both the Lebanese people and infrastructure, it seemed that Lebanon would be largely unaffected by his peculiar brand of electioneering. Beirut had toed the Syrian line and boycotted the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. The Lebanese government justified its position by distinguishing between terrorism and legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation, a claim that paralleled that of the Hezbollah movement.

However, Lebanese authorities showed an especial lack of foresight on the same day as the Sharm el-Sheikh conference when a court released two men involved in the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, U.S. Embassy economic counselor Robert Waring, and their Lebanese driver, Mohammad Moghrabi, on the grounds that the crime was covered by a general amnesty for crimes committed during Lebanon’s civil war. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut responded with a harshly worded communiquþ suggesting that the release was a not-so-subtle response to Sharm el-Sheikh. Because the episode was likely to encourage the U.S. to continue to refuse lifting its ban on travel by Americans to Lebanon, many Lebanese observers wondered aloud if the Lebanese government could afford to continue paying for the messages it sends to the U.S. on Syria’s behalf.

Meanwhile, tension rose in southern Lebanon after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, with an increase in Hezbollah attacks against Israel’s troops and its SLA militia in the Israeli-occupied zone. Sheikh Nasrallah, head of the Hezbollah, stressed, during a press tour he organized to watch live attacks against Israeli positions in southern Lebanon, that henceforth his organization would build its strategy around its suicide volunteers. This, he said, would require Israel to adopt more sophisticated measures to protect its occupation forces. He also threatened retaliation against civilians in northern Galilee in Israel if the Israeli army violated the July 1993 tacit agreement negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and according to which Hezbollah would launch no Katyusha missiles against northern Israel so long as Israel refrained from targeting civilians in southern Lebanon.

When two civilians in a southern Lebanese village were killed by Israeli shells in late March, Hezbollah retaliated almost immediately by launching more than 20 Katyusha rockets on northern Galilee, thus obliging the Israeli inhabitants to take refuge in their shelters.

At first, Prime Minister Shimon Peres seemed anxious to avoid further military escalation. He urged the U.S. to intercede with the Syrians to prevent further Hezbollah assaults against northern Israel. But many Israeli officials, including President Weizmann, called for a military operation against Hezbollah terrorists right after the Jewish Passover holiday.

Tension rose in southern Lebanon after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.

This is what happened on the morning of April 11, when Israeli aircraft heavily rocketed, not only Lebanese villages in the South, but also major Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa Valley town of Baalbeck as well as in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

The Israeli vice-minister of foreign affairs, Ori Orr, expressed a new and worrisome objective in Israeli policy when he accused the Hariri government of protecting and encouraging Hezbollah actions, and stated that there would be, from now on, no reconstruction in Lebanon if the military operations of Hezbollah were not stopped and the movement’s military arm were not disarmed by the Lebanese army.

A few hours after this statement, the European bank Paribas, which was to launch a $100 million Euro-bond loan to the Lebanese government, announced that the financial operation was delayed. Fears are growing in Beirut that an economic recession would worsen the already shaky social situation, while the real power of decision regarding Hezbollah military actions remained in Syrian hands.

President Chirac’s Visit Gives Lebanon New International Impetus

Only days before the Israeli operation, Lebanese spirits had been raised by three international events: First was the report of the Catholic Synod on Lebanon that was held in late November and ended on Dec. 14 at the Vatican, under the auspices of Pope John-Paul II. (See full report on facing page.) In a specific reference to Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, the Synod report called for a departure of both Israeli and Syrian forces from the country, and warned against any regional peace agreement reached at Lebanon’s expense.

This same position was reasserted by French President Jacques Chirac during his April 4-6 visit to Lebanon. His was the first visit by a Western head of state since the end of the war in Lebanon and the first ever of a French president since Lebanon proclaimed its independence in 1943, after 24 years of French mandate.

Chirac arrived after a March 26-27 visit by former U.S. President George Bush, who attended a dinner held in his honor at the Ba’bda presidential palace. Mr. Bush, who arrived from Damascus at the end of a 10-country tour marking the fifth anniversary of the end of the Gulf war, said he hoped once again to see a Lebanon “whole and free.”

The Bush visit was a significant morale booster for the Lebanese government, but it was the French president’s visit, enhanced by a series of commercial and cultural agreements worth 500 million francs ($100 million), that gave back to Lebanon some international stature.

In a memorable address to the Lebanese parliament, transmitted live on all TV channels, President Chirac restated France’s support for Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty, called for real national reconciliation and broader political participation, and urged Christian communities who boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections to participate in the next elections scheduled in the fall of 1996. At the same time, Chirac stressed that the Lebanese government bears the responsibility of ensuring free and fair elections, not tainted with fraud, through a just electoral law that would guarantee equal opportunities to all.

The French president reiterated his offer of active French involvement in security guarantees on the Lebanese-Israeli border after an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, “if both parties agree.” President Chirac, who had sent envoys to Damascus and Tel-Aviv in advance of his visit to Beirut, reaffirmed the necessity for Lebanese armed forces to secure peace and order and extend national sovereignty to all Lebanese territory. The implication was Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, according to United Nations Resolution 425, and also a Syrian pullout from Lebanon. Chirac stressed France’s determination to oppose any regional deal or peace agreement that would be at the expense of Lebanon. “France will be by your side at every step of the peace process,” he said, “to ensure that Lebanon won’t pay the price of any peace agreement.”

The French president’s visit won unanimous approval of all Lebanese factions, including those opposed to the social policy of the Hariri Cabinet. Meant to be a “message of hope in the future,” the French visit boosted the confidence of the Lebanese people in the future of Lebanon as “a centerpiece of any future political, cultural and economic order in the Middle East.” But even before the Israeli attack, as the effects of Chirac’s visit faded away, Lebanon’s internal problem remained. Three main issues will spark national debates for the coming months: the economic policy of the Hariri government that is viewed by many economists as running Lebanon into debt through Euro-bond loans; controversies about the contents of a new electoral law; and the implementation of a new audio-visual media law that will lead to the closing down of most television and radio stations in favour of a small number of large stations in which the main leaders of the country are major shareholders.